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ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis, my purpose is to determine why Augustine’s theory of 
knowledge by illumination was rejected by Franciscan theologians at the end of the 
thirteenth century. My main methodological assumption is that Medieval accounts of 
divine illumination must be interpreted in a theological context, or with attention to a 
scholar’s underlying doctrines of God and of the human mind as the image of God, 
inasmuch as the latter doctrine determines one’s understanding of the nature of the 
mind’s cognitive work, and illumination illustrates cognition. 
In the first chapter, I show how Augustine’s understanding of illumination 
derives from his Trinitarian theology.  In the second chapter, I use the same 
theological methods of inquiry to identify continuity of thought on illumination in 
Augustine and Anselm.  The third chapter covers the events of the twelfth and early 
thirteenth centuries that had an impact on the interpretation of illumination, including 
the Greek and Arabic translation movements and the founding of universities and 
mendicant orders.  In this chapter, I explain how the first Franciscan scholars 
transformed St. Francis of Assisi’s spiritual ideals into a theological and 
philosophical system, appropriating the Trinitarian theology of Richard of St. Victor 
and the philosophy of the Arab scholar Avicenna in the process.   
Bonaventure is typically hailed the great synthesizer of early Franciscan 
thought and the last and best proponent of traditional Medieval Augustinian thought.  
In the fourth chapter, I demonstrate that Bonaventure’s Victorine doctrine of the 
Trinity both enabled and motivated him to assign originally Avicennian meanings to 
philosophical arguments of Augustine and Anselm that were incompatible with the 
original ones.  In the name of Augustine, in other words, Bonaventure introduced a 
theory of knowledge that is not Augustinian.  In the fifth chapter, my aim is to throw 
the non-Augustinian character of Bonaventure’s illumination theory into sharper 
relief through a discussion of knowledge and illumination in the thought of his 
Dominican contemporary Thomas Aquinas.  Although Aquinas is usually supposed 
to reject illumination theory, I show that he only objects to the Franciscan 
interpretation of the account, even while he bolsters a genuinely Augustinian account 
of knowledge and illumination by updating it in the Aristotelian forms of 
philosophical argumentation that were current at the time. 
In the final chapter, I explain why late thirteenth-century Franciscans 
challenged illumination theory, even after Bonaventure had enthusiastically 
championed it.  In this context, I explain that that they did not reject their 
predecessor’s standard of knowledge outright, but only sought to eradicate the 
intellectually offensive interference of illumination, as he had defined it, which they 
perceived as inconsistent with the standard, in the interest of promulgating it.   
In concluding, I reiterate the importance of interpreting illumination as a 
function of Trinitarian theology.  This approach throws the function of illumination 
in Augustine’s thought into relief and facilitates the effort to identify continuity and 
discontinuity amongst Augustine and his Medieval readers, which in turn makes it 
possible to identify the reasons for the late Medieval decline of divine illumination 
theory and the rise of an altogether unprecedented epistemological standard.  
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Realities…must be learned and sought out not 
from names, but rather through themselves. 
-Plato, Cratylus 439B 
 
 
Realities signified are to be valued more highly than their signs. 
-Augustine, De magistro 9.25  
 
 
It would be unreasonable and silly to look at words rather than  
at the power of the meanings.  Anyone seeking to understand divine  
things should never do this, for this is the procedure followed  
by those who…do not wish to know what a particular phrase means  
or how to convey its sense through equivalent but more efficient phrases. 
-Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 708C 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Throughout his writings, St. Augustine speaks of divine illumination as the 
condition of possibility of all human knowledge.  For most of the Middle Ages, his 
theory remained intelligible and authoritative.  By the end of the thirteenth century, 
however, the account of knowledge by illumination had been abandoned.  Ironically, 
it was pronounced untenable by members of the Franciscan order, who claimed most 
emphatically to work in continuity with Augustine.  
In this thesis, my purpose is to identify why late thirteenth-century 
Franciscans rejected Augustine’s illumination account, especially after predecessors 
as noteworthy as Bonaventure had championed it with great enthusiasm.  While I 
acknowledge that Bonaventure employed Augustine’s traditional forms of words and 
metaphors, especially illumination, I will show that he did so in the effort to 
articulate a decidedly Franciscan definition of the nature of knowledge and to lend 
his views authoritative support.  Although he used Augustine’s terms, he meant 
something different by them.  When Bonaventure’s Franciscan successors eliminated 
illumination, consequently, they did not react against Augustine but Bonaventure.  
Even though they rejected illumination as Bonaventure construed it, late thirteenth-
century Franciscans did not abandon the Seraphic Doctor’s innovative views on 
knowledge.  To the contrary, they eliminated illumination in an attempt to eradicate 
what seemed to undermine the plausibility of the Franciscan definition of knowledge 
itself. 
On my contention, identifying the stark contrast between Augustinian and 
Franciscan thought on divine illumination is the crucial preliminary step to 
determining that a perceived inconsistency is the reason for the late thirteenth-
century Franciscan rejection of illumination.  Operating on the assumption that the 
use of the same terms is indicative of adherence to the same beliefs, past scholars 
have virtually universally conflated Augustinian and Franciscan thought on this 
topic.  Implicitly questioning that assumption, I devote the majority of this thesis to 
differentiating Augustinian from Franciscan thought on divine illumination.   
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In order to understand the theory as it has been formulated in the two distinct 
traditions, I argue that it is not enough to take arguments concerning illumination 
presented by Augustinian and Franciscan thinkers at face value.  Instead, one must 
closely attend from the metaphor that thinkers in both traditions invoke to the 
concept of knowledge the metaphor is used to signify.  In the case of divine 
illumination, I argue that it is essential to attend to the theological assumptions at 
play, because these endow philosophical arguments about knowledge with meaning.  
It is by evaluating the theological presuppositions that underlie a given illumination 
account that one can identify where scholars do and do not work in continuity with 
Augustine as it concerns the theory of knowledge by divine illumination.  In this 
introduction, I explain how I endeavour to interpret illumination theologically in the 
present work.  First, however, I review some of the existing scholarship on divine 
illumination in Augustinian and Franciscan thought.   
Scholarship on Divine Illumination in Augustinian Thought 
According to scholarly consensus, “no other important aspect of Augustine’s 
philosophy is as difficult to understand and to explain as this notion that God in some 
way illumines the mind of man.”1  Because of the many ambiguities surrounding 
illumination theory, scholars have yet to agree on the function Augustine assigns it in 
cognition.  Some argue that Augustine never intended to present a coherent and 
comprehensive account of cognition.  He simply assumed his meaning would be 
intelligible to his readers.2  For this reason, they say that he made no effort to 
compile his whole doctrine of knowledge in any specific work, but remained content 
to scatter his remarks about the divine light all throughout his writings.3   
Those that assume Augustine to be such an unsystematic thinker proclaim it 
pointless to strive to decipher the meaning of illumination.4  Others insist there is an 
account to be found in the pages of his works and labour to uncover it.  In the section 
                                                
1 Ronald Nash, The Light of the Mind: St. Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge (Lexington: University 
Press of Kentucky, 2003), 92; see also Gareth B. Matthews, “Knowledge and Illumination,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 180. 
2 R. Allers, “St. Augustine’s Doctrine on Illumination,” Franciscan Studies 12 (1952): 27-46. 
3 C.E. Scheutzinger, The German Controversy on Saint Augustine’s Illumination Theory (New York: 
Pageant Press, 1960), 11, ff. 
4 Ibid., 34.  
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that immediately follows, I quote a number of key passages on illumination from 
Augustine’s writings.  Passages that eventually became standard citations in 
scholastic disputation are indicated with an (*).   
In these passages, Augustine suggests that the function of illumination in 
cognition is four-fold.  It sustains the process of cognition and serves as the source of 
the content of cognition, cognitive certitude, and the cognitive capacity itself.  By 
playing these parts in ‘ordinary’ cognition, illumination is also said to communicate 
knowledge of God, although interpreters rarely make it clear how this happens.5 
After this brief review of Augustine’s references to illumination, I outline the 
major interpretations of the account that have been the focus of discussion in the late 
Medieval and modern periods.6  In the context of explaining the most well known 
interpretations of illumination, I mention the problems typically associated with each 
one of them, the very problems I will have to resolve in presenting an interpretation 
of illumination.  
AUGUSTINE ON ILLUMINATION 
Cognitive Process 
*  The earth is visible and light is visible but the earth cannot be seen unless it 
is brightened by light.  So, likewise for those things, which…everyone 
understands and acknowledges…to be most true, one must believe they 
cannot be understood unless they are illumined by something else as by their 
own sun.  Therefore just as in the sun one may remark three certain things, 
namely that it is that it shines and that it illumines, so also in that most hidden 
God whom you wish to know there are three things, namely, that He is, that 
He is known, and that He makes other things to be known.7 
 
                                                
5 Gareth B. Matthews, “Knowledge and Illumination,” 183. 
6 For a more complete account the various illumination theories earlier Medieval thinkers espoused, 
see my article, “Divine Illumination,” in The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming in 2011).   
7 Augustine, Soliloquia, trans. Thomas F. Gilligan (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 2008), 1.8.15.  See also the Latin-English edition of Augustine’s Soliloquies and 
Immortality of the Soul, ed. Gerard Watson (Warminster, Aris and Phillips, 1990): Nam et terra 
visibilis et lux; sed terra nisi luce inlustrata videri non potest.  Ergo et illa, quae in disciplines 
traduntur, quae quisquis intellegit verissima esse nulla dubitatione concedit, credendum est ea non 
posse intellegi, nisi ab alio quasi suo sole inlustrentur. 
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*  He who teaches us, namely, Christ…is the Wisdom which every rational 
soul does indeed consult…If the soul is sometimes mistaken, this does not 
come about because of any defect on the part of the truth it consulted just as it 
is not through any defect in the light outside us that our bodily eyes are often 
deceived.8 
 
The nature of the intellectual mind is so formed as to see those things, which 
according to the disposition of the Creator are subjoined to intelligible things 
in the natural order, in a sort of incorporeal light of its own kind, as the eye of 
the flesh sees the things that lie about it in this corporeal light, of which light 
it is made to be receptive and to which it is adapted.9 
  
You have seen many true things and you distinguished them by that light 
which shone upon you when you saw them; raise your eyes to that light itself 
and fix them upon it, if you can…It is impossible, however, to fix your gaze 
upon this, so as to behold it clearly and distinctly…Yet this very light reveals 
to you those…things that are likewise certain.10  
Cognitive Content 
 *  If both of us see that what you say is true and that what I say is true then 
where I ask do we see this?  I do not see it in you, nor you in me, but both of 
us see it in the immutable truth which is higher than our minds…the light 
from the Lord our God.11 
 
                                                
8 Idem., De magistro, 11.38, trans. Robert P. Russell in The Fathers of the Church, vol. 59. 
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004). CCL 29, 196: Ille autem, qui 
consulitur, docet, qui in interiore homine habitare dictus est Christus, id est incommutabilis dei virtus 
atque sempiterna sapientia, quam quidem omnis rationalis anima consulit, sed tantum cuique 
panditur, quantum capere propter propriam siue malam siue bonam voluntatem potest.  Et se quando 
fallitur, non fit vitio consulate veritatis, ut neque huius quae foris est, lucis vitium est, quod corporei 
oculi saepe falluntur, quam lucem de rebus visibilibus consuli fatemur, u teas nobis, quantum cernere 
valemus, ostendat. 
9 Idem., De Trinitate 12.15.24, trans. Stephen McKenna (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University 
of America Press, 2002). CCL 50, 378: Sed potius credendum est mentis intellectualis ita conditam 
esse naturam ut rebus intellegibilibus naturali ordine disponente conditore subjuncta sic esta videat 
in quadam luce sui generis incorporeal quemadmodum oculus carnis videt quae in hac corporea luce 
circumadiacent, cuius lucis capax eique congruens est creatus. 
10 Ibid., 15.27.50 (CCL 50, 532-3): Nempe ergo multa vera vidisti eauque discreuisti ab illa luce qua 
tibi lucente vidisti.  Attolle oculos in ipsam lucem et eos in ea fige si potes...Sed ad hoc dilucide 
perspicueque cernendum non potes ibi aciem figere…sed illa luxquae non est quod tu et hoc tibi 
ostendit aliud esse illas incorporeas simultudines corporum et aliud esse verum quod eis reprobates 
intellegentia contuemur.  Haec et alia similiter certa oculis tuis interioribus lux illa monstrauit. 
11 Idem., Confessiones 12.25.35, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).  
CCL 27, 235: Si ambo videmus verum esse quod dicis et ambo videmus verum esse quod dico, ubi, 
quaeso, id videmus?  Nec ego utique in te nec tu in me, sed ambo ipsa quae supra mentes nostras est 
incommutabili veritate.  Cum ergo de ipsa domini dei nostri luce non contendamus. 
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 The things which we behold with the mind…we directly perceive as present 
in that inner light of truth…if one sees what is true…one is being taught…by 
the realities themselves made manifest by the enlightening action of God 
from within.12 
 
*  We contemplate the inviolable truth…in the light of the eternal types.13 
  
 The ideas (forms/formae, species/species, reasons/rationes) are certain 
original and principle forms of things, i.e. reasons, fixed and 
unchangeable…eternal and existing always in the same state, contained in the 
Divine Intelligence.  Though they themselves neither come into being nor 
pass away, nevertheless everything which can come into being and pass 
away…is formed in accord with these ideas….it is by participation in these 
that whatever is exists in whatever manner it does exist…the rational 
soul…can contemplate these ideas…by a certain inner and intelligible 
countenance, indeed an eye of its own….in the measure that [the rational 
soul] has clung to God…[it is] imbued in some way and illumined by Him 
with light, intelligible light…and discerns…those reasons…called ideas, or 
forms, or species.14 
                                                
12 Idem., mag. 12.40 (CCL 29, 197-8): Cum vero de his agitur, auae mente conspicimus, id est 
intellectu atque ratione, ea quidem loquimur, quae praesentia contuemur in illa interiore luce 
veritatis, qua ipse…Ergo ne hunc quidem doceo vera dicens vera intuentem; docetur enim non verbis 
meis, sed ipsis rebus deo intus pandente manifestis.   
13 Idem., trin. 9.6.9 (CCL 50, 301): sed intuemur inviolabilem veritatem ex qua perfecte quantum 
possumus definiamus non quails sit uniuscuiusque hominis mens, sed quails esse sempiternis 
rationibus debeat. 
14 Idem., De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus 46, trans. David L. Mosher (Washington, D.C.: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 1982).  CCL 44A, 70-3: ideas…vel formas vel species 
dicere, ut erbum e verbo transferre videamur.  Sunt namque ideae principales quaedam formae vel 
rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae ipsaw formatae non sunt ac per hoc aeternae ac 
semper eodem modo sese habentes, quae divina intellegentia continentur.  Et cum ipsae neque 
oriantur neque intereant, secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest et 
omne quod oritur et interit.  Anima vero negatur eas intueri posse nisi rationalis, ea sui parte qua 
excellit, id est ipsa mente atque ratione, quasi quadam facie vel oculo suo interiore atque 
intellegibili…Sed anima rationalis inter eas res, quae sunt a deo conditae omnia superat et deo 
proxima est, quando pura est; eique in quantum caritate cohaeserit, in tantum ab eo lumine illo 
intellegibili perfusa quodammodo et inlustrata cernit non per corporeos oculos, sed per ipsius sui 
principale quo excellit, id est per intellegentiam suam, istas rationes, quarum visione fit beatissima.  
Quas rationes, ut dictum est, sive ideas sive formas sive species sive rationes licet vocare, et mulits 
conceditur appelare quod libet, sed paucissimis videre quod verum est.   
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Cognitive Certitude 
That light revealed to our interior eyes these and other things that are likewise 
certain.15 
Cognitive Capacity 
 He himself finds this true “in the truth itself, the light of the mind.16 
 
 “There is a mind capable of the intellectual light, by which we distinguish 
between right and wrong.17 
Knowledge of God 
The Light by which the soul is illumined in order that it may see and truly 
understand everything…is God Himself…when it tries to behold the Light, it 
trembles in its weakness and finds itself unable to do so…When it is carried 
off and after being withdrawn from the senses of the body is made present to 
this vision in a more perfect manner, it also sees above itself that Light, in 
whose illumination it is enabled to see all the objects that it sees and 
understands in itself.18 
INTERPRETATIONS OF ILLUMINATION 
The approaches to interpreting Augustine’s illumination theory that late 
Medieval and modern thinkers have taken can be classified into two main 
categories.19  There are interpretations of illumination that define it in one way or 
another as an extrinsic force, including ontologism and innatism, and the three 
closely related interpretations: Franciscanism, idealism, and formalism.  In the 
                                                
15 Idem., trin. 15.27.50 (CCL 50A, 533): Haec et alia similiter certa oculis tuis interioribus lux illa 
monstrauit. 
16 Ibid., 14.7.9 (CCL 50A, 434): sed quas versa esse etiam ipse invenit sive apud se sive ipsa mentis 
duce veritate. 
17 Idem., De civitate Dei 12.3, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin, 2003).  CCL 48, 358: De 
vitiis quipped nunc loquimur eius naturae, cui mens inest capax intellegibilis lucis, qua discernitur 
justum ab injusto.   
18 Idem., De Genesi ad litteram 12.31.59, ed. P. Agaesse and A. Solignac in Oeuvres de St. Augustin, 
vols 48-9: Nam illud iam ipse Deus est, haec autem creatura, quamuis rationalis et intellectualis ad 
eius imaginem facta, quae cum conatur lumen illud intueri palpitat infirmitate et minus valet.  Inde est 
tamen quidquid intellegit sicut valet.  Cum ergo illuc rapitur et a carnalibus subtracta sensibus illi 
expressius visioni praesentatur non spatiis localibus, sed modo quodam suo, etiam supra se videt illud 
quo adiuta videt quidquid etiam in se intellegendo videt. Translations taken from The Literal Meaning 
of Genesis, 2 vols. trans. John Hammond Taylor (New York: Paulist, 1982).   
19 For more complete surveys of the history of the interpretation of illumination theory, refer to Nash 
and Scheutzinger.  
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second, place, there is the Thomist interpretation of illumination, according to which 
the divine light is an intrinsic one.   
While all the interpretations assume illumination to be the source of the 
intrinsic cognitive capacity, only the Thomist interpretation limits the light to that.  
All the other interpretations affirm that more divine light must be super-added to the 
natural light of reason in order for acts of knowing to be successful.  In the ontologist 
and innatist interpretations, for example, illumination is involved in the cognitive 
process and affords conceptual content and certitude; in the Franciscan and idealist 
interpretations, it enters into the process of cognition and guarantees the truth and 
certitude of ideas; on the formal interpretation, it merely serves as the guarantor of 
certitude.   
By positing this additional, extrinsic illumination, such interpretations tend to 
put human persons in a passive position in their own cognitive acts, at least to some 
extent.  The intrinsic interpretation, by contrast, emphasizes the active nature of the 
knowing agent, who is not passively illumined so much as illumined to illumine 
reality.  Below, I outline the above-mentioned interpretations and the problems 
inherent in them.  
Ontologism 
The seventeenth-century Cartesian philosopher Nicholas Malebranche is the 
most famous proponent of the ontologist interpretation of illumination, although 
earlier Renaissance figures such as Marsilio Ficino also espoused this theory, as did 
nineteenth and twentieth-century scholars like Vicenzo Gioberti, G. Ubaghs, and 
Johannes Hessen.20  Malebranche operated on the dualist assumption that the body 
and the mind do not interact.  On the basis of this assumption, he contended that the 
only way to know the world is to see it ‘in God’.  For Malebranche, in other words, 
the divine light immediately imparts the content of knowledge, whether sensible or 
intellectual, by allowing the intellect to see things as they subsist in the mind of God.  
                                                
20 See Ronald Nash, The Light of the Mind, 102, ff. and C.E. Scheutzinger, Augustine’s Illumination 
Theory, 30, ff. 
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Divine illumination thus performs the intellect’s cognitive work on its behalf and 
gives it certitude with respect to its ideas, which are divinely given.   
The most obvious problem with the ontologist interpretation is that it seems 
to provide premature recourse to the thoughts or even the vision of God.  It also 
appears to bypass the empirical sources of human knowledge and natural cognitive 
processes, and thus undermines the faculties of sensation and imagination, 
precluding an account of the way knowledge is acquired through abstractive or 
discursive reasoning.  Because all the mind has is fully and directly afforded by God, 
the ideas the mind entertains and its certitude about them do not really seem to be 
based on a person’s own experiences and efforts to understand reality.21  On the 
ontologist interpretation, the mind’s role in its own act of knowing is virtually 
eliminated.   
Innatism 
 The interpretation of Augustinian illumination most commonly assumed by 
contemporary scholars is an innatist one, such as the one John Rist espouses.22  Rist 
and many others seem to believe Augustine formulated his illumination theory for 
two main reasons.  The first reason was to rebut the claims of the global academic 
sceptics who were influential in Augustine’s day.23  On Rist’s account, Augustine 
accepted the Platonic distinction between sensible and intelligible realities.  He 
granted to the sceptics that,  “everything which the bodily sense touches and which is 
called sensible is constantly changing…that what does not remain stable cannot be 
                                                
21 Ronald Nash, The Light of the Mind, 104. 
22 See John Rist, Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994); see also Richard Ackworth, “Two Studies in Augustine’s Thought: God and Human 
Knowledge,” The Downside Review 75 (1957): 207-14; Vernon J. Bourke, “Light of Love: Augustine 
on Moral Illumination,” Mediaevalia 4 (1978): 13-31; Brian Hardin, "Skepticism, Illumination and 
Christianity in Augustine's Contra Academicos," Augustinian Studies 34:2 (2003): 197-212; Peter 
King, “Augustine on the Impossibility of Teaching,” Metaphilosophy 29 (1998): 179-95; Robert E. 
Lauder, "Augustine: Illumination, Mysticism, and Person," in Augustine: Mystic and Mystagogue 
(New York: Peter Lang, 1994); Louis H. Mackey, "The Mediator Mediated: Faith and Reason in 
Augustine's De magistro," Franciscan Studies 42 (1982): 135-65; Gareth B. Matthews, “Knowledge 
and Illumination,” 171-85; Michael Mendelson, “By the Things Themselves: Eudaimonism, Direct 
Acquaintance, and Illumination in Augustine’s De magistro,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 
39:4 (2001): 467-89; Joseph Owens, “Faith, Ideas, Illumination, and Experience,” in The Cambridge 
History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 440-59; 
Eugene TeSelle, Augustine the Theologian (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2002), 103-7. 
23 John Rist, Augustine, 42, ff. 
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perceived…[and] therefore that truth in any genuine sense is not something to be 
expected from the bodily senses.”24  In order to annihilate the threat of scepticism 
that accompanies the belief that perceptual experience cannot afford true and certain 
knowledge, Rist holds, Augustine had to prove that the mind has access to eternal 
and unchanging intelligible truths, which is what he does when he develops his 
doctrine of divine illumination in the early dialogue De magistro.   
 The second, related reason for formulating an illumination account, which 
becomes clear in De magistro, is to affirm the possibility of teaching and learning.  
Owing to the transience of sense knowledge and the total depravity of the fallen 
mind, Rist’s Augustine concludes that human beings have no recourse to truth.25  If 
they are to teach and learn anything, consequently, they must already innately know 
what they teach or learn.  Moreover, they must know truth in a direct or immediate 
sense, as Plato supposedly taught, if knowledge is to be absolutely certain.26 
 Although Augustine rejected in De magistro the Platonic notion that 
acquiring knowledge simply entails recollecting ideas perceived before birth, Rist 
contends that he continued to affirm that the mind is equipped with the innate 
knowledge of certain immaterial principles (rationes) or impressed ideas not unlike 
Plato’s Forms, which ultimately subsist in the mind of God.  Although the ideas “are 
no longer retained memories of a previous life, they are in some sense constitutive of 
the human soul.”27  Rist admits that it is difficult to determine just how many of these 
innate ideas Augustine counts as residing in the mind.  Still, he insists that they are, 
for Augustine, the rules of judgment that cannot be judged and that enable the 
intellect to make judgments as instantiated reasons are compared with intelligible 
ones.28   
 According to Rist, the a priori rules are not only given through divine 
illumination, but illumination is also required for the use of the rules in teaching and 
                                                
24 Augustine, div. qu. 9 (CCL 44A, 16-17): Omne quod corporeus sensus adtingit, quod et sensibile 
dicitur, sine ulla intermissione temporis commutatur…Quod autem non manet percipi non potest; 
illud enim percipitur quod scientia conprehenditur; conprehendi autem non potest quod sine 
intermissione mutatur.  Non est igitur exspectanda sinceritas veritatis a sensibus corporis. 
25 John Rist, Augustine, 29. 
26 Ibid., 30, 74. 
27 Ibid., 31. 
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learning.29  In both cases, it is Christ who illumines.  He initially impresses the divine 
ideas on the human intellect, and He mysteriously, interiorly, enables the intellect to 
teach and learn by means of the rules, and thus illumines in an ongoing sense.30  The 
light that makes things knowable to the mind is not the mind itself, consequently, but 
God, or His Forms, as it was for Plato.  
 Although the rules are accessible to all, it is only those who put faith in 
Christ and open themselves up to His influence by shunning the distractions that 
come through the senses that become aware that it is His ideas that are impressed in 
the soul and constitute the human power of knowing.  This awareness is what makes 
the knowing agent certain about the things outside the self, the self itself, and God.31   
 By positing the role of innate rules of judgment received through 
illumination, the use of which is regulated by Christ the illuminator, Augustine saves 
knowledge from scepticism and affirms the possibility of teaching and learning in De 
magistro.  Incidentally, virtually all innatist interpreters of Augustine focus their 
hermeneutic efforts on this dialogue and turn to other texts primarily to supplement 
the inquiry into De magistro.  Augustine avoids scepticism in this work by affirming 
that human minds are wholly dependent upon the extrinsic help of Christ in their 
own acts of knowing.   
While this interpretation of De magistro, according to which ideas of things 
are latent in the human mind and summoned up by Christ, is the most seemingly 
obvious interpretation of the text read at face value, and is therefore widely though 
variously affirmed, it is not without problems.  Many of the problems to which the 
ontologist interpretation is subject apply to the innatist one as well: the innatist 
account seems to bypass normal cognitive processes.  The supernatural appears to 
overtake the natural.  As Ronald Nash has argued, “any account of 
Augustine’s…doctrine of illumination must deal satisfactorily with three paradoxes 
in his thought,”32 namely, that Augustine describes the intellect as both active and 
passive; that he speaks of the Forms the mind knows as in the mind and outside the 
                                                                                                                                     
28 Ibid., 50, 76. 
29 Ibid., 32, 77. 
30 Ibid., 37, 78. 
31 Ibid., 66. 
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mind, or in the mind of God; and thirdly, that he describes the human mind as the 
light that does and does not make knowledge possible.  With so much help coming 
from Christ, however, it becomes difficult for the innatist interpreter to resolve these 
paradoxes in a satisfactory way, that is, to give an account of the sense in which the 
human mind is just as much responsible for its own knowing processes, for the 
attainment of cognitive content and cognitive certitude as God is.  
Franciscanism, Idealism, & Formalism 
 The classic Franciscan interpretation of illumination formulated by 
Bonaventure and his colleagues, which I will explain at length in the fourth chapter 
of this work, holds that illumination is the source of a priori or ‘transcendental’ 
concepts, which are impressed on the ‘active intellect’.  On this account, the reasons 
are not the objects of knowledge as in the two foregoing interpretations.  Rather, they 
supervise the intellect’s efforts to organize empirical data and form ideas about 
reality.  They ensure that the ideas formed directly correspond to the ideas in the 
mind of God and therefore certify them.  Some early thirteenth-century Franciscans 
like William of Auvergne, Roger Bacon, and Roger Marston affirmed with the Arab 
scholar Avicenna that the active intellect is actually God Himself: that it is the divine 
rather than the human mind that oversees human knowing.  E. Portalie has more 
recently espoused this interpretation of illumination.33 
The idealist interpretation of illumination Bruce Bubacz has advanced bears 
striking resemblance to the Franciscan interpretation.34  For Bubacz, illumination is 
the source of a priori concepts, which he calls ‘principal ideas’.  One gains access to 
these ideas when one attends to the ‘inner man’, where the ideas are stored.  The fact 
that the principal ideas are innate does not undermine the empirical sources of human 
knowledge, Bubacz insists.  On what he calls his ‘cartographic model’, the principal 
ideas only provide a blueprint or map for comprehending the ‘terrain’ of created 
reality and for classifying the objects encountered there.  In sum, the principal ideas 
                                                                                                                                     
32 Ronald Nash, The Light of the Mind, 104. 
33 E. Portalie’s article on Augustine has been reprinted in A Guide to the Thought of St. Augustine, 
trans. Ralph Bastian (Chicago: Regnery, 1960). 
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act as rules of judgment.  In the last chapter of his work, Bubacz likens Augustinian 
illumination understood ‘cartographically’ to idealist epistemologies and thus recasts 
the theory in a non-theistic manner, which he hopes contemporary philosophers will 
find plausible.  
Formalism is the interpretation of Augustinian illumination espoused by 
Etienne Gilson.  According to Gilson, Augustine did not give a fully developed or 
systematic account of knowledge.  Even so, he apparently believed the mind is 
naturally competent to produce its own ideas.  The divine light is the natural light of 
the human intellect.  For this reason, it cannot be said that God “takes the place of the 
intellect when it thinks the truth.”35  Illumination, in short, leaves the integrity of the 
human intellect intact.  
Although Gilson denies that divine ideas are impressed upon the mind to 
produce the content of cognition itself, he does affirm that the innate ideas act as the 
rules by which the mind validates its own ideas.  Illumination, in other words, plays a 
regulative or formal role in cognition, confirming that human judgments are 
absolutely true and certain.  
Although illumination and the a priori concepts it affords do not threaten to 
impose the content of cognition when interpreted in any of the three aforementioned 
ways, it does seem to interfere in some sense with the process of cognition, 
especially when God Himself is defined as the active intellect.  Where the divine 
light guarantees the truth and certitude of the mind’s ideas on behalf of the mind, it 
seemingly reduces the intellect to a state of passivity in its own cognitive activity.36  
This means the truth and certitude of the mind’s knowledge is somewhat artificial, 
and the artificial nature of knowledge may lead to scepticism as regards the 
possibility of attaining true and certain knowledge, which is precisely the terminus 
                                                                                                                                     
34 Bruce Bubacz, Saint Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge: A Contemporary Analysis (New York: 
Edwin Mellin Press, 1981).  See also Bubacz’ “Augustine’s Illumination Theory and Epistemic 
Structuring,” Augustinian Studies 11 (1980): 35-48. 
35 Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine, trans. L.E.M. Lynch (London: Victor 
Gollancz, 1961), 79.  For the full discussion of illumination, see 77-97. 
36 Ronald Nash, The Light of the Mind, 104. 
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illumination is supposed to help the intellect avoid.37  
Thomism 
All of the aforementioned interpretations of illumination envisage its 
influence in one way or another as an extrinsic one.  The divine light is extrinsic 
inasmuch as it super-imposes a priori concepts, which may afford the truth content 
and certitude of cognition or simply regulate acts of cognition in some respect.38  All 
such interpretations emphasize the radical reliance of the human intellect upon 
continuous divine aid in what is supposedly a characteristically Augustinian way.   
In the interpretation of illumination promulgated by Thomas Aquinas, there is 
no place for a priori ideas of things.  The intellectual capacity to engage in 
abstraction, as Aristotle described it, is an innate or intrinsic one, but this is in no 
sense true of the ideas that occupy the mind, which are constructed through 
abstractive reasoning.  For the Thomist, the gift of reason through illumination 
empowers the intellect to independently perform its abstractive operations.  One can 
indirectly accredit God with all those operations performed at the initiative of the 
human person, insofar as He endowed the gift of reason, but one cannot claim that 
God compels or interferes with acts of cognition.   
Modern advocates of a Thomist interpretation of Augustine include Maurice 
De Wulf, Charles Boyer, and F. Cayre.  Although there is no philosophical problem 
inherent in the claim that God gives the intellectual power, and many scholars are 
willing to recognize the genius of this ‘intrinsic’ interpretation of illumination, they 
virtually unanimously deny that it captures what Augustine meant by illumination.39   
Some go so far as to say that Aquinas’ Aristotelian rendering of illumination 
is “contrary to the [Platonic] spirit of Augustine’s philosophy,”40 according to which 
human ideas are extrinsically and aprioristically given to the mind rather than 
                                                
37 Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London: Sheed and Ward, 
1955), 447.  
38 Ronald Nash, The Light of the Mind, 78. 
39 Ibid., 41; see also Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine, 83-6; Robert E. 
Lauder, “Augustine: Illumination, Mysticism, and Person,” 181; and Eugene TeSelle, Augustine the 
Theologian, 105. 
40 Ronald Nash, The Light of the Mind, 100. 
   22
constructed by it on the basis of experience.  Illumination and abstraction are defined 
as mutually exclusive theories of knowledge, and although the Aristotelian 
interpretation of illumination has its virtues, scholars tend to agree that it cannot 
draw support from Augustine, and that Thomas was well aware that he undermined 
Augustine’s intended meaning when he formulated his views on the matter.41  
Despite the fact that the various ‘extrinsic’ interpretations of illumination are 
accompanied by more philosophical problems, they are generally regarded as more 
faithful renderings of Augustine’s original views.    
Scholarship on Divine Illumination in Franciscan Thought 
 There are two book-length studies on the decline of divine illumination 
theory in the thirteenth-century Franciscan school: Patrick James Doyle’s thesis 
titled, The Disintegration of Divine Illumination Theory in the Franciscan School, 
1285-1300: Peter of Trabes, Richard of Middleton, William of Ware (1983) and 
Steven P. Marrone’s two-volume work, The Light of Thy Countenance: Science and 
the Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century (2001).   
  Both Doyle and Marrone begin their studies with a review of the 
historiography of late Medieval philosophy.  In preparing to discuss their researches, 
I will do the same.42  As Doyle and Marrone note, scholarly interest in the later 
Middle Ages was renewed in the late nineteenth century, around the time Pope Leo 
XIII issued the encyclical Aeterni Patris.  In this work, the Holy Father summoned 
Catholic thinkers to inquire anew into scholastic thought and that of Thomas Aquinas 
in particular.  At the time, scholars were relatively unaware of the vast differences in 
perspective amongst scholastic thinkers.  When Leo called intellectuals to study the 
Dominican Aquinas, he did so on the assumption that the latter was the best 
representative of the scholastic intellectual synthesis all thinkers of that era 
advocated.    
                                                
41 Ibid., 96. 
42 In The Historical Constitution of St. Bonaventure’s Philosophy (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Studies, 1973), John Francis Quinn gives a clear and comprehensive survey of Medieval 
studies since the late nineteenth century.  This work should be consulted for a more detailed analysis 
of the scholarly developments mentioned here.   
42 Ibid., 35-6. 
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 The synthesis was an Aristotelian one.  Most late nineteenth-century thinkers 
saw thirteenth-century thought as primarily focused on incorporating the newly 
translated resources of Aristotle.  Since Thomas had accomplished this most 
effectively, he was viewed as the scholastic thinker par excellence.  Bonaventure, 
who had appropriated Aristotle less extensively and rather critically, was not seen as 
the proponent of a system distinct from that of Aquinas but as an incipient Thomist.   
 These assumptions about the monolithic character of high Medieval thought 
are reflected in the work of the acclaimed “founder of modern scholarship on 
Medieval philosophy,”43 Maurice De Wulf.  De Wulf argued that scholastics 
universally accepted a system organized around Aristotelian principles, disagreeing 
only on minor points of detail.44  The first significant challenge to De Wulf’s thesis 
came from Franz Ehrle, who argued for two brands of scholasticism, the Aristotelian 
and the Augustinian, where the Augustinians or ‘neo-Augustinians’ as he called them 
simply were Franciscans.45  Pierre Mandonnet then contended that there were in fact 
three main schools of thought in the thirteenth century: the Aristotelian, the 
Augustinian, and the Latin Averroism of Siger of Brabant.  
Etienne Gilson opened a new chapter in the historiography of Medieval 
philosophy by distinguishing the main Medieval intellectual systems at an 
unprecedented level of precision.  It was he who finally established that Bonaventure 
was not in fact an incipient Thomist but the promulgator of an altogether distinctive 
system, which was in Gilson’s view, the last and fullest expression of the 
Augustinian system.46  Although Gilson believed that both Bonaventure and Aquinas 
were proponents of distinctly ‘Christian’ philosophies, he saw those philosophies as 
assuming decidedly different shapes.   
According to Gilson, Bonaventure formulated his philosophical account on 
the Augustinian assumption that there is no philosophy outside Christian wisdom, 
whereas Aquinas developed his on the basis of the Aristotelian assumption that 
                                                
43 Ibid., 1. 
44 Ibid., 18. See Maurice De Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, 3rd ed., trans. P. Coffey (London: 
Longman, Greens & Co., 1909).  
45 Patrick James Doyle, “The Disintegration of Divine Illumination Theory in the Franciscan School” 
(Ph.D. diss., Marquette University, 1984), 15. 
46 John Francis Quinn, The Historical Constitution of St. Bonaventure’s Philosophy, 23-4. 
   24
reason can work without faith.47  While Bonaventure stressed the radical reliance of 
human reason upon faith, Thomas granted reason some autonomy.  Gilson, a self-
proclaimed Thomist, saw Bonaventure as the conservative proponent of the 
longstanding Augustinian tradition and Aquinas as the inventive appropriator of an 
Aristotelian philosophy that was altogether innovative.48   In his view, the thirteenth 
century was the period during which scholars, including Augustinians, became 
increasingly aware of the inadequacy of the Augustinian system by comparison to 
the new Aristotelian one, until they eventually abandoned it.    
Both Doyle and Marrone take the work of Gilson as the point of departure for 
the inquiry into the decline of divine illumination theory in the thirteenth century.  
Gilson had contended that the acceptance of divine illumination theory in the 
thirteenth century entailed acceptance of a whole complex of supposedly 
Augustinian doctrines.49  Doyle’s project was to determine whether three Franciscan 
thinkers working in the last fifteen years of the thirteenth century—Peter of Trabes, 
Richard of Middleton, and William of Ware—rejected other key doctrines in the 
Augustinian complex when they rejected illumination.   
To do this, Doyle recounts each thinker’s discussion of a number of the 
corollary doctrines prior to analyzing their arguments against illumination.  In the 
end, he finds that the rejection of illumination by all three did not entail the 
abandonment of the other doctrines associated with the Augustinianism of the 
Franciscan school.  In making this discovery, he adds clarity to Gilson’s description 
of the events through which Franciscan thinkers abandoned illumination theory, after 
they had put forth a concerted but failed effort to find in Augustine’s writings a 
theory of cognition comparable to Aristotle’s theory of abstraction.50 
In his two-volume study, Marrone traces the decline of the illumination 
account through ten thirteenth-century Augustinian figures, all of which happen to be 
associated with the Franciscan order.  He bases his study on Gilson’s assumptions 
that Franciscans were Augustinians and that the greatest challenge thirteenth-century 
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thinkers faced was to accommodate Aristotle in their intellectual systems.  More 
strongly than Gilson, Marrone contends that Augustine never intended to provide a 
thorough account of ordinary human knowledge.  Instead, Marrone describes 
Augustine as the expert on the mystical knowledge of God and on the undefined 
processes through which He imparts knowledge of Himself to human beings.  He 
sees the decline of divine illumination theory as one that came about as intellectuals 
moved away from the “symbolic and animist”51 cognitive theory espoused by 
Augustine and earlier Medieval thinkers “towards doctrinal clarity and coherence,”52 
and thus towards the Aristotelian ideal of scientific knowledge, which he affirms laid 
the foundations for the modern achievements of Descartes and others.  For Marrone, 
the rise of that ideal is inversely proportional to the decline of the longstanding 
illumination theory in the Augustinian school.53   
Marrone begins his study early in the thirteenth century with William of 
Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste.  These two Franciscan sympathizers attempted to 
reconcile Aristotle and Augustinian illumination theory.  Subsequently, he discusses 
what he calls the ‘classic’ Augustinian illumination account formulated by 
Bonaventure and his associates, such as John Pecham and Matthew of Acquasparta.  
Conservative Augustinians like Bonaventure, Marrone explains, felt unprepared to 
forfeit the outdated theory of knowledge that bolstered traditional religious practices 
and affirmed the intimacy of the human mind to God, even though they saw that 
Aristotle’s ideal gave an account of the empirical sources of human knowledge and 
natural cognitive processes in a way Augustine utterly failed to do.  For this reason, 
they strove to recast the cherished illumination theory so that it met the new 
Aristotelian standards, which demanded hardcore evidence for the justification of 
beliefs.54  They attempted to do what Augustine himself had failed to do, which was 
to systematize an authentically Augustinian theory of knowledge by illumination.55   
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In the second volume of his study, Marrone shows how figures working later 
in the century, such as Henry of Ghent and Vital du Four, came to the realization that 
Bonaventure’s efforts were futile.  There was no plausible way to systematize 
Augustine’s “scattered thoughts about God’s intervention”56 in human knowledge.  
Henry worked to qualify those thoughts in order to make them tenable, yet William 
of Ware and his student Duns Scotus found his work inadequate and finally 
determined to eliminate illumination from ordinary human knowledge altogether.  
Finally, in Scotus’ thought, the Aristotelian cognitive ideal prevailed. 
In concluding his study, Marrone reminds the reader that Medieval historians 
normally identify a late Medieval school of thought where philosophical doctrines 
are held in common.  The problem with this approach, he contends, is that there is no 
doctrinal continuity within the Augustinian school as scholars usually suppose.  
Within the school, very different opinions about illumination theory, which was the 
hallmark of the school, were entertained.  Consequently, the author insists that the 
existing understanding of late Medieval schools must be replaced with a “non-
doctrinal conception of allegiance.”57  On this concept, members of the same school 
do not adhere to any of the same philosophical principles.  They merely use the same 
metaphors.  According to Marrone, this idea of scholarly allegiance is the only one 
that makes sense of the late Medieval situation, in which the only interest common to 
all was the interest in incorporating Aristotle. 
Divine Illumination in Augustinian and Franciscan Thought 
For all their differences, scholarly interpreters of illumination in Augustine’s 
thought as well as the thirteenth-century decline of the theory mostly have one thing 
in common.  They assume that the effective way to assess issues pertaining to 
illumination is to go directly to arguments about illumination, that is, to take 
philosophical arguments about knowledge at face value, and to take those arguments 
as the point of departure for efforts to interpret illumination.  I do not operate on the 
assumption that this is the best way to grasp the meaning of illumination, because I 
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believe the Medievalist must take seriously the fact that most Medieval philosophers 
were theologians first.   
The assumption on which this whole thesis turns is that the cognitive function 
attributed to divine illumination is always theologically determined.  On the basis of 
this assumption, I also assume that any Medieval thinker’s definition of illumination 
follows logically, albeit through a series of steps, from his concept of the Triune 
nature of God.  To identify what any thinker means when he speaks of illumination, 
consequently, one must first evaluate how the doctrine of the Trinity affects his 
explanation of the created order and above all the human mind as images of God.  In 
the second place, one must identify the way the doctrine of the imago dei delimits the 
nature of the work the intellect qua image performs.   
Implicit in the account of the intellect’s work is an understanding of the 
effects of the fall and redemption on the image as well as the cognitive process 
involved in re-conforming to the image that was lost at the fall; these are the issues 
that must subsequently be assessed.  Since illumination illustrates cognition, which 
is, for the theologian, the cognitive process of conforming to the image of God (faith 
seeking understanding), the discovery as to what that process entails finally throws 
light on the function illumination performs in cognition.   
By interpreting illumination as a function of Trinitarian theology through the 
steps from the theological to the philosophical outlined above, I will determine what 
illumination means to Augustinians by contrast to Franciscans.  I will strive to 
identify what it does and does not mean to be an Augustinian with respect to the 
theory of knowledge by divine illumination.  In this, I seek to dispel the confusion 
that still surrounds Augustine’s doctrine of divine illumination as well as the 
circumstances related to its late thirteenth-century abandonment in the Franciscan 
circle that the tendency to take Medieval philosophical arguments at face value has 
perpetuated. 
Having determined to take this approach, I devote a large percentage of the 
chapters on my principal subjects—Augustine, Anselm, and Bonaventure—to an 
investigation of the theological and philosophical views that underpin these thinkers’ 
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views on illumination.  Only at the end of chapters do I comparatively briefly treat 
illumination itself.   
While my method of interpreting the principal subjects diverges widely from 
the one employed by those that turn immediately to texts on illumination, there are 
concrete reasons for employing it.  The main reason is that the meaning of 
illumination as any Medieval thinker conceives it is best determined by attending to 
the theological factors that lend his philosophical arguments on knowledge their 
significance.  With this approach, one may identify discontinuity amongst accounts 
of knowledge, even ones that are articulated in the same forms of words, as well as 
continuity of thought where divergent methods and sources are utilized, which is 
precisely what I plan to do. 
As regards the secondary subjects I discuss in the last two chapters of the 
thesis, including the Dominican Aquinas and the Franciscans Peter John Olivi, 
Henry of Ghent, and John Duns Scotus, I do admittedly bypass the preliminary 
theological inquiry and directly proceed to discuss these figures' views on move 
knowledge and illumination.  I justify this move on the grounds that the theological 
allegiances of Aquinas, Olivi, Ghent, and Scotus are well known.  While the first 
adheres to an Augustinian theology, the last three maintain the Franciscan theological 
perspective they inherited from Bonaventure. 
The preparatory studies I undertake in the chapters on Augustine, Anselm, 
and Bonaventure might have been unnecessary if contemporary scholars generally 
worked from the theological perspective that lays bare the meaning of Medieval 
illumination accounts, or if there was a fully developed body of secondary literature, 
which instructed how to read Medieval primary texts through the theological lens 
that exposes Medieval philosophical perspectives and allegiances.  Because current 
scholars do not tend to assume a theological outlook, however, and because the 
requisite body of secondary literature is still developing or barely exists, in the case 
of Franciscans like Bonaventure, whose philosophical thought is still conflated with 
Augustine’s by Medieval historians despite vast theological differences, the 
preliminary inquiries, which focus heavily on the exposition of primary texts, are 
indeed essential to the task of understanding the accounts of knowledge and 
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illumination under consideration here and the phenomenon of illumination’s 
thirteenth-century decline.   
Although I must broadly outline the theological thought of Augustine, 
Anselm, and Bonaventure for the sake of identifying their views on illumination and 
the cause of the account’s late Medieval decline, my intention is not to give a 
comprehensive re-reading of the writings of any figure whose work I evaluate.  I 
openly acknowledge that I leave much to be elaborated by other scholars, and in the 
case of Augustine and Aquinas especially, all my arguments rest on a foundation that 
has been laid by scholars who have come before me.  In this context, my goal is only 
to sketch what I must sketch if I am to address the question as to what it does and 
does not mean to be an Augustinian with respect to divine illumination theory, where 
that question was itself engendered by the primary question why late Medieval 
Franciscans who pledged allegiance to Augustine eventually abandoned his account 
of knowledge.  
In the first chapter on Augustine, I address the question as to what it means to 
be an Augustinian on illumination in the most direct way.  As I have noted, 
contemporary interpreters tend to read Augustine’s early works on illumination, 
especially De magistro, at philosophical face value and without much regard for 
relevant theological works of his maturity, most importantly, De Trinitate.  I explain 
why this is the case and argue that early writings on illumination should be 
retrospectively read in their later stated theological context.   
Starting with the Trinitarian doctrine Augustine explains in the first half of 
De Trinitate, I elaborate that context, supplementing my study with references to the 
simultaneously composed treatise De Genesi ad litteram.  Next, I explain what 
Augustine states it means that the created order, above all the human mind, is made 
in the image of the Trinity.  I describe how he understands the effects of the fall on 
the intellect.  Returning to the second half of De Trinitate, I show how the 
redemptive work of the Incarnate Son enacts the possibility of re-conforming to the 
lost image of God, and subsequently explain what that process entails.  The section 
on this topic elucidates how the seven ‘psychological analogies’ Augustine presents 
in the second half of his treatise outline the cognitive process involved in conforming 
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the image of Christ.  The discussion of them therefore throws the part illumination 
plays in cognition into relief.  The status of illumination, the study of the theory’s 
theological context reveals, is an intrinsic rather than an extrinsic one, contrary to 
what is commonly assumed.   
Here I might mention that illumination has only been described as an 
extrinsic force in late Medieval and modern times, that is, since Bonaventure 
interpreted the theory extrinsically and assigned his views to Augustine.  
Reformation thinkers like John Calvin, who wanted to stress the total depravity of 
the human intellect apart from grace, adopted and advanced the extrinsic 
interpretation of illumination and ‘grace’ more generally, projecting their views onto 
Augustine, such that those views have been generally presupposed ever since.58   
The attentive study of Augustine’s own words on the matter reveals that the 
grace of illumination is not what his late Medieval and modern readers have needed 
it to be in order for their own opinions to carry weight.  It is something intrinsic 
rather than extrinsic.  The charges normally directed at Augustinian illumination 
extrinsically interpreted do not therefore obtain.   
As the study of De Trinitate throws the function of illumination into relief, so 
the effort to interpret illumination in its theological context also highlights what is 
happening in the controversial treatise De Trinitate.  In this treatise, it would appear 
that Augustine invents a genre of theological literature designed to help intellectually 
gifted readers harness their whole minds and lives for the understanding and 
advancement of the Christian faith, a project he anticipated in the philosophical 
dialogues he composed shortly after his conversion.59  The treatise, in other words, is 
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and to address misguided criticisms, which have been made because of failures to recognize the 
pastoral purpose the works in question.  Building on Charry’s argument, I go so far as to designate a 
specifically Augustinian genre of theological-pedagogical literature.  I locate Augustine’s De 
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a ‘progressive enquiry’60 designed to bring the reader from the beginning to the end 
of the process of conforming to the image of Christ.  Only when its sections are 
divided and read outside of this context do the charges sometimes associated with it 
apply.   
In the first part of De Trinitate, Augustine delineates the doctrine of the 
Triune God the Person of Christ—the image of the Trinity—revealed, even as He 
revealed that all persons were made to reflect that image.  In the second half, he 
shows how to re-learn to constantly reflect that image that was lost at the fall and 
consequently imitate Christ, who glorified the Father in all He did.  Where the 
second half makes it possible to reason in the light of faith in the Triune God, the 
first half enables the reader who reasons in faith to give an account of how and why 
it is possible to do so, that is, to explain the Christian doctrine of a Triune, Incarnate 
God, and respond to challenges posed to it. 
While the first part teaches how to directly interpret the doctrine of the 
Trinity that Christ—and Scripture—makes known, the second half instructs how to 
interpret Scripture indirectly and therefore imitate Christ by means of efforts to 
render thoughts and actions consistent with the professed belief in the Triune God as 
the Highest Good, until the Father is glorified in all that pours forth from the human 
spirit, as was the case with Christ.  The two halves form a progressive and 
interdependent line of inquiry designed to reform the reader in the image of the 
Trinity in preparation for the ultimate vision of the Trinity.  The process of 
reformation is a process of learning to regard reality in the light of faith in God in 
order to ready the mind to see the Light itself. 
Anselm is often described as the chief proponent of the Augustinian tradition 
in the early Middle Ages.  The inquiry into Anselm’s views on the Trinity, the image 
of God, the fall, redemption, the process of conforming to God’s image, and finally, 
illumination, confirms this belief.  The argument in the second chapter turns on the 
contention that Anselm’s Monologion and Proslogion fulfill much the same purpose 
                                                                                                                                     
Trinitate, Anselm’s Monologion and Proslogion as well as Aquinas’ ST in this genre of works 
designed to facilitate the efforts of erudite Christian readers to conform to the image of Christ.   
60 Luigi Gioia, The Theological Epistemology of Augustine’s ‘De Trinitate’ (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 2-3. 
   32
as the two halves of Augustine’s De Trinitate, albeit in forms of argumentation 
relevant in the eleventh century intellectual context.   
In the first treatise, Anselm delineates his obviously Augustinian doctrine of 
the Trinity, creation, and the imago dei.  In the latter, where he presents his famous 
‘ontological’ argument, he provides his reader with a resource for conforming to the 
image of the Trinity, as Augustine had done with his psychological analogies.  This 
‘resource’ is one Anselm claims he received in a moment of illumination and 
formulated to help those seeking more illumination.  By reading Anselm’s treatises 
in relation to Augustine’s De Trinitate, and thus as a work that falls in the same 
genre, as the author instructs his readers to do, I challenge the idea that Anselm’s 
argument proves the existence of God per se and redefine it as a formula for 
conforming to the imago dei, for thereby becoming a ‘living’ argument for the 
existence of God.  Although I highlight the ways in which Anselm’s methods differ 
from Augustine’s for the sake of relevance in a new context, I stress that he remains 
an Augustinian with respect to his understanding of illumination inasmuch as he does 
as Augustine does—constructing a theory of knowledge on Augustinian theological 
assumptions—even if he does not do exactly what Augustine does, articulating his 
theory in the same forms of philosophical argumentation. 
In the third chapter of the thesis, I show how divine illumination theory 
passed from the hands of the ‘classic’ Augustinians of the early Medieval period into 
the hands of thirteenth-century Dominican and especially Franciscan thinkers.  The 
three most important points I discuss in this context are the development of 
scholastic methodology, the translation movements of the twelfth and early 
thirteenth-centuries, and the circumstances surrounding the founding of the 
Franciscan order, including the reasons why as well as the ways Franciscans 
appropriated newly translated resources upon their arrival in the university setting.  
In that context, I explain, the first Franciscan scholars adopted much of the theology 
of the twelfth-century mystic Richard of St. Victor and the philosophy of the Arab 
scholar Avicenna, which was consistent with the founding principles of their order, 
and they articulated their novel ideas in the terms of Augustine and Anselm in order 
to ground them on the authority of authorities. 
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Although Bonaventure acknowledges a great theological debt to Richard of 
St. Victor, he never mentions Avicenna in his writings.  This is largely due to the fact 
that some of Avicenna’s ideas had been condemned by the time the second 
generation of Franciscan scholars began working.  If one is prepared to identify the 
contours of Victorine theology and Avicennian philosophy, however, one can 
identify them in Bonaventure’s thought.  Although it is widely acknowledged that 
Bonaventure departs from the Augustinian tradition in the matter of Trinitarian 
doctrine, scholars continue to affirm, virtually without exception, that the Seraphic 
Doctor is a philosophical Augustinian.  They do this on the basis of the fact that he 
invokes so much of the traditional Augustinian terminology, including illumination, 
as well as Anselm’s argument, which he re-defines as per Avicenna as an a priori 
proof for the existence of God.  
The fact that Bonaventure speaks the language of Augustine masks the fact 
that he endows traditional terms and arguments with meanings that preclude 
Augustine’s.  His manoeuvres were ones that newly developed scholastic methods 
afforded the opportunity and the freedom to make, just as much as those methods 
enabled scholars like Aquinas to bolster traditional Augustinian perspectives in novel 
and creative ways.  Although Bonaventure departs from Augustine on Augustine’s 
own authority, a scholarly habit of taking philosophical arguments at face value has 
prevented this from being adequately emphasized in the past. 
In the fourth chapter, I try to make it obvious that Bonaventure diverges from 
the traditional Augustinian thought as I show how he derives his extrinsic 
understanding of illumination from his Trinitarian doctrine through the usual series 
of steps.  While doing this, I demonstrate that the Seraphic Doctor codified a theory 
of knowledge, and thus an understanding of what is involved in conforming to God’s 
image, that is incompatible with Augustine’s.  Although he is typically heralded as 
the last and best champion on the earlier Medieval Augustinian tradition, I contend 
that he is one of the first and certainly the foremost promulgator of classic Franciscan 
philosophical thought.   
While Bonaventure employed Augustine’s terms and assigned them new 
meanings, his Dominican contemporary Thomas Aquinas was drawing on all sorts of 
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intellectual resources to convey the sense of Augustine’s views on knowledge and 
illumination in new ways.  The main point of the chapter on Aquinas is to throw the 
non-Augustinian character of Bonaventure’s thought into sharper relief by 
highlighting how it would in fact look to do as Augustine did in the thirteenth-
century with respect to the theory of knowledge by illumination.   
Ironically, it is Aquinas who has often been said to abandon Augustinian 
illumination and Anselm’s argument in favour of an Aristotelian theory of 
knowledge by abstraction.  In the fifth chapter, I show that he only rejects the 
Franciscan interpretations of these accounts even while he espouses and advances the 
Augustinian views in new and contextually relevant forms.  Although the limited 
scope of this inquiry prevents me from elaborating on Aquinas’ rendering of 
Augustine’s doctrines of the Trinity and the imago dei, I stress that the Augustinian 
character of his thought on these issues is generally acknowledged.   
On such grounds, I argue that Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae falls within the 
Augustinian genre of theological-pedagogical literature and serves much the same 
purpose as De Trinitate and Monologion-Proslogion.  It is a continuous line of 
inquiry designed to reform the intellectually gifted reader in God’s image.  
Consequently, there is an affinity of purpose between Augustine’s psychological 
analogies, Anselm’s argument, and Aquinas’ five ways.  All are formulae for 
conforming to the image of God.  All are designed to fuel an increase in divine 
illumination, which Aquinas, like Augustine and Anselm, understands as an intrinsic 
force.  Attention to the theological factors at play in illumination accounts thus 
reveals that the reverse of the received view is true: it is Aquinas rather than 
Bonaventure who is the thirteenth-century proponent of traditional Augustinian 
thought.   
In the last chapter, I turn to explain why late thirteenth-century Franciscans 
abandoned the illumination account.  My study focuses on Peter John Olivi, the first 
Franciscan to note the problems inherent in the ‘extrinsic’ account of Bonaventure; 
Henry of Ghent, the one who attempted to recast the account so that it could evade 
the problems; and John Duns Scotus, who pronounced Henry’s attempts inadequate 
and rejected illumination theory once and for all.  The basic problem all three saw 
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was that illumination, extrinsically defined, problematically interfered in the natural 
operations of reason, as Bonaventure had defined them.   
While the Seraphic Doctor had welcomed this interference, which to his mind 
affirmed the possibility of intellectual intimacy with God like that which Francis 
enjoyed, his successors discerned the philosophical inconsistency in positing it and 
felt constrained to reduce and eventually eliminate it.  When they did so, I emphasize 
that they did not eliminate illumination as Augustinians but as Franciscans 
understood it.  Although Duns Scotus and those that prepared the way for him 
rejected illumination, moreover, they only did so in the effort to carry Franciscan 
assumptions about the nature of knowledge to their logical conclusions and eradicate 
inconsistencies.  Their goal was not to undermine Augustinian or even Franciscan 
philosophical principles, but to promote Franciscan ones.   
In concluding my study, I reiterate the importance of interpreting 
philosophical terms and arguments with a view to the theological assumptions that 
impart meaning.  This approach to interpreting illumination theory not only 
highlights the contours of Augustine’s intrinsic—not extrinsic—illumination account 
but also exposes where there is and is not continuity with Augustine in the later 
Middle Ages.  Although Bonaventure is typically hailed the thirteenth-century 
proponent of Augustinianism, this study has shown that he actually introduced a new 
Avicennian-Franciscan account of knowledge under the name of Augustine even 
while Thomas Aquinas advances the Augustinian tradition through his use of sources 
besides, though not excluding, Augustine.  The thought of Aquinas confirms that 
Augustinian and Aristotelian traditions were not opposed to one another in the 
thirteenth century, as is often supposed by Medievalists who take philosophical 
arguments at face value, but that the two are in fact highly compatible, even if the 
Franciscan Augustine and Aristotle are less conducive systems of thought. 
Such research findings confirm that it is not enough to take the philosophical 
terms and metaphors Medieval thinkers invoked into consideration in the effort to 
identify their scholarly positions and allegiances.  Instead, it is essential to attend to 
the theological factors that motivated the use of language and that lent significance to 
it.  In short, it is necessary to inquire into late Medieval thought and intellectual 
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phenomena with the perspective of a late Medieval thinker, that is, a perspective that 
is theological. 
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I. AUGUSTINE 
(354 – 430) 
Introduction 
 Scholarly interpreters of illumination theory tend to focus on works 
Augustine composed shortly after his conversion in 386, such as Soliloquia and 
above all De magistro.  When they consult later works, it is normally for 
supplementary references to illumination rather than for theological context.  If 
neglecting to consider divine illumination theory in that context complicates the 
effort to interpret its function, one may wonder why the scholarly habit of taking 
arguments for illumination at face value has not been challenged in the past.   
There are a number of likely reasons why an alternative approach to 
interpreting illumination has not been suggested.  In the first place, it is human nature 
to dwell on appearances rather than to attend from them to that which they signify.  It 
is also a human tendency to project one’s own views onto authorities for the sake of 
advancing a polemical or intellectual agenda, as has been done in the case of 
Augustine’s illumination theory.   
On a more scholarly level, it is important to note that the treatise in which 
Augustine provides the theological context most pertinent to the interpretation of 
illumination, De Trinitate, has been criticized on the basis of misapprehensions for 
quite some time.  The account of relevant sections of De Trinitate I offer in this 
chapter presupposes the unity and coherence of the work, which scholars in the fairly 
recent past have called into question.  Only briefly do I pause to mention and address 
the accusations that have been levelled against Augustinian theology, which apply to 
Augustinian theologians like Anselm and Aquinas more generally. 
My treatment of these issues is limited because I assume knowledge of the 
comprehensive work other scholars have done in these regards.  While Rowan 
Williams, Lewis Ayres, and Michel René Barnes have addressed the problems 
typically associated with the Trinitarian theology Augustine presents in the first half 
of De Trinitate, as well as his theological anthropology, Luigi Gioia has recently 
produced a study which incorporates the research findings of the aforementioned in 
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giving an analytical exposition of the whole treatise that traces the progression of its 
inquiry and underlines its coherence.61  Building on the foundation laid by these 
scholars, I aim to focus in on the the contours of the theory of human cognition that 
can be derived from De Trinitate, with a view to throwing the operation of 
illumination in cognition into relief.  If such a project has not been undertaken in the 
past, it is likely due to the fact that the groundwork in the scholarship on Augustine’s 
theology needed to be laid first.  Yet this has now been done. 
In a recent book, Carol Harrison discusses another aspect of the situation in 
Augustinian studies, which has encouraged readings of Augustine’s early writings, 
including those on illumination, without reference to the theological context he later 
elucidates in works like De Trinitate.62  As she explains, scholars have taken 
Confessiones as the point of departure for the study of Augustine for over a century.  
Augustine began to compose this work in 396, ten years after his conversion and in 
the same year he became Bishop of Hippo.  Researchers usually begin with 
Confessiones, Harrison relates, because they virtually universally assume that 
Augustine underwent an intellectual revolution in the early 390’s as a result of 
reading the Apostle Paul.  In commentaries on Paul’s writings dating from this 
decade, Augustine works out his mature theology of original sin, the Fall, grace, free 
will, and so forth.  Because elaborate versions of these doctrines are absent in the 
earlier works, the most well known of which include the four dialogues Augustine 
composed at Cassiciacum (Contra academicos, De beata vita, De ordine, and 
Soliloquia) and De magistro, many scholars see 396 rather than 386 as the real 
turning point in the bishop’s thought.   
 In his immensely influential biography of Augustine, Harrison notes, Peter 
Brown perpetuated this notion that there are ‘two Augustines’: the Augustine of the 
early works, a young devotee of Christian philosophy, and the Augustine of 396, a 
                                                
61 See the footnotes in the sections of this chapter on ‘Trinity’ and ‘Criticisms of the Psychological 
Analogies’.  Also see my article titled, “Knowledge by Illumination: The Grandeur of Reason 
According to Augustine,” in The Grandeur of Reason (London: SCM, 2009). 
62 Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology: An Argument for Continuity (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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mature and devout clergyman.63  Following the publication of Brown’s book in 1967, 
the ‘two Augustines’ theory became canonical in the scholarship.  As a result, the 
author of the early works came to be considered as “no more and no less than a 
philosopher.”64  Because Augustine supposedly remained under the spell of Neo-
Platonism during the first decade of his Christian life, his first writings are said to be, 
“of doubtful significance for appreciating his mature thought.”65  On Harrison’s 
view, the ‘two Augustines’ thesis is simply a revised version of the old and long 
since dispatched idea that Augustine was converted to Neo-Platonism rather than 
Christianity in 386.66  However, she thinks the ‘two Augustines’ theory questions 
“the nature and importance of his conversion in 386 in a manner just as radical as 
those who held that Augustine was initially converted to Neo-Platonism.”67  
 In the second edition of his biography, which was published in 2000, Peter 
Brown admits that the ‘two Augustines’ thesis was more of a theoretical experiment 
than a statement of fact.68  By this time, however, his thesis had already earned 
universal acclaim.69  In the effort to counteract the scholarly effects of the wide 
acceptance of that thesis, Harrison contends that the real revolution in Augustine’s 
thought happened in 386.  Recently, Platonism had freed him from a false Manichean 
concept of God as “an infinitely diffused material substance,”70 and had instilled in 
him a sense of God’s transcendence and of the reliance of all reality upon Him.  By 
reading the books of the Platonists, Augustine was prepared to realize at his 
conversion that faith in the Triune, Incarnate God fulfils the Platonic vision.  When 
Augustine went on to construct his theology, he did so on a foundation that was laid 
in the Garden of Milan.  Harrison’s goal is to demonstrate that Augustine’s mature 
understanding of sin, grace, free will, and so on, is inchoately present in his early 
                                                
63 Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967; 2nd 
ed. 2000). 
64 Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, 4. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 18. 
67 Ibid., 6. 
68 Ibid., 17. 
69 Ibid., 15. 
70 Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth Century Trinitarian Theology 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 366.  Also see Augustine, Confessiones, 7.10.16, ff.   
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works, and thus to highlight the continuity between the early and late theological 
thought of St. Augustine.  
In this chapter, my argument also turns on the assumption that there is 
continuity in Augustine’s thought.  My goal is to show that the later works contain an 
account of the theological context and mechanics of illumination that throws light on 
the logic of the theory as Augustine presents it in the early works.  Around the time 
of his conversion, it would seem that Augustine came to see that faith in Christ 
enacts the Platonic theory of knowledge by illumination, the contours of which had 
become clear to him through the prior reading of Platonist works.  Although he had 
yet to explain for the sake of his readers how the directly proportional relationship 
between faith in Christ and illumination works, Augustine gestures in the early works 
towards the distinctly Christian conception of illumination he already has in mind.   
In his Retractationes, Augustine testifies that this is truly the case.  In the 
entry on De magistro, for instance, he expresses satisfaction with the work and 
makes no amendments to it.71  In the retraction on Soliloquia, he affirms that what he 
wrote about illumination in this work is consistent with what he wrote about it in De 
Trinitate.72  In the entry on De Trinitate itself, the bishop states that he wrote the 
work for the audience he had addressed in his earlier philosophical dialogues, which 
was inclusive of all believers who longed to understand how their faith pertains to 
the rigorous intellectual pursuits they were gifted to undertake.73  Augustine’s erudite 
Christian readers were apparently so eager to know his views on this issue that they 
began to circulate sections of his manuscript before he had approved its publication.  
Ultimately, they convinced him to release the work in entirety before he had polished 
it to his satisfaction.   
If Augustine’s divine illumination theory has not been interpreted in its 
proper, though later formulated, theological context as his retractions suggest is 
appropriate to do, it must be at least partially due to the reason Harrison cites, 
namely, that the ‘two Augustines’ theory has prompted scholars to regard works 
from the two phases of his career in separation.  For the contemporary reader, for 
                                                
71 See Retractationes (CCL 57, 36). 
72 Ibid. (CCL 57, 13-15). 
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whom a theory of knowledge by illumination is a foreign concept, however, a 
reading of the account in its proper context is the key to grasping its purpose and 
plausibility.   
 In this chapter, I explain one way of giving such a theologically 
contextualized reading.  I begin my study by offering an account of the Trinitarian 
doctrine Augustine delineates in the first half of De Trinitate.  I discuss the 
implications the doctrine has for Augustine’s account of the created order and the 
human being as an image of God, which can be found in the complementary treatise, 
De Genesi ad litteram.  In this context, I also explain how Augustine envisions the 
nature of the cognitive work the mind performs as the imago dei. 
Subsequently, I explain the impact of the fall upon the image, as Augustine 
describes it in De Genesi, as well as the effect of redemption as he describes it in De 
Trinitate.  Turning to the latter half of De Trinitate, I focus on demonstrating how he 
illustrates the cognitive process of conforming to the lost image, with the help of his 
seven psychological analogies.  On the basis of the discovery as to how Augustine 
understands cognition, I finally strive to make sense of the arguments for the role of 
illumination in human knowing, which Augustine presents in De magistro and 
Soliloquia.   
Trinity 
One point Augustine makes unmistakably clear in De Trinitate is that the 
divine nature is radically distinct from the nature of any created being.74  By contrast 
to creatures, God is not corporeal and thus He is not visible.  He is not comprised of 
parts and therefore He is not mutable.  Rather, He is simple.  He is one in essence 
and in action.  Since accidents only apply to composite, changeable beings, He has 
no properties.  Instead, He is what He has, and He has all things eternally.  He is 
always all that it is to be Being Itself. 
In the first half of De Trinitate where the doctrine of the Trinity is unfurled, 
Augustine acknowledges that some find the teaching on divine simplicity troubling, 
                                                                                                                                     
73 Ibid., (CCL 57, 101-2). 
74 Augustine, trin. 1.1.3 (CCL 50, 30-1); 2.8.14 (CCL 50, 98-9); 5.1.1 (CCL 50, 206). 
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given that God is also described as Triune.  God the Father is the unbegotten 
beginning from which the Son proceeds.75  The Son, who is generated by the Father, 
does nothing of His own accord but simply expresses what He receives from the 
Father.76  The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son and thus 
proceeds from both Persons.77   
Although the Father, Son, and Spirit can be distinguished in these ways, 
Augustine insists that, they are not three Gods, but one God.78  He then explains how 
one can maintain that God works indivisibly, even though the Father, Son, and 
Spirit, are appropriated different functions.79  To do this, he introduces the 
distinction between ‘substance’ (substantia) and ‘relation’ (relativus).80  Whatever is 
spoken of the substance of God, such as that He is good or that He acts in a certain 
way can be predicated of all three Persons.81  Whatever is predicated relatively is 
said of one Person in particular.82   
On Augustine’s reasoning, the involvement of three Persons in different 
modes of relation does not undermine but enact the simplicity of the divine being 
and divine action.  When the Son proceeds from the Father, He receives and 
manifests the Spirit of God.83  His Spirit thus gestures back towards the Father, 
returning to Him what He gave through the Son, binding Father and Son together.  
While it is true that the Father who sends takes priority over the ones He sends, who 
glorify their sender, no inferiority within the Godhead is implied, as those of Arian 
persuasion believe, because the glory of the Father simply is the work of the Son and 
His Spirit.  Each Person contributes in His own way to establishing that God’s nature 
is to enable another in the effort to reinforce the glory of God, and it is in virtue of 
the fact that the three Persons subsist in different relations that there is one divine 
Being whose glory is eternally reinforced.84   
                                                
75 Ibid., 5.13.14 (CCL 50, 221). 
76 Ibid., 2.1.2 (CCL 50, 81-2). 
77 Ibid., 5.14.15 (CCL 50, 222-3). 
78 Ibid., 1.4.7 (CCL 50, 35). 
79 Ibid., 1.5.8 (CCL 50, 36-7). 
80 Ibid., 5.5.6 (CCL 50, 210). 
81 Ibid., 5.8.9 (CCL 50, 215-6). 
82 Ibid., 5.11.12 (CCL 50, 219). 
83 Ibid., 2.3.5 (CCL 50, 85-6). 
84 Ibid., 6.5.7 (CCL 50, 235-6). 
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The Trinitarian theology outlined above was attacked on numerous counts in 
an earlier generation of scholars.  More recently, however, Ayres, Barnes, Gioia, and 
Williams have managed to reverse this critical trend by calling attention to the actual 
content and context of De Trinitate, which Augustine’s critics tended to overlook.85   
As Michel René Barnes has explained, the universal acceptance of Théodore 
De Régnon’s account of the history of Trinitarian theology has been the main source 
of the problems for Augustine.86  For De Régnon, “Western Trinitarian theology 
begins with divine unity (i.e. the essence) while Eastern Trinitarian theology begins 
with divine diversity (i.e. the Persons).”87  In modern times, Lewis Ayres writes, 
Augustine has been “treated as the source and exemplar of the distinctively Western 
style of Trinitarian theology…[that] highlights the supposed deficiencies of the 
West.”88   
On Ayres’ account, this is especially true of the scholar Olivier Du Roy.89  
Du Roy interprets Augustine’s distinctly ‘Western’ emphasis on divine simplicity as 
an unorthodox preoccupation with Neo-Platonism.  On his reading, “the substantial 
influence of Neo-Platonism upon Augustine’s Trinitarian theology results in an 
overly metaphysical portrait of God, which diminishes the reality of the Trinity to 
the point of being a functionally modalist”90 account of God.  In that kind of 
account, Father, Son and Spirit are effectively interchangeable modes of being rather 
than unique Persons; each one could conceivably do the work of another. 
Barnes and Ayres contend that Augustine’s emphasis on divine simplicity is 
indicative of a ‘pro-Nicene’ as opposed to Platonist outlook on the nature of God.  
The authors demonstrate that the “reading of Augustine’s Trinitarian theology as an 
event in Latin Neo-Platonism can no longer credibly serve to locate that theology 
                                                
85 See Michel René Barnes, “Rereading Augustine on the Trinity,” in The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary 
Symposium on the Trinity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); the chapter on Augustine in Lewis 
Ayres’ Nicaea and Its Legacy, as well as Ayres’ article, “The Fundamental Grammar of Augustine’s 
Trinitarian Theology,” in Augustine and His Critics (London: Routledge: 2000); Luigi Gioia, 
Theological Epistemology, 10-16 & 24-39; Rowan Williams, "De Trinitate" in Augustine through the 
Ages (Grand Rapids: Eerdman’s, 1999). 
86 Michel René Barnes, “Augustine in Contemporary Trinitarian Theology, Theological Studies 56:2: 
(1995): 237. 
87 Michel René Barnes, “Rereading Augustine on the Trinity,” 152. 
88 Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 364. 
89 Refer to Olivier Du Roy, L’intelligence de la foi en la Trinité selon S. Augustin (Paris: Etudes 
Augustiniennes, 1966).  
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historically,”91 because it fails to reflect the context and “the doctrinal content of the 
texts it is supposed to explain.”92   
The two overcome the misreading of Augustine’s Trinitarian theology by 
situating it in its proper context.  By the 380’s, Barnes writes, the Nicene Creed of 
325 had been generally accepted and substantially developed in both the East and the 
West.93  Although the Creed was originally formulated in a polemical context as a 
response to the Arian heresy, which denied the Son’s equality to the Father, Barnes 
shows that by Augustine’s time, the mark of a genuine ‘pro-Nicene’ theologian had 
come to be identified with a more general emphasis on the notion that “any action of 
any member of the Trinity is an action of the three inseparably.”94   
The doctrine of ‘inseparable operations’ is precisely what Augustine upholds 
by laying stress on divine simplicity.  That stress on simplicity by no means 
undermines the distinctness of the three Persons.  As Ayres points out, Augustine’s 
way of depicting the separate Persons in relation calls the reader to recognize their 
unity.  “The Triune communion is a consubstantial and eternal unity, but there is 
nothing but the Persons.”95  Augustine is no heterodox Platonist, consequently, but a 
genuine pro-Nicene Trinitarian theologian. 
Creation in God’s Image 
THE NATURAL ORDER 
Although Augustine begins to transition from treating the Triune nature of 
God to explaining how He fashioned the natural order in His image in De Trinitate 
book three, his most elaborate account of God’s creation is not to be found in that 
treatise but in the twelve books of De Genesi ad litteram, and in the first six books 
particularly.  The bishop opens his account of God’s creative work in that treatise by 
explaining the role each Person of the Trinity played in the creative act.  Thus, the 
                                                                                                                                     
90 Michel René Barnes, “Rereading Augustine on the Trinity,” 145. 
91 Ibid., 150. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., 155. 
94 Ibid., 156. 
95 Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 380. 
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commentary starts with an explication of Genesis 1:3: then God said, ‘let there be 
light’!96   
According to Augustine, all three Persons were involved in this proclamation 
of light, inasmuch as the Word the Father uttered was His Son, who gave outward 
expression to the Spirit that is eternally expressed within the Godhead.  As in the 
inner life of the Trinity, so in the external manifestation of the divine, all three 
Persons are involved.97  Because they are, the proclamation of the Uncreated Light of 
God gave rise to a created light.  That created light participated in the Uncreated 
Light from which it came and which was undiminished by and thus utterly distinct 
from its creation.  
With that established, Augustine proceeds to consider what the created light 
originally was.  On his reasoning, it can only have consisted in creatures that exist in 
a spiritual mode of being like God Himself.  For Augustine, this mode is at once 
intellectual, inasmuch as it entails orientation towards the knowledge of God.98  On 
these grounds, he concludes that the words ‘let there be light’ illumined angelic 
beings to participate in the vision God has of Himself.99  God did not speak those 
words into time, Augustine insists, but issued his proclamation of light on the first 
day of creation, prior to the start of time. 
 On that first day, the Genesis account relates that God also separated the light 
from the darkness.  According to Augustine, the primordial darkness was the absence 
of light or ‘nothingness’ that arose where there was formlessness and mutability, or 
all that God and spiritual beings are not.  Presumably, darkness became separable 
from light as a result of the fall of the devil.100  Although what was inherently 
formless could not impose form upon itself, it was naturally receptive to modification 
and the imposition of form.101  Therefore, it was from this stuff of nothing that God 
created the world. 
                                                
96 Augustine, Gn. litt. 1.2.4.  
97 Ibid., 1.2.6 (the Son); 1.5.10 (the Spirit); 1.6.12 (the Trinity). 
98 Ibid., 1.5.10. 
99 Ibid., 1.9.15. 
100 Ibid., 1.10.18 & 1.14.28; on the fall of the devil see 11.16.21. 
101 Idem., conf., 13.19.28 (CCL 27, 257). 
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 At this juncture in his argument, Augustine stresses the significance of the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo.  Because God did not fashion material reality from His 
own immaterial substance but only imposed His form upon matter, there is a radical 
difference between Creator and creatures.  The doctrine of creation ex nihilo 
underscores the fact that God’s creative work does not detract from His being nor 
make Him dependent upon what He made, even though it impacts the corporeal 
creatures that receive their form from Him and therefore depend on Him for their 
existence.102  Inasmuch as God caused matter that was ‘next to nothing’ to become 
something, so far as it was formed nothingness, God caused creatures to become 
images of Him who is never an image of them.103 
When God gave form to what was formless, His creatures retained both the 
mutability characteristic of formlessness and the immutability they derived from 
their form.  The form or essence of the creature ensured that its parts were always 
structured to comprise the same kind of being suited to perform the same sorts of 
operations.  Owing to the interplay of immutability and mutability, however, 
creatures were constrained to develop into their forms.  The forms God imparted 
creatures were not actualized, in other words.  Rather, they instilled in creatures the 
potential to gradually become the beings they were made to be.  For this reason, 
Augustine writes that creation from nothing must be creation in time.104  
Augustine introduces his doctrine of ‘causal’, ‘eternal’, or ‘seminal’ reasons 
(rationes seminales) in order to explain how a creature grows into its form.  A causal 
reason, he states, is simply the form the creature has the potential to actualize as it 
develops in the course of time.105  When God created the heavens and earth at the 
first moment in time, He brought all the causal reasons into effect at once and in this 
enacted the potential existence of all things.  As the creation narrative of 
Ecclesiasticus book eighteen teaches, He created all things simultaneously.106  
Although this is true from the perspective of Him who stands outside of time and 
eternally sees the potential of all things in act, the Genesis account of creation in the 
                                                
102 Ibid., 12.11.11 (CCL 27, 211); 12.28.38 (CCL 27, 23-8). 
103 Ibid., 12.27.37 (CCL 27, 236-7); 13.2.2 (CCL 27, 242). 
104 Ibid., 12.8.8 (CCL 27, 220); 12.11.14 (CCL 27, 222-3).  See also Gn. litt. 1.5.12. 
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course of time is also true from the standpoint of the creatures that are situated within 
it.107  
Augustine’s description of the way creatures actualize the potential a causal 
reason instils comes in the form of his comments on Wisdom 11.20.  This verse states 
that God ordered all things in virtue of measure, number, and weight (mensura, 
numerus, pondus).108  On Augustine’s account, ‘measure’ is a being’s finite limit or 
maximum potential.  ‘Number’ is the form or causal reason the creature has the 
potential to fully instantiate.  Weight is the characteristic operation of the creature, 
through which it increases in number and approximates its measure.109  Number 
gauges the extent to which a creature has met its measure by operating in accordance 
with its weight and thus mediates between measure and weight, facilitating a 
creature’s efforts to become what it was made to be, that is, to reach its measure.   
In order for beings to actualize their potential through the cooperation of 
measure, number, and weight, Augustine argues that there must be a Being that is 
always actualized.  There must exist a ‘Measure without measure’; a ‘Number 
without number’, “by which all things are formed, but that receives no form;” 110 and 
a ‘Weight without weight’, to which beings are drawn, but which “is not drawn to 
any other.111   
Augustine affirms that the Triune God is such a Being, because the Son is the 
exact likeness of the Father in the Spirit, which is to say that God’s number is 
eternally equal to an infinite measure since His weight is Himself.  On Augustine’s 
account, God is Measure, Number, and Weight, because the ratio of measure to 
number to weight never alters in Him, and His measure is all that is.  For that very 
reason, He pre-contains and makes possible without predetermining all finite modes 
of measure, all increase in number, and all operation in accordance with weight.  His 
existence allows creatures to come into existence and grow into their essences so 
                                                                                                                                     
106 Ibid., 4.33.51. 
107 Ibid., 4.33.52-34.53. 
108 See Carol Harrison, ‘Measure, Number, and Weight in Saint Augustine’s Aesthetics’, 
Augustinianum 28 (1998): 591-602. 
109 Ibid., 4.3.7; see also conf. 13.4 (CCL 27, 244). 
110 Idem., Gn. litt., 4.4.8. 
111 Ibid. 
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long as they exist.  Although there appear to be many finite measures that increase in 
number by carrying weight, Augustine argues that they are all simply different 
manifestations of one Measure, Number, and Weight.  The causal reasons are 
‘eternal reasons’ inasmuch as Measure, Number, and Weight is eternal.   
  In giving his account of measure, number, and weight, Augustine outlines the 
contours of his ontology of participation.  In this ontology, a creature is said to 
participate in the divine mode of being when it increasingly participates in its own 
essential mode of being through the cooperation of measure, number, and weight.  
As God’s simplicity is enacted by His Triune nature, so the simplicity of a creature, 
or the fact that it always remains the same kind of being that performs the same sort 
of function, despite growth and development, is sustained by the involvement of 
three elements.  The more a being becomes itself as it performs it proper function, 
the more its triune structure renders its potential to image divine simplicity effectual, 
such that it becomes an ever better image of the Trinity. 
Despite the fact that God exists in an eternal and unchangeable manner “far 
different from beings which are made…and cannot be spoken of in any way with 
human language without recourse to expression of time and space,”112 Augustine 
confirms that ‘traces’ of Him can be detected all throughout the natural order.  Even 
though God is not knowable in Himself, He can be known because the creatures He 
made are structured in a manner analogous to His.  When they are seen as analogues, 
the study of their structure becomes an indirect study of His. 
While Augustine believes all creatures participate in the divine essence 
through increasing participation in their own essences, he does not think they all do 
so at the same level.  Rather, he states that, “creatures express the goodness of God 
“according to the appointed capacity granted to each entity according to its genus.”113  
Even though all substances are naturally good, Augustine affirms that some “abide 
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close to God in the graded hierarchy of being, or stand further away from Him.”114  
Put differently, there are levels to the goodness of what God has made.   
One reason Augustine thinks the account of creation in time is important is 
that it discloses the hierarchical order God established.  In the first place, God 
produced vegetation or non-sentient, non-rational creatures, and called them good.  
He then created the animals, or sentient, non-rational creatures, and called them 
good.  Finally, He made human beings sentient, rational creatures and called them 
very good, locating them at the top of the hierarchy of being and indicating that they 
have a unique role to play in the governance of the natural order.   
THE HUMAN BEING 
 Augustine insists that God called human beings very good because He made 
them capable of identifying things as good and thus of doing as He does.  After 
devoting the first half of De Genesi to the discussion of the natural order, the bishop 
turns in the second half to treat the creation, nature, and purpose of human beings.  In 
the twelfth and final book, he gives his account of the three modes of cognition that 
enable human beings to identify the good and to ultimately attain the knowledge of 
the Good that is God Himself, which is the measure of humankind. 
 Augustine calls the first mode ‘corporeal vision’ (ratio).  In this mode, a 
person passively receives empirical data through sense perception.115  The second 
mode is referred to as ‘spiritual vision’ (intellectus) and is otherwise known as the 
imagination.116  In spiritual vision, the mind makes a mental image (phantasm) of a 
corporeal object to determine the nature of the object, or to identify what is good in 
it.  The bishop stresses that corporeal faculties do not generate images themselves.  
                                                
114Idem., conf., 12.28.38 (CCL 27, 237-8): sed de nihilo dissimilitudinem informem, quae formaretur 
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115 Idem., Gn. litt. 12.7.16: primum ergo appelemus corporale, quia per corpus percipitur et corporis 
sensibus exhibetur. 
116 Ibid., secondum spiritale: quidquid enim corpus non est et tamen aliquid est, iam recte spiritus 
dicitur et utique non est corpus, quamuis corpori similes sit, imago absentis corporis, nec ille ipse 
obtutus, quo cernitur. 
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Rather, the formation of an image is something the spirit accomplishes, as it 
perceives created realities by means of the body.117 
 On Augustine’s description, the imagination is the faculty that considers 
absent bodies, yet the bishop notes that it is possible to do this in any one of three 
ways.  The imagination can be used simply to recall objects that have been perceived 
in the past, insofar as the images of objects the mind forms upon experiencing them 
give the objects a spiritual existence in the mind which allows the mind to retain 
them in the memory even when they are no longer physically present.118  
 Additionally, the imaginative faculty can be employed to “arbitrarily or 
fancifully fashion objects which have no real existence,”119 that is, to combine and 
multiply and vary images of things that have been perceived in order to form images 
of things that have not been or cannot be perceived in reality.  Although the 
resources for human cognition are limited to what the mind passively receives by 
way of the senses, Augustine affirms that it is possible to exceed the limitations 
imposed by the corporeal faculties the act of thinking imaginatively about corporeal 
reality.120   
 The imaginative power to utilize images of objects that have been seen for the 
purpose of conceptualizing ones that have not been seen is the same power that 
makes it possible to envision a future course of events or plan of action in the third 
use of the imagination Augustine mentions.121  As the bishop points out, the 
imagination is the faculty that enacts the possibility of human ingenuity and 
creativity.122  In his view, therefore, spiritual vision is in many respects the seat of 
human cognition inasmuch as the mind’s methods for representing its objects are an 
expression of the unique interests and abilities of the human spirit itself.   
                                                
117 Ibid., 12.16.32-33 & 12.24.51. 
118 Ibid., 12.7.16. 
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120 Idem., trin., 11.8.13 (CCL 50, 350). 
121 Idem., Gn. litt. 12.16.33. 
122 Idem., trin., 8.4.7 (CCL 50, 275-6). 
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 Together, corporeal and spiritual vision comprise what Augustine calls ‘lower 
reason’.  Lower reason seeks knowledge of the natural order (scientia), by contrast to 
higher reason, which is constituted by the third mode of intellectual vision 
(intelligentia), in which the mind pursues wisdom (sapientia).123  While the proper 
objects of lower reason are corporeal bodies, the proper objects of higher reason are 
incorporeal.  In the present life, those incorporeal objects are ideas.124  Ultimately, 
however, the proper object of the intellect is the idea of God.  So long as lower 
reason comes into contact with corporeal bodies, however, the intellect cannot 
behold God, who is incorporeal by nature.  The knowledge of the material and the 
immaterial, instantiations of goodness and the Good Itself, is mutually exclusive.   
 For this reason, Augustine argues that the proper function of the intellect in 
the present life is to judge what the good things the imagination represents are good 
for, and so govern the use of the imagination.  Such is the wisdom of God that is 
currently attainable.  In forming wise judgments, Augustine writes, the mind 
“analyzes and synthesizes,”125 (discernere vel conectere) “distinguishes and 
connects,”126 “combines and separates,”127 what it learns, ‘seeking oneness’.128  In 
determining what good things are good for, in other words, the intellect classifies 
them under categories.  It determines the form creatures exhibit, compares creatures 
with different forms and contrasts creatures with the same form on the basis of 
differences in measure and weight.  As human beings operate in this categorizing 
mode of cognition, they mimic the simplifying cognitive mode of the Father who 
thinks Himself, through the Son, in the Spirit.  The intellectual faculty through which 
they engage in such ‘abstractive’ acts of reasoning, Augustine writes, “has been 
                                                
123 Idem., Gn. litt. 7.7.16. 
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impressed upon human nature as if it were a law.”129  The ‘law’ whereby the intellect 
discerns unity in diversity is ultimately the unity of God; it is intrinsic to human 
nature, and it renders human beings in the image of God. 
 Augustine frequently affirms that human beings know whatever they know in 
the rules (regulae) of judgment or eternal reasons that are above the human mind, in 
the mind of God.130  More than anything else, these references have led interpreters 
of Augustine to conclude that God impresses ideas upon human minds that either 
impose the very content of cognition or regulate the process of concept formation, or 
to conclude that God’s assistance in human cognitive efforts is extrinsic and that 
something supernatural must be added to the natural power of reason in order for 
reason to perform its proper function.    
The passages highlighted above suggest that Augustine thinks the laws 
according to which the mind judges reduce to one law, namely, the intellect’s 
intrinsic ability to cognize in a unifying manner.  They therefore lead the reader to 
envisage a rather different picture of the relationship between divine and human 
cognitive action.  Far from intimating that God interferes with the use of the 
intellectual power, Augustine seems to indicate that God’s primary causality enacts 
the ability of human beings to act as secondary causes in their own created sphere.   
Some scholars have referred to the model of divine causality that Augustine 
and many other early Medieval thinkers presuppose as the influentia model, in which 
the human intellectual powers are literally said to ‘flow in’ from the divine power 
that posits what He creates as an influence in its own right.131  On this model, human 
acts are accredited to God, not because God compels or performs them in any way 
                                                
129 Idem., trin., 8.4.7 (CCL 50, 275-6): habemus enim quasi regulariter infixam naturae humanae 
notitiam secundum quam quidquid tale aspicimus statim hominem esse cognoscimus vel hominis 
formam. 
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that undermines the integrity of the intellect, but because the very ability to be a 
secondary cause comes from Him.   
From this perspective, the mind remains free to formulate ideas of its own 
accord.  Inevitably, these ideas are subject to evolution and are nothing like the 
immutable knowledge of God for that very reason.  Inasmuch as God eternally 
knows all things in Himself, however, He foreknows all knowledge of goodness a 
mutable mind might achieve.   Although Augustine admittedly affirms that human 
beings perform their acts of knowing in the light of God’s eternal types, he does not 
say this on the assumption that God imposes ideas but on the basis of the belief that 
human minds come to know what God always knows as they form their own 
judgments in view of the knowledge that He is the source of all that is good, which is 
to see things as they really are.   
Doing what God wants one to do by adhering to the Good in this way is the 
very definition of exercising the freedom to know, in Augustine’s opinion.132  While 
the incorporeal Good cannot be reduced to any one corporeal good, all corporeal 
goods have something in common with the incorporeal one.  Evaluating corporeal 
goods in view of the fact that they come from an all-inclusive and invisible Good 
therefore liberates the intellect to find the good in all things and thus find happiness 
through all things.  In willing the Common Good, which is what God wants human 
beings to will, consequently, they will their own good.133  They do not abandon but 
obtain and enjoy the freedom and happiness they are born to desire.134  They begin to 
participate already in an eternal life that consists in knowing the Goodness of God.   
To gaze on the Goodness of God Himself is the measure of humankind, as 
Augustine understands it.  Even though human beings cannot reach their intellectual 
measure in the present life, Augustine affirms that they approach it as they acquire 
knowledge of the good, or increase in number, under the impetus of the love of God, 
which is the weight of humankind.135  Measure, number, and weight cooperate to 
increase a person’s level of participation in the divine essence, in other words, as the 
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intellect accumulates knowledge in the love of God.  Indeed, the intellect, its 
knowledge, and its love are the measure, number, and weight, respectively, of the 
human being. 
As human persons employ the God-given power to identify His Goodness in 
the goods He has made, one thing in diverse things, they order various goods 
according to the type and level of goodness they manifest and ‘preserve justice’ or 
proper order among them.  The view of all things in their just order, Augustine 
writes, is the divine perspective on the goodness of the natural order through which 
the intellect participates in God’s knowledge of His own Goodness.136  It is the wise 
outlook that is needed in order to exercise dominion over creation and thus do what 
God wanted human beings to do, which is to call His creation good, as He does.137  
By maintaining such a sound perspective on reality, human beings reflect the imago 
dei and prepare to encounter the Reality.138 
At the end of De Genesi, Augustine explains how the vision of temporal 
goods readies the mind to gaze upon the eternal Good.  Although he admits that the 
‘matter of thought’ comes into the mind from without, he observes that, “the intellect 
completes its operation within, and nothing in it lies outside the nature of the mind 
itself.”139  On those grounds, he infers that the final mode of vision need not pass 
away, even when the first two modes of vision that operate on corporeal bodies do.  
When the corporeal order is replaced with an incorporeal one, Augustine writes, the 
intellect will go on operating for eternity on spiritual realities in a manner continuous 
with the way it worked with respect to corporeal bodies in time.140  In paradise, the 
three modes of vision will be perfected.141  
Fall 
 There is a double edge to Augustine’s influentia model of divine causality.  
While God willed that human beings constantly adhere to the incorporeal Good 
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however they willed to do this, He also gave them the faculties to grasp corporeal 
realities.142  Because they possess the latter set of faculties, human beings are 
mutable.  They do not always act in the same way.  In the original order of creation, 
there was nothing detrimental about human mutability, for this was what enabled 
human beings to be creative and to grow in the knowledge of the Good.  Even so, it 
was owing to the interplay of the mutable with the immutable in human nature that 
the first man and woman could think to deviate from the Good.  
 A turn a way from the Common Good as Augustine explains it is a turn 
towards a private good, which is no good at all, since the individual good is the 
Common Good.143  To make that turn is to forfeit the knowledge of God as Highest 
Good and His image along with it.  By losing sight of the spiritual Being of God, the 
intellect forgets itself as a spiritual being designed to know Him.  In forgetting its 
purpose, it also forgets the purpose of all the things it knows, which is to lead it 
towards the knowledge of the Good and makes the prideful mistake of regarding 
itself and its desires as Highest Goods. 
 This inordinate perception of the self, which is accompanied by an inordinate 
self-love, incapacitates the intellect for the purposes of governing the operations of 
the imagination.  It causes the intellect to lose its proper—divine—perspective on 
reality.  In the fallen context, the intellect is prone to take the finite goods represented 
by the imagination as ultimate goods.144  The unsupervised imagination leads the 
intellect to become “so absorbed in material forms that it judges them to be the only 
ones and refers all its functions towards those ends.145  The unchecked imagination 
thus compels the mind to invent its own idea of what constitutes the happy life, 
which almost always consists in temporal attainments.146 
 When the intellect overestimates the goodness of finite goods in this manner, 
the mind ceases to know them as they really are, namely, as goods that contribute to 
but do not constitute the incorporeal Good.  Ironically, the loss of perspective on 
what is really good makes it difficult if not impossible to see the good at all, 
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particularly in a fallen world, where the good is hard to find in many circumstances, 
and goods that are found are fleeting.  Since the mind that cannot see the good or 
hope to obtain it can never be happy, the fallen tendency to pursue the happy life one 
has defined for oneself is even more ironically bound to become the cause of 
dissatisfaction with one’s own life.  In committing themselves to doing anything in 
order to grasp and retain the happy life as they have defined it, Augustine observes 
that fallen human beings become the cause of their own unhappiness.147  In the same 
instance, they became the cause of the strife, disorder, and injustice that begins to 
prevail amongst them as they pursue their personal, and frequently conflicting, 
desires.   
 Augustine often refers to human sin as a privation of the good and denies that 
is has any positive existence.  Far from denying the detrimental effects of sin, 
privation theory rightly identifies that sin keeps things from being the way they are 
supposed to be; it makes the abnormal the norm.  When anyone sins, they act out of 
character.  All people want to feel at ease to be themselves, which is to be happy.  
Yet the deep-seated belief that something temporal can make or break happiness 
prevents people from thriving because it makes them slaves to their desires for 
transient things, and therefore nurtures attitudes like pride, envy, and fear, which 
inhibit or distort the free expression of the human spirit.  Acknowledging and 
abandoning that belief would enable people to recover the freedom to be themselves.  
Yet this is precisely the measure for securing happiness that fallen persons are 
generally unwilling to take.   
The tragedy of the fallen situation is that people who try to be most useful to 
themselves by looking out for their own interests actually do what is most harmful to 
themselves.148  In attempting to love themselves, they hate themselves.  What is even 
more tragic to Augustine’s mind is that people are usually perplexed when they find 
unhappiness after they have taken every precaution to ensure personal happiness.  
The difference between human beings living before and after the fall, as 
Augustine summarizes it, is the difference between those that know and love God as 
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the Highest Good, and therefore have the ability to always find the Good in temporal 
things, and thus to see it eternally, and those that consider the self and the pursuit of 
its desires to be so great a good, and for that very reason are unable to find lasting 
happiness either temporally or eternally.149 
Redemption 
 In books four and thirteen of De Trinitate, Augustine explains how the Son of 
God restored the knowledge of God as the Highest Good He originally imparted 
human beings made in His image.150  Since the scope of human knowledge had been 
restricted to corporeal goods in virtue of the loss of the knowledge of the incorporeal 
Good, the Son of God took on bodily form.151  In doing this, Augustine insists, the 
Son maintained His divine form.  The bishop sees no inherent contradiction in the 
claim that Christ was fully human and fully divine, because human beings were 
created with the potential for union with God.  In assuming a human body, the Son 
did not abandon His divine nature.  He actualized the potential to know God fully 
that human beings could only realize at the end of time.  Inasmuch as Christ 
accomplished this feat in a human body, Augustine writes, the Father was greater 
than Him.  Inasmuch as He retained His divine form throughout His life on earth, He 
remained co-equal with the Father at all times.152  
 On earth, Christ continued His eternal work of reflecting the Spirit of God, 
who gestures towards the Father, His work of being the Image of the Trinity.  His 
coming to reveal God thus revealed for the first time that the nature of God is 
Triune.153  Because He revealed the Triune nature of God while in the form of a 
human person, the Incarnate Son at once revealed that all human persons are made in 
the image of the Trinity and are therefore designed to work as He does, that is, to 
bring glory to the Father in all the work the human spirit undertakes.154 
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When Christ ascended into heaven and sent the Spirit at Pentecost, His 
revelation was fully and finally accomplished.  In His absence, Christ confirmed the 
message He always sought to communicate, namely, that the Spirit of God is not to 
glorify the self but another, the Father, who only ever gives of Himself.  By 
removing the actual presence of the Spirit of God through the departure of His own 
Person, Christ reinstated the potential of all human beings to live according to the 
Spirit He made manifest.155  
 By placing faith in Christ, Augustine teaches, a person rediscovers that God 
the Father is the Highest Good and is therefore awakened to the realization that He 
has always been the proper object of the intellect, which has always unwittingly 
borne His image.156  In making this discovery, the mind becomes aware of its 
ultimate cognitive objective, which is to know the Good and to evaluate the goods it 
knows now with that goal in mind.157  Although faith raises awareness of the image, 
Augustine emphasizes that it does not immediately restore it.  He thus proceeds to 
address the question why human beings are not in fact restored to their original state 
of happiness, in view of the fact that Christ is said to have accomplished the work of 
redemption once and for all. 
 In this effort, the bishop draws the reader’s attention back to the purpose for 
which human beings were made.  They were designed to consistently work, of their 
own volition, in the spirit that prioritizes the Highest Good over temporal goods.  
This is exactly the habit that was broken at the fall.  While faith in Christ entails 
profession of belief in God as the Highest Good and thus reinstates the potential to 
work in this habit, it does not instantly re-create the habit.  Instead, faith must be 
made effective and the effects of the fall gradually overcome, as reason practices 
operating in an attitude of faith until the habit of doing so is fully re-formed.158   
On Augustine’s reasoning, Christ did not carry the redeemed away 
immediately so that they might re-learn to become exactly what He made them to be, 
that God’s unchanging purposes might be fulfilled.  Although laborious, Augustine 
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thinks human efforts to form faithful habits are nonetheless gratifying, inasmuch as 
they help the labourer appreciate what it means to be made in God’s image in a way 
that was not possible before the Fall.  In the struggle to re-conform to the lost image 
of God, the wayfarer has the benefit of experiencing a double measure of the grace 
God eternally, unchangeably gives.   
Conforming to God’s Image 
In the first half of De Trinitate, Augustine sought to give an account of the 
Triune nature of God as Christ revealed it.  In the latter half of the treatise, starting 
with book eight, his goal is to train the reader to imitate Christ.159  As the Imago Dei, 
Christ constantly manifested the Spirit of God and brought glory to the Father.  A 
profession of faith in His revelation of the Triune God is the Highest Good thus 
instigates the process of conforming to His image.160  Making progress in the 
process, to Augustine, means consistently applying the knowledge of God as Highest 
Good in knowing created goods, subjecting the lower to the higher, and the temporal 
to the eternal.  Striving to evaluate reality in view of the knowledge of God entails 
learning to regard it as Christ did and by these means preparing to see God.  
Because it is impossible to know ‘what God is’ in the present life, as God is 
invisible by nature, Augustine concludes that the intellect must begin to participate in 
its eternal life through the knowledge of ‘what God is not’.  What God is not, he goes 
on to say, is ‘earth or heaven’.161  By this Augustine means to reiterate that the good 
things the intellect knows now are not the Good.162  When the mind maintains this 
perspective, it brings the knowledge of God as the ultimate source of human 
happiness to bear on the knowledge of the natural order and simultaneously checks 
the fallen tendency to consider any object under consideration as something able to 
make or break human happiness.  As this perspective gradually enables the intellect 
to overcome the effects of the fall, it teaches the mind to reason with faith in Christ 
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and so to reason like Christ, who saw all things working for the Father’s good 
purposes.163   
At first glance, it may seem that Augustine’s ‘negative way’ to God 
denigrates all that ‘God is not’ whether it be in heaven or on earth.  Yet Augustine 
thinks just the opposite is true.  As the bishop demonstrates when he delineates his 
psychological analogies, the denial of any limited good as an ultimate good actually 
allows the intellect to affirm creation’s goodness in all circumstances.  In a fallen 
world where the good is often hard to find and the goods that are found are fleeting, 
the ‘negative’ affirmation that anything in reality can take the place of God enables 
one to give a positive assessment of the good in reality and thus to agree with God’s 
own assessment of reality at all times.    
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALOGIES TO THE TRINITY 
After offering his preliminary explanation of the ‘negative way’ to God in 
book eight, Augustine proceeds to introduce his seven psychological analogies to the 
Trinity.  With these analogies, Augustine teaches the reader how to cultivate the skill 
of reasoning in faith, through which faith is made effective as reason’s outlook and 
ultimately actions are aligned to the professed belief in the Triune God as Highest 
Good.  
Intellect, Knowledge, Love (mens, notita, amor) 
 The first trinity Augustine presents in book nine is not strictly psychological.  
It is the trinity of lover, beloved, and the love that is shared between them.  This 
trinity is introduced to underscore the point that cultivating love for the God who is 
Love is the goal of conforming to His image.  In that sense, love is primary for 
Augustine.  Even so, Augustine notes that it is impossible to love what one does not 
first know at least to some extent.164  Although one may not fully know what one 
loves at the outset, which is the case with God, one must at least know that one wants 
to know it—that one desires it—in order to eventually know and love it in entirety.  
Such ‘unfulfilled’ knowledge is what Augustine would call faith, and there is a sense 
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in which knowledge takes priority over love in cases where what is loved is not yet 
obtained, inasmuch as knowledge is needed to bring one to an as yet unattained love.  
To have faith in anything is to have designated it as an object of desire.  Faith and 
desire thus anticipate total knowledge and love of the object of faith and desire.   
 Neither faith nor desire takes priority absolutely in Augustine’s thought, 
because love compels one to know and knowledge enables one to love an object that 
still stands at a distance.  At every step which contributes to closing the distance, the 
faith and desire that anticipate love and knowledge, respectively, are present 
together.  Indeed, either one is indicative of the other.  From his perspective, every 
act of loving is equally an act of knowing, as well as the other way around.   
 This discussion naturally leads into Augustine’s introduction of the first 
psychological analogy: the trinity of intellect, knowledge, and love, which 
corresponds to the measure, number, and weight of human beings.165  In presenting 
this analogy, the bishop reiterates that the intellect accumulates knowledge of what it 
desires most.  Ultimately, moreover, it is bound to obtain what it really loves, 
because that which the intellect loves is the unfulfilled objective that directs all its 
knowing efforts and that is increasingly realized as those efforts are made. 
When the knowledge and love of God was lost at the fall, Augustine recalls 
that human beings began to conform their desires to creatures rather than to God.  
They accumulated knowledge that contributed to the fulfilment of the desires for 
creatures rather than for God and thus forfeited the chance of attaining the Love of 
God.166  If anyone hopes to learn to reason in faith and eventually experience the 
desired object of faith, divine love, consequently, Augustine instructs that they must 
commit to loving the Triune God above all else by placing faith in Christ who 
revealed Him as the Highest Good.167  The commitment to God that is made in faith 
is the expression of an overriding desire for Him, which reinstates the intellect’s 
potential to pursue knowledge with the goal of loving God.   
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Memory, Understanding, Will (memoria, intellegentia, voluntas) 
 According to Augustine, the second trinity of memory, understanding, and 
will is an even closer analogy to the Trinity because it reveals how knowledge is 
actually acquired—and the image of the Trinity reflected—in the mode of 
intellectual vision.168  When Augustine explains this analogy in book ten, building on 
conclusions drawn in previous works, what he elaborates his theory of knowledge.169  
In this section, I will describe how memory, understanding, and will co-operate to 
bring about a general growth in knowledge.  Subsequently, I will show how the 
understanding the intellect acquires mediates an understanding of God, or increases 
the faith that readies the mind to understand God, when the intellect that operates 
desires God.    
According to the Bishop of Hippo, memory is what defines and distinguishes  
the human person.  Memory retains all the information that has been acquired 
through the three modes of cognition.  It therefore includes all a person’s 
experiences, the thoughts and feelings that were associated with those experiences, 
desires for certain kinds of experience, skills acquired through experience, and 
stories about others’ experiences.170  While the memory preserves all the judgments 
the intellect has formed in the understanding on the basis of first or second-hand 
experience, it also keeps many hazier images that were formed with little or no notice 
by one that did not understand or consider important what was perceived when it was 
perceived. 
 This happens, for example, when someone says something to another person 
who is not paying attention and therefore proves unable to account for what was said, 
Augustine writes.171  Although the truth is technically that the speaker was heard, the 
hearer did not feel compelled to commit the speaker’s words to memory because 
there was no desire to attend to the person that was communicating or to the message 
that was being communicated.  As Augustine emphasizes, the will is what compels a 
person to pay attention to or ignore information.  It forms the intellect’s desires for 
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understanding.  The understanding a person already possesses, moreover, is 
representative of the type of knowledge that one desires, and it attunes the will to 
seek new understanding that satisfies those same fundamental desires.   
Whenever the memory acquires or becomes aware of information that the 
mind’s current understanding cannot explain but has been predisposed by the will to 
desire to explain, a will for new understanding arises.  The sense of dissatisfaction or 
restlessness that accompanies the sudden realization that the understanding is 
inadequate to the will for understanding incites the mind to search through the 
resources in the memory that were previously unnoticed or thought unimportant in 
order to render the new experience intelligible.172  
 If all the resources needed to come to a conclusion that satisfies the will 
cannot be found in the memory, the will is likely to direct the intellect to go in search 
of new information that will serve this end.173  For this reason, the quest for 
understanding in the memory that both limits and defines the quest, as Augustine 
describes it, is not entirely straightforward.  On his account, the intellect makes 
progress towards understanding by trial and error as it forms, tests, rejects, and 
revises possible solutions to the problem it wills to resolve.174 
 Augustine does not seem to think the discursive nature of human knowledge 
a detriment to it.  To the contrary, he contends that ‘doubt’ indicates that one is 
actively and effectively engaged in the knowing process.  ‘If I doubt’, Augustine 
writes, ‘I exist’ (si fallor, sum).175  This conclusion is just one of the corollaries of his 
belief that no finite good is the supreme Good.  On the grounds of the claim that no 
particular truth the intellect knows can capture the whole Truth, Augustine concludes 
that things are “in some respects true precisely because they are in other respects 
false.”176   
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By ‘false’ Augustine simply means less than the whole of Truth.  The 
knowledge that something is false, as knowledge of the sense in which it is less than 
totally true, is knowledge of the way in which it can come closer to the truth.177  
Since true things cannot succeed in becoming “what they want or ought to be as long 
as they refuse to be false,”178 Augustine thinks it senseless to “dread falsities and 
desire truth”179 as if it were the only good.  In an order where there is no full 
disclosure of Truth, what is false has a truth bearing function.   
To illustrate how an idea of inferior truth facilitates efforts to better know the 
truth, Augustine discusses the difference between his knowledge of the city of 
Carthage, which he had seen, and the city of Alexandria, which he had never seen.180  
Augustine states that he had many ideas about Carthage, which he knew to be true 
because he had been a witness to their truth.  His idea of Alexandria, on the other 
hand, was much more vague, at least initially.  In order to envision what Alexandria 
was like, the bishop relates that he had to combine images of cities he had visited, 
such as Carthage, with facts he learned about Alexandria from external sources.   
The discovery of something new about cities in general or Alexandria in 
particular incited him to reject or adjust an existing concept of Alexandria and make 
it more precise.  In the process and for the purpose of forming a picture of 
Alexandria, then, Augustine notes that he had to turn the attention of his mind to 
many things besides Alexandria that promised to help him understand Alexandria.  In 
time, he developed a fuller picture of Alexandria, which not only increased his desire 
to experience the city but also made him feel ready to navigate it on arrival.  The 
vision of Alexandria itself would substantiate his correct insights into the nature of 
the city and correct those aspects of his idea that remained inaccurate.  
The ‘erroneous’ ideas of Alexandria that Augustine entertained along the way 
to forming a clearer picture of it—with the help of mental pictures of things he had 
known by first or second hand—were not detrimental but beneficial to his knowing 
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effort, because they stimulated the intellect on towards truer understanding.181  In 
affirming this, Augustine indicates that the way to know what is closer to the truth is 
a negative one.  To come to know any truth, in other words, the intellect must accept 
that it does not already know what it desires to know, but only that it desires to know 
it.  The desire to grasp a certain truth doubles as faith that it exists to be known.  
Together, desire and faith motivate and direct the search for the truth.182   
The way towards attaining the desired understanding of truth is basically a 
way of falsification, in which the intellect converts the things it knows, which are not 
the thing it desires to know, into speculations about the truth it does not know but 
wishes to know.  For Augustine, the way of negation is the only way a human being 
can come to understand any as yet unknown truth, because one can only come to 
know what one does not know by drawing on what one already knows.   
On this model of cognition, provisional ideas about the truth must be 
entertained and then revised or rejected with further experience until they 
increasingly resemble and then seem to accurately represent the truth that is desired.  
All knowing is ‘faith seeking understanding’ (fides quaerens intellectum), because all 
knowing efforts begin with an unfulfilled cognitive objective, which is reached by 
degrees as the intellect employs what it does know to pursue understanding of the 
unknown.   
According to Augustine, the only way to err on the cognitive scheme of faith 
seeking understanding, such that what is false utterly fails to bear the truth and is 
patently false, is to settle on a notion of the truth that obviously falls short of the 
desired truth, that is, to intentionally and counter-intuitively obstruct the way to truth 
through the passivity of apathy or the activity of lying to oneself and others about the 
nature of the truth.183 
Each time the intellect forms or adjusts an idea of what is true, Augustine 
states that the product is “that which was hidden in the memory in a dispersed and 
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disordered way before [the thought] was conceived, the [understanding], which 
arises from memory in the thought when it is perceived, and the will which combines 
both and so from these two and itself as a third completes one single thing.”184  
Augustine calls the resulting instance of understanding a ‘trinity of understanding’; 
the image of that trinity, a ‘mental word’ (verbum mentis).185  This, in short, is an 
idea or judgment. 
According to Augustine, the trinities of the understanding return to the 
memory where they collide with what is already tacitly stored there.  As a result of 
this, what was formerly thought insignificant may now appear important.  The 
trinities may prompt the will to direct the mind to transform contents in the memory, 
which were previously unnoticed, into matters of explicit understanding.  Because of 
the newly attained trinity of thought, consequently, the mind may suddenly be 
motivated to attend to things without as well as within.  Whenever this happens, the 
process of concept production facilitated by the cooperation of memory, 
understanding, and will, begins all over again.   
For this reason, Augustine states that the trinities of understanding are 
constantly changing.186  They are intrinsically fecund, because the memory, or the 
tacit component of human knowledge, enacts the possibility of combining, 
expanding, and multiplying the trinities of thought ad infinitum, through cooperation 
with the understanding and the will.   Augustine’s appeal to the tacit component in 
human knowledge is his way of resolving the Platonic Meno paradox.187  The 
paradox is that one must already know X in order to be able to identify it, yet there is 
no need to discover X if one already knows it.  
Augustine solves the paradox by pointing out that faith in X necessarily 
precedes knowledge of X where human agents are concerned.188  The intellect can, 
indeed must, know X potentially or tacitly before it knows X actually or explicitly.  It 
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knows X inasmuch as it believes there is X to know and has the knowledge of X as 
its cognitive objective.  This is the sense in which the mind can simultaneously not 
know and know X.  It does not know X so far as it has yet to substantiate the belief 
that X can be known through efforts to acquire understanding of X. 
The Stoic philosophers that dominated the philosophical scene before 
Augustine’s time resolved the paradox by arguing that it is possible for human beings 
to form ideas that correspond precisely to attendant realities.  Their contention was 
that all things were made in accord with a fixed seminal reason, which the mind was 
suited to grasp.189  The academic sceptics of Augustine’s day reacted to this view and 
declared Plato’s paradox impossible to resolve on the grounds that the undefined 
elements and inaccuracies inherent in the knowing process undermine the possibility 
of attaining knowledge of truth such as the Stoics defined it.  They therefore 
concluded that certain knowledge of truth was altogether unattainable.   
In De Trinitate as in earlier works, Augustine overturns the arguments of the 
Stoics and the sceptics, even while enacting their true intuitions, by demonstrating 
that faith is the very precondition of gaining and growing in the knowledge of 
truth.190  He affirms with the Stoics that knowledge of truth in eternal types is 
achievable.  Yet he also echoes the sceptical claim that totalized knowledge of truth 
is unattainable in the human situation.  Augustine finds away to substantiate the 
accurate insights of both Stoics and sceptics while avoiding their extreme 
conclusions, inasmuch as he argues that the obtainment of truth is contingent upon 
the faith-based acknowledgement that one does not have it at the outset and that one 
must make progress towards it by trial and error.  In arguing along these lines, 
Augustine allows for the undefined elements and inaccuracies inherent in the 
knowing process without denying the possibility of knowing truth.  He affirms and 
redeems what was valuable in the observations of philosophers working in both Stoic 
and sceptical camps, with the help of a fundamentally Platonist concept of human 
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knowledge which he transformed into his theory of knowledge as ‘faith seeking 
understanding’.    
In this theory, the mind is said to increase in understanding the better that 
understanding is committed to the memory.  Thus there are two senses in which 
knowledge may be buried deeply in the memory.  It may be buried there due to 
neglect, that is, because it is a matter of faith that has yet to be made a matter of 
explicit understanding.  Or it may be buried because it has been so well memorized 
that the mind does not need to think about its understanding in order to act in 
accordance with it.    
When anyone memorizes or places faith in an idea that has been formed, they 
automatically bring the idea bear in other acts of knowing.  If the rules of a foreign 
language have been effectively memorized, to take Augustine’s example, then they 
are applied as a matter of habit and the language is fluently spoken.191  In cases like 
this one, the mind is said to know the rules better the less frequently it needs to pause 
and refer to them.  In fact, stopping to think about them means halting progress in 
using them as tools to know other things, which is exactly what Augustine thinks 
ideas are: resources discovery rather than ends in themselves. 
The more fluently the mind employs its ideas in its heuristic efforts, the more 
certain it is about them.  Certitude is something functional for Augustine, and it 
comes in degrees.  It is not the sort of thing the mind either has or does not have.  
The less time the intellect spends determining whether or how to regard reality in the 
light of an idea and the more easily it simply acts on its ideas, the more certain it is 
about them.  Ideas the memory has truly interiorized are exteriorized.  If human 
patterns of thought have truly changed, the change will be evidenced in changed 
behaviour, and in the ability to give an account of how behaviours were changed.  
This is how Augustine seems to think ideas are justified, namely, by their effects and 
by those that can give explain the cause of the effect.  On the basis of the belief that 
the things a person commits to memory determine who they are and the way they 
think and act, Augustine speaks of the memory as the “essence, mind, and life” 
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(essentia, mens, vita)192 of human persons.  And he reminds that reader that what 
they are bound to memorize is what they desire most. 
On Augustine’s account, that which one desires most is that which one thinks 
will bring the greatest happienss.  All people retain in the memory the desire to be 
happy, Augustine observes.  The desire for happiness is the overarching desire that 
directs the intellect to acquire knowledge of the source of happiness in which the 
intellect has placed its faith.  At the Fall, the bishop recalls, the intellect began to put 
faith in corporeal, temporal things.  The problem with this approach in his view is 
that such truths can always be negated.  They do not constitute the whole Truth, 
which is what the misguided intellect tries to make them be.  The whole Truth is and 
can only be incorporeal and eternal, for only such a Truth embraces all modes and 
manifestations of truth.  True happiness can only be found in the universal Truth that 
is the truth of all particular truths.  Yet the universal Truth is precisely the one that 
cannot be grasped in the realm of finite truths.   
While the elusiveness of Truth led the academic sceptics to despair of 
knowing truth at all, where the Stoics counter-intuitively denied its elusiveness, 
Augustine regards it as a positive, inasmuch as it motivates the intellect that reasons 
in faith to strive without ceasing after the object of faith, as opposed to abandoning 
the search for truth or stopping short in the middle of it.  From his perspective, the 
striving is the source of the mind’s integrity in the present life, and it is what ensures 
that the mind will attain what it desires in the life to come.   
What the person of faith remembers when they remember the desire for the 
truth that brings happiness is the desire for God.193  Yet the recollection of God is 
inevitably only a faint one at first.  Although initial faith in Christ removes the cause 
of the mind’s disease, by restoring the knowledge that the knowledge of God is the 
intellect’s ultimate cognitive goal, Augustine reasons that this is just the first step 
towards being cured.  The second is to heal the disease itself.194 The disease, which is 
the loss of the knowledge of God, is healed as the intellect memorizes how to operate 
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under the influence of faith in God as the Highest Good and thus comes to truly 
believe that God is the real source of happiness.195   
Faith in Christ establishes that what-God-is is what the mind aims to know, 
even though it does not disclose what-God-is.  Because of faith, the desire to know 
God is brought to bear in efforts to know other things.  Love for God directs the 
mind to attend to some things, to ignore others.  It determines what the mind 
perceives and the way it perceives it.  It checks the inordinate desire for temporal 
things, and transfers those desires from “temporal to eternal things, from visible to 
intelligible things, from carnal to spiritual things.” 196   
With the effort to know God as with the effort to know any truth, it is 
possible to love what one does not know and live in accordance with love by loving 
those things that promise to help the mind attain the goal.197  Reasoning in faith 
makes it possible to obtain the knowledge of God because it prevents the mind from 
judging its objects as the ultimate goods they are not and allows it to consider them 
as the limited goods they really are.   
Philosophers are often troubled by the realization that human minds are prone 
to entertain false beliefs.  What is even more unsettling is the fact that the mind often 
remains unaware of its false beliefs until a major mistake exposes them.  If one was 
conscious that one adhered to false beliefs, one would likely try to be rid of them.  
The problem is that it seems human beings have no recourse apart from failure to 
discovering what they wrongly affirm.  As a result, some conclude that it is 
impossible to be objective in the human situation. 
Augustine thinks differently.  In his opinion, adherence to belief in God as 
Highest Good can help to check false beliefs before they cause harm.  Such beliefs 
are usually based in one way or another on a misguided assumption that some object 
or personal interest matters more than anything else.  The elevation of a private good 
to the status of all-inclusive good tends to skew the mind’s perception of everything 
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else it encounters.  Indeed, the mind that forms a habit of operating on such skewed 
perceptions effectively comes to reside in an ‘alternate reality’ that is bound to come 
crashing down when it becomes necessary to face reality.  The way to prevent this 
from happening, in Augustine’s view, is to train the mind not to live in a fanciful 
world in the first place, but to embrace and evaluate reality as it really is.   
To see things from such a sound perspective is to see them from the ‘divine’ 
perspective that guards against the formation of patently false beliefs.  In a realm 
where it is impossible to transcend space and time in order to determine what is true 
and how to act, the only access human subjects have to objective knowledge comes 
through orientation towards the objective of knowing God, the Highest Good.  This 
perspective on created reality that faith in Christ produces is the affect of faith in 
what the mind is seeking to understand.  That faith doubles as the understanding of 
the God that has yet to be understood.  To live by faith with respect to temporal 
things is to live in accordance with the knowledge of God and thus to form a habit 
that will last for eternity.198  
 Since every faithful act of knowing is performed in a spirit that glorifies the 
Father, Augustine affirms that every such act is performed in remembrance of Christ 
who manifested the Spirit of God and therefore keeps on manifesting it.  Memory’s 
labour to make understanding adequate to the will, and its eventual success signifies 
the switch from ‘the old to the new’ that took place in the mystery of His Passion and 
Resurrection.199  The ‘epiphany’ of new understanding, which is at once the end of 
one effort to gain understanding and the beginning of another, represents both the 
coming of Christ and His eventual coming again.  That epiphany gives the mind a 
sense of the final rest in God, yet the fleetingness of the will’s satisfaction with its 
understanding teaches it not to stop short in the pursuit of understanding until the 
final rest is actually achieved.   
Every act of knowing that remembers the life and work of Christ helps the 
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intellect better memorize how to reason with faith in Christ.200  As the mind 
improves at this skill, its ordinary thoughts are formed through the Son, in the human 
spirit, under the influence of the belief that the Father is the Highest Good.  Mundane 
thought processes come to double as prayers in virtue of the formality under which 
they are conceived.  Through those thought processes, conversely, the mind 
discovers the profound and inexhaustible significance of the principles it always 
professed to believe, as per Plato’s Meno.  It thereby comes to increasingly 
participate subjectively in the objective knowledge of God.  As this happens, 
thoughts and eventually actions become consistent with the stated belief that God is 
the Highest Good. 
According to Augustine, one who faithfully strives to determine the way and 
extent to all things accomplish some good, overcoming limited ideas of what is good 
and the effects of the fall in the process, cultivates the habit of reasoning in the mind 
of Christ who remained confident in God’s goodness, even in the hour of His 
death.201  The upshot of privation theory, after all, is that trials, evil, and even 
personal sin need not devastate nor separate one from the love of God, whose good 
plans can never be upset.  Every time a person performs an act of reasoning in faith, 
the mind’s mode of thinking becomes increasingly analogous to Christ.  The effaced 
image of God that was always there is renewed and progressively conformed to the 
image of Him who is the Image of God.   
The ultimate goal of the process of faith seeking understanding is to learn to 
reason in faith automatically and reflect God’s image consistently, as if by second 
nature, that is, to pray without ceasing.  Where this happens, the image of God is 
restored and a person predisposed to work at all times in the spirit of Christ who 
knew and made known the goodness of the Father.202  The restoration of the image of 
God restores the will’s freedom to direct the intellect anywhere and understand 
God’s goodness through its understanding of all other things and to ‘preserve justice’ 
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amongst them.  All of this prepares the intellect for the vision of the Good Itself, the 
sight of the Reality that accomplishes the perfection of the image.203  
Ability, Learning, Use (ingenium, doctrina, usus) 
 The next analogy Augustine presents in book ten is that of ability, learning 
and use.   With this analogy, the bishop validates the many different ways of putting 
memory, understanding, and will to work, that is, the many ways of directing 
thoughts and actions to the Father, through the Son, in the human spirit.204  Although 
he affirms that all people of faith share the objective of knowing and loving God, 
Augustine emphasizes that each one can only strive to obtain that objective in 
accordance with an individual level and type of ability.205  While all are informed by 
belief in the Triune God, each applies the belief in a different way.  The faith they 
share is not one in number, but one in kind.  There are as many ways to express the 
Spirit of God as there are human spirits.  
 Because no one has achieved the goal of fully knowing and loving God, yet 
all with faith strive towards it, Augustine reasons that the efforts of one can inform 
those of another working towards this end.  Here as ever, the way forward on the 
path of faith seeking understanding is a way of negation.  One can learn more about 
what it means to place faith in God from another, whose way of desiring God differs 
from one’s own.  As the people of faith express their faith through acts of charity or 
the use of individual abilities their individual faith increases as well as the faith of the 
community.206  In the context of Christian faith, the different types and level of 
ability are not a cause for competition but celebration, inasmuch as the way one 
imitates Christ can stimulate another to imitate Christ in yet another of an infinite 
number of possible ways.207  
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Corporeal & Spiritual Analogies 
When the intellect works in accordance with its abilities from the standpoint 
of faith, it considers temporal things with reference to eternal things and therefore 
contemplates the eternal by means of the temporal.  The acquisition of knowledge 
(scientia) through corporeal and spiritual vision becomes coextensive with the 
acquisition of the wisdom (sapientia) of God.208  As the intellect conforms to Christ, 
in other words, the senses and imagination are simultaneously redeemed. 
For this reason, Augustine argues in book eleven that analogies to the Trinity 
can be detected in the corporeal and spiritual faculties, in addition to the three 
associated with intellectual vision (intellect, knowledge, love; memory, 
understanding, will; ability, learning, use).  An analogy can be discerned in corporeal 
vision, for instance, which consists in the sight of the eyes, the object seen, and the 
perceptive faculties’ attention to its object.209  The trinity of spiritual vision unites the 
memory of sense perceptions, the internal comparison of perceptions, and the 
resulting image.210  Although the corporeal and spiritual faculties cannot properly be 
said to bear the image of God since they will pass away, they are rightly described as 
analogues because they will be perfected even as they are replaced with two related 
faculties, which will carry on operating in an incorporeal order as the ‘imperfect’ 
faculties worked in the corporeal one.  
In books twelve and thirteen, Augustine goes on to discuss knowledge and 
wisdom, respectively, offering the mature statement of the views on these issues he 
espoused in the early Cassiciacum dialogues, especially De ordine and De beata vita, 
and spelling out the interrelationship between the analogies associated with 
knowledge-seeking lower reason and wisdom-seeking higher reason.211  In De 
ordine, Augustine had stressed the importance of learning to identify order in the 
cosmos, or becoming trained in matters of science, before attempting to engage in 
philosophical speculation as to the principles that underlie the natural order, an 
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inquiry that falls within the domain of wisdom.212  He argued that the most effective 
way to form an intellectual habit of identifying cosmological order is through a 
course of study in the liberal arts (i.e. the trivium: grammar, logic, rhetoric; and 
quadrivium: arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy), such as the one he outlines in 
De ordine itself.  Learning to discern order, he contends, readies the mind to 
formulate the principles that account for that order through philosophical and 
theological inquiries.  Knowledge, consequently, must precede wisdom.  
Although he affirms this, Augustine also observes that the cursory concept of 
wisdom the untrained mind inevitably though possibly unwittingly entertains is 
bound to impact the way it pursues knowledge, and eventually wisdom itself.  For 
this reason, he thinks it important to impress upon the young mind that wisdom is 
that of the Triune God.  If the student is allowed to go in search of knowledge 
without awareness of God’s wisdom, Augustine says s/he may come under the 
impression that the acquisition of knowledge has no ultimate purpose and may fail to 
do anything useful with it.213  Alternatively, s/he may feel at liberty to define wisdom 
as s/he wills and grow inordinately proud.  In another scenario Augustine describes 
in De beata vita, the student may become so disturbed by the disordered state of the 
fallen world that s/he declares there to be no principles of order—no wisdom—at all.  
The learning of such students, Augustine writes, does not make them people of study 
but of cares; not people of discretion but people ready to discredit everything.214   
Another class of scholars Augustine mentions includes those like the 
Platonists, who give a sound explanation of the principles that uphold the natural 
order, but fail to give an adequate account of the identity of the divine being that 
sustains the real world order and His ability to intervene in it.  They therefore fail, in 
his opinion, to actually enact their true understanding, which is something he thinks 
the doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation equip the Christian scholar to accomplish.215  
Even though Augustine praises the Platonists for their intellectual achievements, he 
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struggles to call the wisdom of philosophers genuine inasmuch as they fail to name 
the source of their wisdom.216 
Augustine describes the dangers associated with embarking on the pursuit of 
knowledge and even wisdom without a preliminary notion of what wisdom is in 
order to reiterate the importance of starting with the belief that wisdom belongs to 
the Triune God.  There are two ways Augustine thinks a person of faith can adhere to 
divine wisdom: the way of authority and the way of reason.  
The first way more or less bypasses the road to wisdom through knowledge 
outlined above.  It is the shortest and safest way of achieving wisdom because it 
involves holding fast to wisdom and never letting go of it.  Many of the faithful take 
this first way.  “Although they are exceedingly strong in the faith itself,” Augustine 
writes, “they are not exceedingly strong in science.”217  Nevertheless, the wisdom of 
Christ predisposes them to affirm that there are indeed principles of order that 
underlie reality, even if they cannot or do not care to understand what those 
principles are.218   
For their purposes, the wisdom of Christ is summarized in the cross, upon 
which the Son of God demonstrated that supposed evils can fulfill divine purposes as 
much as apparent goods, inordinately desired, can hinder the realization of those 
purposes.219  The cross enables those that cling to it to acknowledge that, “all the 
things…called evil are still not outside the divine order,”220 and to endure whatever 
adversity may befall them on the assumption that all things work together for God 
for those who love God.221  The cross or wisdom of Christ thus prevents those that 
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believe on authority from placing their hope in temporal things or from directing the 
desire for happiness towards them;222 it instead accustoms them to keep their gaze 
fixed on eternal things.223  It gives them the perspective on their daily lives and 
difficulties that is required for the attainment of eternal life.   
Augustine affirms that the way of authority takes priority in the order of 
operation since faith is the forerunner of understanding.224  Yet he calls the way of 
reason the more highly prized object of desire.225  Although the way of authority 
schools people of faith in the wisdom they need to gain eternal life, Augustine does 
not think it fosters the highest possible level of enjoyment of the temporal life.  The 
way of reason, which comes to the eternal not by passing over but by passing 
through the temporal is preferable to his mind, because it promotes the happy life of 
using all things on earth to enjoy God that human beings were originally intended to 
live. 
Those that desire such a life are instructed to not merely believe that God is 
the source of order but to also seek to grasp the profundity of that belief by bringing 
it to bear in the very study of His order, however they are gifted to undertake it.  
Although those that take the way of authority have the potential to reflect God’s 
image just as constantly as those on the way of reason, such that there is no objective 
discrepancy as regards the clarity of the image, there is a subjectively realizable 
difference, of which the person who takes the way of reason becomes aware when 
s/he realizes the happiness that accompanies discoveries of the implications of God’s 
wisdom for science, faith for the endeavours of human reason.226   
The reasoning believer is bound to make such a discovery each time s/he 
identifies order in some sector of the cosmos and identifies the principle of order 
with the work of the Father, through the Son, in the Holy Spirit, which is the 
principle that Christ revealed.227  As s/he does this, the study of order becomes the 
sort of enterprise in negative theology Augustine encourages his readers to undertake 
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in the second half of De Trinitate, that is, an inquiry in which all things that are ‘not 
God’ are regarded under the formality of belief in God.  For those that embark on 
this enterprise, the study of all conceivable things doubles as the study of God, and 
this renders both intellectual pursuits and faith profoundly meaningful to the 
inquirers that are prepared through them to find God in all things.228 
Although their circumstances may change, Augustine insists that the wise 
perspective such persons have cultivated need never alter.229  Those that maintain it 
can “survey all things and find nothing unarranged, unclassed, or unassigned to its 
own place.”230  They consistently find traces of spiritual things in material things;231 
they conform to God rather than the world in every encounter with reality.232  The 
steadiness of their outlook prepares them to gaze unflinchingly on God.  In the 
present, it enables them to properly order their lives, that is, to live virtuously and be 
happy.233   
On Augustine’s account, the wise outlook that transforms the life of those 
that obtain it further equips them to “help the godly and defend against the 
godless.”234  The perspective on the temporal that is informed by the eternal prepares 
the wise to address questions about the relationship between faith and life that may 
arise amongst believers.  Besides its instructive power in a Christian setting, a wise 
perspective is the source of persuasive power in the context of dialogue with 
unbelieving thinkers.  It allows the wise to address the same questions that concern 
philosophers from the standpoint of faith and to appropriate philosophical insights in 
doing this.235  In dealing with those issues, they are able to challenge and correct the 
mistakes of philosophers even while substantiating their true insights, as Augustine 
did with the Stoics and sceptics.  Moreover, they can explain how Christian doctrines 
enact the possibility of giving the sort of philosophical account essentially 
monotheist philosophers such as the Platonists desired to give. 
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In De Trinitate, Augustine testifies that his purpose is to provide his erudite 
Christian readers with the conceptual tools to grow in Christian wisdom, that is, to 
form a habit of reconciling reason and faith in their own outlook, so as to be ready on 
demand to bring faith to Christ in dealing with any dilemma, difficult question, or 
difference in perspective that might arise.  By leaning to bring the wisdom of God to 
bear on matters of ‘science’, Augustine concludes that his readers can carry on the 
redemptive work of Christ in the world, even as they discover how to use the world’s 
resources to enjoy God, as He originally intended.   
Self Memory, Understanding, Love (meminit sui, intellegit se, diligit se)
  
Augustine introduced his first five psychological analogies for the purpose of 
helping his readers to form a habit of reasoning in faith in accordance with their 
individual abilities, that they might bear witness to the profound implications of 
divine wisdom for all areas of scientific inquiry and for the philosophic inquiry itself.  
To form that habit, as Augustine explains in book fourteen, is to remember, 
understand, and love the self.236  To remember, understand, and love oneself, 
consequently, is to have trained the mind to operate in a manner analogous to the 
mind of Christ, who glorified the Father in each expression of His Spirit, and so 
constantly reflected the image of the Trinity.   
In many respects, Augustine considers this last psychological analogy to the 
Trinity to be the most significant one, because its presence on the mind is indicative 
of the presence of all the five analogies that come before it.  This sixth analogy can 
only be detected on the intellect that has come by way of the foregoing analogies to 
experience the restoration of the image of God.  While the first five trinities are 
designed to teach the mind how to reason in this faith, the presence of this sixth 
trinity indicates that one has truly learned to reconcile faith with reason in their own 
mind, that the purpose of the earlier trinities has been fulfilled.   
In order to remember, understand, and love the self, Augustine reminds his 
readers, it is first necessary to overcome the effects of the loss of the knowledge and 
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love of the self that occurred at the fall.  That loss was the immediate repercussion of 
the loss of knowledge and love for God, inasmuch as the true knowledge of the self 
is simply the knowledge of the self as created an image of God.  When the 
knowledge of God was forfeited at the fall, the self lost awareness of itself as a 
spiritual being designed for the eternal knowledge of God.  It began to admire itself 
“for being what in fact it is not: the source of its own value and potency.”237  In 
consequence, it came to rate itself and its selfish desires above all else.238  The lack 
of genuine self-knowledge resulted in a perverse love of the self.  It became the chief 
cause of human error, because it compelled the self to make decisions on the basis of 
a false view of the self as the centre of reality.239  In operating on this false 
assumption, the self did not help itself.  Rather, it “did that which is opposed to the 
self.”240  Its so-called self-love was in fact a form of self-hatred.  
Although the image of God remained as ever, the intellect was not conscious 
of its presence and for this reason failed to reflect it.  As Augustine famously writes, 
“You were with me, but I was not with You.”241  Since he regards the knowledge and 
love of God and self as coextensive, Augustine argues that the two that were 
abandoned together must be recovered simultaneously.242  The memory, 
understanding, and love of the self must accompany the memory, understanding, and 
love of God. 
The first step towards fully remembering, understanding, and loving God, 
entails the negation of the self as an end in itself.  Such an act enacts the possibility 
of knowing God through all the things He is not, which are encountered in the real 
world order.  The act is performed when one places faith in Christ, who taught that 
the Triune God is truly the Highest Good, and did so in His own kenotic assumption 
of human form, and through His suffering and death on the cross.   
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The decision to deny that the self and its desires are ultimate represents a 
choice to figuratively follow Christ to Golgotha from Gethsemene, where He gave up 
the will to do His own will.  The continuous traversal of that path, by checking 
selfish desires, enables one to gradually re-learn to genuinely know and love oneself.  
The failure to do these things prevents the intellect from rightly identifying its 
abilities, or causes it to rate their value too high or too low.  It preoccupies the human 
spirit with thoughts and worries about itself that keep it from expressing itself.  The 
ongoing denial of selfish desires, by contrast, liberates the self from such inhibitions.  
By degrees, consequently, it enables one to re-learn how to be oneself, as one would 
be if one were not hindered by fallen attitudes like envy, fear, and pride. 
The decision to sacrifice the self is not a commitment to abandon one’s 
identify, consequently, but to rediscover it, and thus the image of God.  The empty 
tomb at the end of Christ’s own sacrificial path reinforces that what is forfeited 
through the sacrifice of the self is not the human spirit itself but only what 
encumbered it.243  The alleged loss is truly a gain, and what is gained is a resurrected 
life in which the human spirit becomes free to automatically express itself to the 
glory of God the Father, to constantly reflect the image of the Trinity.  The one that 
imitates Christ in this manner need not give a thought to the self because this one has 
memorized how to behave like oneself and has therefore achieved the goal of self-
reflection, which is self-forgetfulness.  As Augustine writes, “it is one thing not to 
know oneself, and another thing not to think of oneself.”244  The one who knows the 
spirit within so well as to need to time to ponder how to be oneself is the one that can 
actually do so. 
Such interior awareness—which signals that one fully remembers, 
understands, and loves oneself—predisposes one to determine precisely when and 
where and how to behave in any circumstance that may arise.245  Just as wisdom 
helps one judge how to order ordinary goods, so it also enables one to identify the 
self and others as uniquely gifted bearers of the good and thus facilitates the effort to 
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decide where people could put their abilities to the most effective use.246  In short, 
the coextensive love of God and self makes it clear how to love one’s neighbour as 
oneself.247  It exposes where one ought to freely give of oneself and where one ought 
to withhold oneself for the sake of expressing as much love as one’s limited abilities 
and resources enable one to express.248  It enables one to differentiate between the 
love others request, often for selfish reasons, and the sort of love that God has 
empowered one to give. 
In summary, the memory, understanding, and love of the self is accompanied 
by a view of the self ‘with open face’ which readies the mind for the face-to-face 
vision of God that is to come.249  When Christ returns and the need for faith passes 
away, the memory, understanding and love of oneself, which is the memory, 
understanding, and love of the faith one placed in God, will be transformed into the 
seventh and last Trinitarian analogue that can be found upon the mind.  Because of 
that trinity, the mind will finally ascend to the knowledge of the Triune God Himself.  
That trinity will determine the manner in which the mind goes about the eternal 
knowledge of the Trinity.250  The whole goal of De Trinitate, Augustine concludes in 
book fifteen, is to prepare the reader to make a seamless transition to the beatific 
vision of the Trinity, to learn to enjoy Him to the greatest possible extent in the 
present, so as to maximize the experience of Him for eternity. 
CRITICISMS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALOGIES 
Thus far, I have analyzed Augustine’s psychological analogies on the 
assumption that they outline the dynamic cognitive process of conforming to the 
image of God.  Although this is an assumption that arises from a reading of De 
Trinitate that remains attentive to its content, context, and structure, it is an 
assumption that is by no means generally made.  In this section, I briefly address the 
claims of those that do not envision the function of the analogies as I do nor see that 
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function as plausible.  For a more detailed response to the charges commonly 
levelled against the second half of Augustine’s treatise on the Trinity, I refer the 
reader to the groundbreaking work of scholars that have come before me. 
Until recently, academics tended to regard Augustine’s psychological 
analogies as mere “illustrations of three-in-oneness.”251  Olivier Du Roy is one well-
known proponent of the view that the analogies are indicative of Augustine’s belief 
that an understanding of the Triune God can be derived from an analogy to human 
consciousness, where the image of the Trinity is found.252  Assuming that Augustine 
did indeed argue that the knowledge of God can be inferred from self-reflection or 
even from the evaluation of creation, Karl Barth accused the bishop of founding the 
discipline of natural theology, which operates on the belief that it is possible to 
discern the existence and nature of God apart from the revelation of Christ.253   
In arguing along such lines, Du Roy and those that accept his conclusions 
contend that Augustine believed that a person contemplates God best when “retired 
from the world in glorious and intimate seclusion.”254  He thus “handed over to the 
West a dogmatic pattern which tends to cut off the knowledge of the Trinity from the 
economy of salvation.”255  Similar charges, incidentally, have been put to Anselm 
and Aquinas. 
The last mentioned charge is one that theologians like Karl Rahner, Catherine 
La Cugna, and Colin Gunton have picked up and advanced.256  According to La 
Cugna, Augustine’s psychological analogies establish that, “God and the self are 
complete and enclosed within themselves rather than when in relationship with 
others.”257  His model therefore promotes individualism and sidesteps the social 
responsibilities that constitute human life.  It segregates the knowledge of God 
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Himself from ordinary life.  Related to La Cugna’s contention that the psychological 
analogies promote an unhealthy individualism is the accusation that they outline a 
characteristically Neo-Platonic ascent or ‘exercise of the mind’, which involves 
“training in modes of thinking increasingly ‘interior’, and increasingly free from [the 
senses] and images.”258   
Interpreted in the aforementioned ways, Augustine’s teaching on the 
psychological analogies is said to anticipate the ‘turn to the subject’ that took place 
in the thought of Descartes and Kant and has since fallen into disrepute as a result of 
the work of Nietzche, Heidegger, and others.259  In making such a turn, Descartes, 
and incipiently, Augustine, promoted the notion that the human subject is the 
adequate and autonomous foundation for all knowledge, as opposed to a cognitive 
participant in an objective order founded by God.  When the intellect reflects upon 
itself, it gains access to a priori ideas that act as rules for infallibly true and certain 
judgment, ideas which come from God and therefore provide ‘ontological’ proof for 
His existence.  
The chief advocate of the argument for continuity between Augustinian 
interiority and Cartesian subjectivity is Charles Taylor, though there are many other 
proponents of his thesis.260  According to Taylor, nothing evidences Augustine’s 
affinity to Cartesian subjectivity and solipsism so much as his psychological 
analogies to the Trinity.261  It is no exaggeration, in his view, to say that Augustine 
“bequeathed inwardness to the Western tradition of thought.”262   
In recent years, Augustine has been cleared of all such accusations against the 
second half of his treatise on the Trinity.  The researches of several scholars in 
particular have confirmed that Augustine successfully accomplished exactly what he 
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had been accused of failing to do.  The latter of half of De Trinitate, “far from being 
responsible for a move towards individualism in anthropology and abstract theism in 
theology,”263 actually subverts such trends.264  Augustine does not segregate 
Trinitarian theology from the economy of salvation or from real life, much less 
advocate a natural theology.  To the contrary, theology is for him “nothing other than 
a teasing out of what it is to be converted and to come to live in Christ.”265  “Books 
eight through fifteen of De Trinitate are most accurately characterized as a 
consideration of the process…of reformation or redemption.”266  The psychological 
analogies are “more than a series of approximating models; they are a description of 
the route to the knowledge of God.”267  They present a “plan to reform the self 
through the economy of salvation that discloses…the being of God.”268  By 
following that plan, a person learns that s/he is in the best position to enjoy life when 
s/he prefers the Triune God to other goods.  
On the basis of arguments like these, I have tried to explain in greater detail 
what Augustine’s plan for conforming the intellect to God’s image entails.  The 
motivation for doing this was to grasp exactly how Augustine understands the 
mechanics of cognition, so as to be able to determine how divine illumination 
features in them. 
Divine Illumination 
 In both De Trinitate and De genesi, Augustine invokes illumination to illustrate 
                                                                                                                                     
262 Ibid., 131. 
263 Luigi Gioia, Theological Epistemology, 16. 
264 John Milbank argues this in, “Sacred Triads: Augustine and the Indo-European Soul,” Modern 
Theology 13:4 (1997): 451-74, as do Lewis Ayres and Rowan Williams in the works mentioned in 
following two footnotes.  Michael Hanby’s Augustine and Modernity offers the definitive response on 
this issue. 
265 Rowan Williams, “De Trinitate,” 850.  See also his article titled, “The Paradoxes of Self-
Knowledge in the De Trinitate,” in Collectanea Augustiniana: Augustine: Presbyter factus sum (New 
York: Peter Lang, 1993), 121-134. 
266 Lewis Ayres, “The Discipline of Self-Knowledge in Augustine’s De Trinitate Book X,” in The 
Passionate Intellect (Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University, 1995), 264. 
267 Oliver O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine, 75; Luigi Gioia, Theological 
Epistemology, 232-97. 
268 Ellen T. Charry, By the Renewing of Your Minds, 132. 
   86
the work of the human intellect.269  These references invite the reader to interpret the 
account of knowledge that is presented in earlier works like De magistro and 
Soliloquia in a larger theological context.  In this section, I will summarize the 
passages of the dialogues relevant to the discussion of divine illumination and show 
how they can be retrospectively read in that context.   
 In De magistro, Augustine recounts a dialogue between himself and his son 
Adeodatus concerning the nature of signs and the possibility of teaching and learning 
using signs, especially words.  Towards the end of the discussion, the father and son 
conclude that it is impossible to teach solely by means of signs.  A teacher can create 
an environment conducive to comprehending signs and can stimulate the student to 
attend to the realities the signs signify.  Yet the teacher’s efforts merely create the 
potential to learn the meaning of signs, inasmuch as a teacher is unable to impress 
ideas upon a student that is unwilling or incapable of understanding them.  There is 
only so long a teacher can work with an incompliant student, and it is only a matter 
of time until such a student rejects the teacher.270 
A willing and capable learner, by contrast, is in a position to benefit from the 
teacher’s guidance and expertise.  When the teacher calls upon such a student to 
draw a conclusion about the meaning of signs that are unknown on the basis of s/he 
does know, the student can give a response.  Furthermore, s/he can comprehend the 
teacher’s own interpretation of the signs.  In light of all this, Augustine and 
Adeodatus reiterate that the efficacy of teaching is just as contingent upon the 
teachable spirit of the student as it is on the skill of the teacher.  
In the second part of the dialogue, Augustine follows up on the foregoing by 
claiming that divine illumination prepares one to learn and therefore enacts the 
possibility of both teaching and learning.  There, he speaks of Christ as the inner 
Teacher, the light all consult to gain understanding.271  Christ, Augustine states, both 
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bestowed “the light of the mind by His enlightening act”272 at creation and reminded 
that the light was dwelling within at His Incarnation.273  Because of His illumination, 
human minds may continually experience the enlightening action of God from 
within.274  
 The contemporary reader, removed from Augustine’s intellectual context, can 
surely find reason to conclude that illumination is an extrinsic force upon reading 
these statements at face value.  There is ample evidence in them to bolster the belief 
that Augustine thinks human teaching and learning are possible only because Christ 
effectively sets Himself up as an ‘external’ internal teacher, who communicates 
whatever is taught by a human teacher, either by impressing ideas on the intellect 
innately or ontologistically or by performing cognitive work on behalf of the mind.   
 An evaluation of De magistro that takes the context of Augustine’s mature 
theological treatises into consideration, however, precludes such concepts of Christ’s 
illuminating work.  That context-attentive reading highlights Augustine’s belief that 
what Christ illumines is simply the Triune nature of God.  Augustine had already 
hinted in this direction in the Soliloquia, where he speaks of God as “the intelligible 
Light, from whom and through whom and in whom all things intelligibly shine.”275  
Just as there are three things in the sun, “that it is, that it shines, and that it 
illumines,” he writes, “so also in that most hidden God there are three things, 
namely, that He is, that He is known, and that He makes other things to be 
known.”276  In making these claims, Augustine speaks obliquely of the three Persons 
of the Trinity that the Person of Jesus Christ revealed as He illumined God’s Triune 
nature.  He suggests, moreover, that the doctrine of the Trinity is required to enact 
the account of knowledge by illumination the Platonists espoused. 
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 When the Person of Christ illumined God’s Triune nature, He simultaneously 
revealed the image of the Trinity on all human persons.  As the image of the Trinity, 
He demonstrated that reflecting the image means expressing the spirit for the purpose 
of illuminating the nature of the Father.  When He illumined His image on human 
beings, therefore, Christ awakened the minds that are receptive in faith to the 
realization that they were designed to illumine the Father through the expression of 
the mind (animus = spirit) itself, as Christ did.  What Christ made known, in other 
words, was that the intrinsic intellectual ability human beings have to illumine reality 
is truly an ability to illumine God, who gave that ability so that human beings could 
use it however they willed, so long as they willed to glorify God.   
 When human beings ceased to will this end at the fall, they lost the ability to 
teach and learn from one another, inasmuch as a commonality of will is the 
prerequisite for interpersonal communication.  If Augustine contends that it is 
impossible to teach and learn apart from the illumination of Christ, it is not because 
Christ is needed to act as an ‘external’ internal teacher of the mind.  To suggest that 
this is the role Augustine posits for him in the last part of De magistro would be to 
defeat the whole purpose of first part, which was to establish that there is very little 
someone on the outside can do to directly impose ideas on a student; the initiative to 
learn must come from the student.   
In illumining humanity, Christ did not put himself in such an impossible 
position.  Rather, he empowered human beings to put themselves in a position to 
communicate with one another when He relayed that those with divergent wills to 
learn ought to will whatever they will in accordance with His will to glorify the 
Father.  By conveying this, Christ revealed how those with diverse wills could unite 
themselves in one will, so as to learn from one another.  He did not suspend normal 
patterns of teaching and learning.  Instead, He reinstated them.  
Although the above has made it clear that Christ illumines human minds to 
the knowledge that the proper use of their intrinsic intellectual ability is to illumine 
the nature of God by bringing faith in Him to bear on acts of knowing, it remains to 
show how the statements Augustine makes in De magistro which imply that Christ’s 
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illumination gives cognitive content, plays a part in the process of cognition, and 
provides cognitive certitude are to be interpreted.   
De Genesi made it unmistakably clear that that the sources of human 
knowledge are empirical, and thus rendered the opinion that Christ directly imposes 
the sensible or intelligible content of knowledge untenable.  Admittedly, Augustine 
denies that it is possible to derive ideas from the incessantly changing sense realm 
and insists that this can only be accomplished by the intellect.277  Yet neither the 
wholesale rejection of sense knowledge nor adherence to a theory of innate ideas is 
implicit in this claim, which is made to establish the point that the sense perceptive 
faculties are themselves unfit to perform the characteristically intellectual work of 
forming ideas.  Although human beings perceive things through the bodily senses, 
Augustine explains that, “they do not judge them by the senses.”278  This is the task 
of higher reason, the proper work of which is intelligible ideas.  In virtue of the fact 
that those ideas are not sensible, even if they are formed on the basis of empirical 
data, they can permanently determine the nature and extent of the mind’s knowledge 
of God.  
When higher reason is informed by faith in God as the Highest Good, 
concepts about reality are formed under the auspices of this belief.  Although the 
perspective that is shaped by faith reveals nothing about God Himself since it bears 
on created realities, it doubles as the knowledge of God that is attainable in this life, 
inasmuch as it is affected by belief in Him.279  That perspective, which represents the 
‘indirect’ vision of God, whets the appetite of the mind for the direct vision of Him 
that is to be enjoyed in the life to come and motivates the intellect to continue 
striving towards it as it currently can, namely, by maintaining a perspective on the 
world that is informed by faith.   
Such perspective is attained when the ideas the mind comes to entertain are 
formed through the use of the intellect the Son imparted, which is the manifestation 
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of the human spirit, on the assumption that the Father is ultimate.  Since God the 
Father eternally knows Himself through the Son and in the Spirit, He pre-contains 
though He does not predetermine all the ideas humans conceive in the same way, and 
through which He permits them to participate at their own initiative and of their own 
accord in an eternal life that consists in knowing the idea of God. 
Inasmuch as the intellect forms its ideas through the Son in a spirit that seeks 
to glorify the Father, the illumination of Christ has an ongoing effect in the cognitive 
process.  The cognitive process, conversely, replays the events of His life, death, and 
resurrection, such that His work is ‘remembered’ in every human act of knowing.  
Still, Christ does not directly instigate or interfere with the cognitive process, for this 
is accomplished by the human spirit that works in His Spirit and makes His 
illumination effective by stoking rather than extinguishing His light through the 
dispositions of the will.280  
Evaluated in this way, Christ’s illumination comes into relief as an intrinsic, 
empowering, and indirect, as opposed to extrinsic, interfering, and direct, one.  His 
influence does not force but free the human spirit to gesture towards the Father as it 
wills.  If illumination is ineffective or goes unacknowledged, it is not the fault of 
Christ but of the one whose spirit refuses to work in His Spirit that exalts the Father. 
The prevalent ignorance of the light, Augustine states, is owing to the fact 
that God the Father inhabits light inaccessible, and the eyes of human minds have 
been darkened by the fallen notion that corporeal images are all-encompassing lights 
by which to judge the world.281  In discussing illumination in Soliloquia, Augustine 
states that faith opens or cleanses the eyes of the mind, converting them from 
darkness to the light of the realization that the mind is created in God’s image in 
order to know like God, and eventually, to know God.282  Initial conversion to faith 
in God raises the intellect’s awareness of its creation in God’s image and initiates the 
process of conforming to the image.  
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Augustine explains that the preliminary cleansing involves acknowledging 
that God is not represented by any of the corporeal images of heaven and earth.283  
The initial purification of the eyes teaches the mind to believe that the “interior eyes 
are judges of the exterior ones” and that “the former [should be preferred] to the 
latter.”284  To have clean eyes, in other words, is to affirm that none of the things that 
are or will be seen by the light is the light itself.  The light itself is God, and although 
traces of Him can be found everywhere, He is contained nowhere.  
Although the opening or cleansing of the eyes through faith instigates the 
process of the mind’s conversion to the light, it does not at once adjust them to the 
light.  The image of God on the mind is still an effaced one, or as Augustine 
elaborates in Soliloquia, the all-encompassing Light of God is too bright for those 
whose limited concepts of goodness and light make them unaccustomed to it.  For 
this reason, the newly illumined are forced to assume a ‘bent over’ (incurvatus se) 
cognitive position, to bow the head and cover the eyes for protection. 
 In order to stand upright and actually see the world in the light of faith, 
Augustine exhorts the illumined to invite the influence of more illumination, which is 
to undergo the renewal of the image of God.285  The eyes of the mind adjust to the 
vision of the world at ever higher, more inclusive grades of light by judging whatever 
can be seen under the level of light they are able to bear.  Judging by the light means 
cultivating the habit of acknowledging that nothing that is seen by the light is itself 
an all-consuming light by which to judge the world.  The light by which all things are 
perceived and distinguished is not diffused in any one place.286 
 The low grade of light at which the mind initially sees results in narrow-
minded judgments, since darkness excludes what light subsumes and rightly 
includes.  Dimness of vision prevents the mind from grasping fully that the 
‘unspeakable and incomprehensible light of minds’ encompasses far more than the 
light of one outlook ever could, from seeing that there is more than one road to 
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wisdom and allowing others to guide and be guided towards that light “according to 
their health and endurance.”287  Darkened vision, in summary, makes the mind 
unsure about what can be subsumed under the light, fostering aversions and fears and 
inhibiting one’s ability to confidently navigate the world in the light of the 
knowledge that there is a place for everything in it in the divine order, and thus to 
identify God’s goodness in all things. 
 Augustine urges those responsible for teaching others to see reality by that 
light to begin to do so at the level that the newly illumined eyes are able to handle, 
and not a shade brighter, lest the student become afraid and abandon the effort to 
make progress in illumination.  Some that have “eyes so healthy and vigorous that 
they can fearlessly turn towards the sun as soon as they are opened,”288 Augustine 
says, should not be held back by their teachers, but only cautioned against pride.  
Others with weaker eyesight must gradually adjust to the light if they are to grow 
comfortable manoeuvring in it.  They must see what they can see at a bearable grade 
of light.  That experience, according to Augustine, leads naturally to vision at a 
higher degree of illumination, for it is impossible to forget what it was like to come 
to see more clearly and to realize where vision remained obscure.   
The maintenance of an ‘illumined’ outlook cannot allow the mind to stay in 
the dimness of light forever if the mind faithfully adheres to the knowledge that the 
light includes all things but is reduced to none.  The contrast between darkness and 
light trains the eyes of the mind to move, by trial and error, out of darkness and into 
brighter levels of light that dispel the shadows that prevent the realization that the 
light is an all-inclusive one, in which a greater share can be gained as one learns from 
others and from all circumstances how that light operates.289   Each time the intellect 
attempts to judge in the light, it cultivates the habit of doing so, undergoing the 
renewal of God’s imagine and bringing that blurry image into clearer focus.  The 
eyes of the mind, in sum, become better accustomed to the light of God. 
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As the intellect forms a habit of viewing reality in the light of faith, it realizes 
the benefits of adhering to faith and therefore grows more confident in the faith.  
Growth in certainty with respect to the belief in God is therefore accompanied by a 
proportional increase in certitude as regards the knowledge of the nature of reality.  
Certainty that arises as a result of having formed a habit of seeing in the light doubles 
as the confidence in the Light Itself that remains unseen yet will be seen by the eyes 
that adjust to it.290   
It is by learning to use one’s ability to see in the light in one’s own way and 
at one’s own pace, Augustine affirms, that “each one according to his strength, grows 
more proficient…and [prepares to] sooner or later behold the sun without flinching 
and with immense delight.”291  As the mind improvingly realizes that there is a place 
for all things under the common light, Augustine explains, the head is lifted by 
degrees and the hands drawn away from the eyes until the illumined stands upright 
with arms outstretched and sees all that surrounds under the constant ray of divine 
light that exposes the distinctive purpose and worth of all things.  Augustine calls 
attention to the fact that the human person that assumes this cognitive position poises 
like Christ who accomplished the redemption of mankind on the cross and is thus 
restored to His image, or re-enabled to constantly reflect it.292  
 Postured with eyes and heart and mind and arms wide open, the constantly 
illumined intellect reactivates the freedom of the will to manoeuvre the world 
without the inhibitions of fallen attitudes like narrow-mindedness and fear which 
formerly tainted the light of the mind, and to find the good in any circumstance, 
furthering the redemptive work of Christ in the same instance.293  Although 
circumstances may change, Augustine insists the illumined perspective on them need 
not shift any more than the Son’s steady gaze upon the Father in the Spirit.  Changes 
in circumstance, far from disquieting the steadily illumined outlook, can only 
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broaden the scope of illumined judgment.294 
 On Augustine’s account, the capacity to put all things into a perspective that 
identifies the good in them—and thus to ‘redeem’ them—is the locus of the 
persuasive power of the Christian faith in the Triune God the Incarnate Christ 
revealed.295  Faithful and faithless thinkers alike can only observe the truth of 
Christian doctrines in their effects.  Furthermore, the effects of the doctrines can only 
be identified by the human mind that is affected by them and is competent to give an 
account of what is affected by—the Triune God—and how—the Incarnation of 
Christ.  To convince anyone that divine illumination is the condition of possibility of 
all human knowledge, Augustine emphasizes, one can only persuade in the way 
Christ Himself modelled: not by shining the light of faith in the eyes of those who 
reason in the dark but by showing how effective it is to see reality and walk through 
it in the light that fosters fellowship with others.  
While Augustine admits that all minds are illumined inasmuch as they are put 
to work, he believes that it is only those that can name the unseen source of the Light 
and give an account of its coming into the world that can be properly called 
illumined. Although he affirms that pagan thinkers like the Platonists, and even the 
Stoics and sceptics, are illumined to the degree they employed the intellectual faculty 
for ‘seeking oneness’, he notes that they lack awareness of the Triune God as the 
unity they seek. 
Those cognizant of their illumination have the power to appropriate into their 
perspective the views of those who are unwittingly illumined, as Augustine did 
through his use of Platonist, Stoic, and sceptic ideas, because they know the light that 
encompasses all.  The reverse, however, does not always hold true.  Those who are 
not aware of the all-inclusive nature of the light, that reduce it to some finite light, 
may struggle to be receptive to different or opposing outlooks.  The resources to 
embrace and redeem all that surrounds, to foster conversation amongst those with 
different perspectives, are unique to the Christian faith.  Augustine’s outline of the 
cognitive process involved in conforming to God’s image in De Trinitate 
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particularly, which is illustrated by the metaphor of illumination to which he appeals 
all throughout his writings, is designed to teach the reader how to put those resources 
to use. 
 The metaphor of illumination as it has been explained here is a metaphor for 
the intrinsic cognitive capacity God gives all human beings.  As such, illumination 
theory evades the problems typically associated with extrinsic interpretations of it.  
Those interpretations have not done justice to the later developed theological context 
of the account Augustine most famously mentions in early ‘philosophical’ works.  
The study that has been undertaken here has implicitly indicated that there is a great 
deal of thematic continuity between those early works and the treatise on the Trinity; 
the latter may even be the mature expression of the speculations on the relationship 
between faith and reason Augustine made in his dialogues.  Most importantly for the 
present purposes, however, the inquiry into Augustine’s treatise on Genesis and 
above all on the Trinity has thrown into relief the logic of his claim that divine 
illumination is the condition of possibility of all human knowledge.  
 
 
























Thus far, I have shown that Augustine regarded illumination as an illustration 
of the cognitive process involved in conforming to the image of God.  By adhering to 
illumination, he affirmed, the mind learns to regard every situation in light of the 
knowledge that happiness does not depend upon temporal circumstances, but is 
found in the eternal God.  Through the time of Anselm of Canterbury, it would 
appear that Western scholars tended to assume Augustine’s theological outlook.  For 
this reason, his theory of knowledge was commonly considered intelligible and 
authoritative.  In fact, it was Augustine’s concept of knowledge that carried early 
Medieval thinkers through the tumultuous period between the death of Augustine in 
430 and the birth of Anselm in 1033.   
During the last years of his life, Augustine composed his De civitate dei 
while he watched the Roman Empire enter into the initial stages of its decline.  In 
that treatise, the bishop exhorts his readers to bear in mind that the ‘city of God’ will 
not come to the same end as the ‘city of man’ in which it is presently situated, and he 
encourages them to face the trials of the times with that truth in view.  He urges 
them, in short, to maintain an illumined outlook on reality.  In the years surrounding 
Augustine’s death, Roman territories were repeatedly invaded by barbarian groups.  
As the conquerors divided the vast realm amongst themselves, they tended to 
undermine political and economic stability and decentralize learning.  The social 
upheaval that resulted is a major reason why the six centuries intervening between 
Augustine and Anselm have been referred to as ‘dark ages’.   
As Augustine had predicted, however, the darkness did not prevail in the city 
of God.  If anything, the uncertain times threw the constancy of the divine light into 
sharper relief.  Late antique Roman statesman such as Boethius and Cassiodorus 
testified that an illumined outlook enabled them to negotiate volatile political 
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circumstances and face the challenges posed by rulers that opposed their faith.296  
The sixth century Pope Gregory the Great admitted to relying on illumination in his 
efforts to bring stability to the institutional Church.  Additionally, he preached a 
message of illumination.  In his Magna moralia, Gregory calls the faithful to shine 
like stars in the dark times and patiently wait for the dawn of God.297  Following 
Augustine, he instructs his readers to repent of placing their hope in the present life.  
On his account, this attitude of ‘compunction’ renders the ‘inner man’ receptive to 
the light of God that puts the external circumstances the ‘outer man’ faces into 
perspective.298   
In his hagiographical writings, Gregory presents St. Benedict as the model of 
an illumined mindset.299  He recounts a vision in which Benedict perceived the whole 
world gathered under one brilliant beam of light, which showed him how to manage 
great challenges and serve others facing them.  In 529, Benedict had founded his first 
monastic community.  Most of the many abbeys that were opened across the Western 
world between 550 and 1150, and even beyond the original borders of the former 
Roman Empire, were associated with his order.   
In between the regular periods of prayer prescribed by the liturgy of the 
hours, Benedictine monks pored over the classic works of the Christian tradition, 
especially those of Augustine.  In addition to this, they laboured to support 
themselves.  Through their various economic and agricultural enterprises, the 
Benedictines came to hold “a prominent position in the social landscape of Europe as 
landowning corporations, ecclesiastical patrons, and [proponents of] learning.”300  In 
an era characterized by uncertainty and disunity, the Benedictine abbeys scattered 
throughout Western Christendom created intellectual, religious, and social 
continuity.  Benedict’s illumined outlook, brought to bear on a grand scale, 
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contributed to the preservation and perpetuation of Christian thought and culture in 
the early Middle Ages.   
The light began to return to the city of man around the turn of the ninth 
century, when Charlemagne was crowned the first Holy Roman Emperor.  Under his 
rule, the West enjoyed a measure of government-driven political and economic 
stability, which put Charlemagne and his successors in the position to initiate a 
revival of learning.  Charlemagne founded schools based in the local cathedrals, 
where select members of the clergy received basic training in the liberal arts, 
Scripture, and the Church Fathers, so as to become more competent administrators of 
church affairs.301  In addition, the Emperor collected for scholarly use the few 
classical texts that were available in Latin at the time, including Boethius’ Latin 
translation of Aristotle’s six logical treatises (Organon), Boethius’ own philosophical 
and theological works, and a few works by Cicero and Plato.302  He appointed Alcuin 
of York as master of the arts for members of his own court, and he commissioned 
independent scholars to complete new translations, the most important of which was 
John Scotus Eriugena’s Latin version of the works of Pseudo-Dionysius.   
Prior to the Carolingian renaissance, scholars working in the monastic setting 
had focused their intellectual energies on the study of Scripture and the Fathers.  That 
is not to say that they failed to conduct rigorous researches or that they had no 
training in the liberal disciplines.303  Even so, with exceptions like Isidore of Seville 
and the Venerable Bede, the pursuit of sapientia rather than scientia was the order of 
the day.  
By the eleventh century, the trends that were set during the Carolingian 
renaissance had become norms.  Scholarly work was undertaken in monasteries as 
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well as in cathedral schools and the rapidly proliferating intellectual circles that were 
sheltered by no institution but were governed by a master of the arts who determined 
the course of study for his pupils.304  In these schools, there was a growing interest in 
the liberal arts and philosophy and in the logical or dialectical methods of inquiry 
that were employed in these disciplines.  By Anselm’s day, this development had 
rendered necessary a re-appraisal of the relationship between liberal and Biblical 
studies, scientia and sapientia.305  After so long a time on the ‘way of authority’, as 
Augustine had called it, eleventh-century scholars faced the challenge of determining 
what it would mean in their context to take his ‘way of reason’.   
Naturally, there were those that favoured the use of logic in the study of 
Scripture as well as those that opposed it to varying degrees.  Contrary to what has 
been supposed for so long, however, the ‘dialecticians’ did not construe reason as the 
only source of truth, and the ‘anti-dialecticians’ did not declare reason superfluous 
for the purposes of faith.306  As has been shown in the recent past, eleventh-century 
scholars simply did not operate on the modern conceptual extremes of rationalism 
and fideism.  They commonly affirmed that faith is fundamental and that reason 
constitutes the very image of God.  They only disagreed when it came to deciding 
where and how to lay the emphasis.307  
Through his studies at the Benedictine abbey of Bec, Anselm would have 
become well versed in Augustine’s thought before he succeeded his master Lanfranc 
as prior there.308  As prior and later abbot, Anselm composed treatises that have been 
called the most perfect definitions of Augustine’s views.309  In the process, he built 
the abbey’s reputation as one of the foremost centres of learning in Europe, until he 
was appointed Archbishop of Canterbury in 1093.  For these reasons, the monks who 
were in his care while he was at Bec requested that he explain in light of the 
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contemporary controversies how they might come to know God through the use of 
reason.310 
In the preface to his Monologion, Anselm indicates that his response is 
effectively an update of the message Augustine communicates over the course of De 
Trinitate.311  There, Augustine had given a two-fold account of the way to 
contemplate God.  In the first half of the treatise, he explained the message of 
Scripture that the Incarnate Christ revealed, which is that the Father is the Highest 
Good, who works all things through the Son in the Spirit.  In other words, he 
explained how to interpret Scripture in a positive sense, how to think about God on 
the basis of authority.   
In the second half, Augustine showed how to apply the doctrine of the Trinity 
and thus ‘negatively’ interpret Scripture by bringing faith in Christ to bear in efforts 
to understand reality.  Through those efforts, Augustine insisted, one could learn to 
find the good in all things and to identify experiences of goodness with the work of 
the Father, through the Son, in the Spirit, that is, to know God by means of the 
reasoning faculty.   
According to Augustine, both the way of authority and the way of reason are 
equally legitimate ways to God, inasmuch as they begin and end with the wisdom 
that God is the Highest Good, that He is so because He is Triune, and that this is 
known because He made Himself Incarnate.  Even so, Augustine argues that the way 
of reason, which proceeds from wisdom through science back to wisdom, can be a 
far more satisfying way to take, inasmuch as the profound depths of the wisdom of 
God that cannot be fathomed on the way of authority are revealed on that route.   
While Anselm’s monks would have been well acquainted with the way of 
authority, they apparently felt unprepared to give an account of what it would mean 
to traverse the way of reason.  They needed to be reminded of what Augustine had 
communicated in De Trinitate, yet they needed this reminder to come in a new form, 
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which addressed new concerns regarding the place of logic in the study of Scripture.  
In the main, Augustine had based his arguments on Scripture, but the monks of Bec 
needed to see that it was both possible and permissible to reach his conclusions 
rationally. 
The Monologion was Anselm’s attempt to briefly summarize Augustine’s De 
Trinitate in new and relevant way.312  His way involved making almost no appeal to 
authoritative sources.  Instead of building arguments on the basis Scriptural and 
patristic texts, Anselm argues by ‘reason alone’ (sola ratione).  When discussing the 
logic behind divine actions, he cites ‘necessary reasons’ (rationes necessariae).  
When explaining what is proper action for human beings created in God’s image, 
Anselm presents arguments from fittingness (convenientia).  The only authority 
Anselm names is Augustine himself, and even the bishop’s name appears a mere 
eight times in six passages, all of which are found in the Monologion or Proslogion 
and refer to De Trinitate.313  Anselm appealed to what seemed logically necessary or 
fitting rather than to authority in order to throw the contours and coherence of an 
Augustinian understanding of the relationship of reason to faith into relief.314  In 
doing this, he told his readers how to take Augustine’s negative way by showing 
them how to do so.   
After he had completed the Monologion, Anselm was apparently not 
convinced that he had successfully modernized the message of Augustine’s treatise.  
Although he had satisfactorily given an account of the Triune God and creation in the 
image of God, he felt he had not provided an adequate formula for conforming to the 
image of God that worked from reason alone as well.  For a long time, Anselm says 
he considered how to formulate such a formula, to no avail.  Just after he had given 
up on the project, the idea came to him in a flash of insight that disclosed the famous 
proof for the existence of God he proceeded to outline in the Proslogion.  In that 
brief treatise, Anselm completed in his own way the project Augustine had 
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undertaken in the latter half of his De Trinitate and which he himself had begun in 
the Monologion.  
When I discuss the interpretations of the Proslogion that have been offered in 
the past, I will explain why Anselm’s instructions to read that text in relation to 
Augustine’s treatise on the Trinity are virtually never heeded.315  Breaking with that 
trend in the scholarship, the argument of this chapter turns on the contention that, 
whatever their methodological differences, Anselm’s Monologion and Proslogion 
and Augustine’s De Trinitate fall within the same genre of theological-pedagogical 
literature.  Initially, I will support this contention by explaining the way Anselm 
gives a decidedly Augustinian account of God’s nature, His creative work, and the 
imago dei in the Monologion, albeit in his own forms of argumentation.  
Subsequently, I will turn to a number of theological tractates Anselm wrote while 
archbishop, which delineate the effect of the fall and redemption on the image of 
God.  Juxtaposing the early and late works of Anselm in this manner is a legitimate 
scholarly move to make, since Anselm did not “change his mind significantly over 
the course of his career.”316 
Next, I will interpret the Proslogion and the famous argument it contains as 
an account of the process involved in conforming to God’s image.  Anselm claims to 
receive his argument in an instant of illumination, and he states that it is designed to 
help bring about an increase in illumination.  On those grounds, I will argue that 
Anselm presupposes Augustine’s view of illumination as an illustration of the 
process involved in conforming to the image of God.  In summary, I will bolster the 
contention that Anselm remains a traditional Augustinian thinker in virtually all 
respects, and so also with respect to the theory of knowledge by divine illumination, 
even as he puts traditional perspectives in different forms of philosophical 
argumentation. 
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Trinity 
Anselm is remembered as the ‘perfect being’ theologian par excellence.  As 
scholars have noticed, however, Anselm appears to have formed his idea for the 
perfect-being project on the basis of Augustine’s writings, and specifically De 
Trinitate.317  The basic premise of perfect-being theology builds on Augustine’s 
claim that God is the Highest Good that manifests Itself in every good.318  According 
to Anselm, that premise states that, “there is one nature that is supreme.  It alone is 
self-sufficient…Through its all-powerful goodness, It creates and gives to all other 
things their very existence and their goodness.”319   
To bolster his belief in the Supreme Good, Anselm argues along the 
following lines.  He first points out that many things exist and exhibit goodness in 
different ways and to varying degrees.  He stresses that none of these things has 
something in common with all other good things.320  None, in other words, is an all-
inclusive good capable of making and keeping all things good.  On those grounds, 
Anselm argues that all things necessarily derive their being and goodness from 
something that does not possess properties like being and goodness but is Being and 
Goodness Itself.321  God is such a maximally perfect being because He, unlike His 
creatures, does not have His goodness through any other than Himself.   
On the assumption that God is identical with goodness, Anselm concludes 
that His identity never changes, and that He cannot have been brought into existence 
by another being.  God has no beginning and no end.  He is eternally the maximally 
perfect Being.322  Because He is identical with goodness, Anselm further contends 
that God is identical with every other good quality one could conceivably name, 
including justice, existence, reason, truth, greatness, beauty, immortality, 
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incorruptibility, immutability, happiness, eternity, power, and unity.323  His primary 
perfection, which is to be all that is and is good at all times, generates and includes 
all His other good qualities.  Those qualities, which human beings tend to perceive as 
many are actually one, because they are predicated of a Being who is one, inasmuch 
as He is every perfection eternally, by definition.324   
To summarize, God is one because He is not comprised of various parts.  He 
is not a composite because He does not owe His existence to anything else; and He 
does not owe His existence to anything else because He is the source of Himself and 
is therefore identical with Himself.  He is simple because He is one thing eternally, 
and that one thing is the best possible thing to be, which exists supremely.325 
 In addition to existing supremely, Anselm elaborates, God knows and loves 
Himself as the Supreme Being.326  The references to the self-knowledge and self-love 
of God lead Anselm to discuss His Triune nature.327  On Anselm’s account, the claim 
that God loves and knows Himself suggests that there is within the Godhead a 
knower, a known, and their knowledge, a lover, a beloved, and their love.  In order to 
validate the claim that God knows and loves Himself through Himself, consequently, 
Anselm insists that He must be described as Triune.   
 According to Anselm, Triune is precisely what God is.  The Father begets the 
Son, who is the knowledge and love of the Father.  What the Son receives and 
returns to the Father is the Spirit they share, which proceeds from both of them.328  
Because the nature of God is Triune, one may reasonably conclude that there is one 
God who supremely exists through Himself and who knows and loves Himself as the 
Supreme Being.  For Anselm, acknowledging the distinct roles of the three Persons 
by no means implies that “there are three knowers, or three lovers, much less three 
objects of knowledge, or three things loved.”329  The discussion of the three Persons, 
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in short, does not suggest there are three gods.  To the contrary, it “points up the 
supreme unity and simplicity of their common nature.”330  
Creation in God’s Image 
THE NATURAL ORDER 
Anselm likens God’s creative work to the work of a craftsman.  Before he 
begins a project, a craftsman envisions what he wishes to make.  He must form an 
idea in order to pattern something after it.331  Similarly, Anselm writes, God 
preconceived the idea for the natural order He wanted to bring into existence.  Unlike 
the craftsman, who draws on external resources to accomplish his task, however, 
God is the prime, sole, and sufficient cause of His creation.  When He eternally 
thinks Himself, He thinks all He needs to know in order to create.  
According to Anselm, the divine thought of one in three, simplicity in 
diversity, is the idea that serves as the exemplar for the creation of all things.332  
Although there are many different kinds of beings that appear to have been formed in 
accordance with many different exemplars, Anselm, who draws his inspiration from 
Augustine’s account of the eternal reasons, argues that the many forms of being 
conform to a single form of being, which is the divine form of being one thing in 
virtue of the involvement of various elements.   
All creatures exhibit simplicity analogous to His inasmuch as the essence 
God gives each creature unifies its component parts, makes it the limited being it is, 
and enables it to perform a particular function.333  Whatever function a creature 
naturally performs is what Anselm calls its truth.  He also speaks of a being’s truth or 
proper behaviour as its ‘rectitude’ or ‘correctness’.334  Truth, for him, is not an object 
but an action, which can be performed to greater and lesser extents.  In Anselm’s 
scheme, therefore, truth is not something fixed but something that admits of gradual 
growth.  
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Each being was created with the potential to instantiate a certain type of truth, 
which it has not yet fully instantiated, but which its nature dictates that it ought to 
instantiate.  As the creature performs its proper function, it participates in its truth 
and so approximates the truth that it is fitting for it to be.  Through persistent 
existence, in other words, it approaches its essence.  Inasmuch as any true thing has 
not yet reached its total truth at any point in time, it is bound to be ‘false’ in some 
respects.  In Anselm’s view, however, falsity does not inhibit growth in truth but 
facilitate it.335  Only when something ceases to do what it was made to do can it be 
called patently false.   
Anselm regards any level of participation in truth as participation in the one 
source of Truth that is God.  Since He gives all truths the ability to become a 
particular sort of truth, He pre-contains and makes possible, though He never 
prevents or compels, all manifestations of truth.336  Although God is nothing like His 
creatures, since He is actually and absolutely true while they merely have the 
potential to become a limited truth, and He is not therefore analogous to those beings 
that are analogous to Him, creatures can still be said to indirectly disclose His Truth 
inasmuch as they manifest their own.  While His simple nature is not discernible in 
itself, it can be seen at all places and at all times through the simplicity exhibited by 
created beings.337   
In Anselm’s participatory metaphysical scheme, a creature is more a closely 
analogous to the supreme nature the more it participates in its own nature.  In 
addition to the degrees of participation within classes of being, however, there are 
levels of participation determined in accordance with the classes themselves, where 
the higher classes are said to participate in more of the various aspects of the divine 
life.  Since “the supreme nature does not just exist but also lives, senses, and is 
rational in its own unique way,”338 Anselm affirms that living natures should be 
ranked above the non-living, perceptive above non-perceptive, and rational above 
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non-rational on the hierarchy of being.339  To summarize, creatures are more like 
God the more they do as He does, because this situates them closer to His Truth.   
Anselm’s account of truth has led many of his scholarly readers to regard him 
as a ‘realist’ in an allegedly Platonic and Augustinian sense.340  Platonic realism or 
essentialism supposedly entails the notion that objective forms independently exist in 
the mind of God.  These forms or exemplars as Anselm calls them are the totalized 
archetypes after which instantiations are copied.  Because creatures are copies of 
fixed exemplars, there is a univocal relationship between the two.341   In other words, 
creatures have the exact same features as their patterns in the Creator’s mind.342  On 
these grounds, Anselm has been described as one of the first and foremost 
proponents of a correspondence theory of truth.  To many readers, the references to 
truth as ‘rectitude’ and ‘correctness’ clearly imply that Anselm adheres to such a 
theory.343   
In response to this view, others have stressed the significance of Anselm’s 
description of “truth is something which is done.”344  Since Anselm defines truth in 
this way, it is argued that correctness cannot denote complete correspondence to an 
exemplary object.  Rather, it must indicate action towards the objective of becoming 
a certain kind of truth.  Inasmuch as Anselm defines truth as an action rather than an 
object, he cannot be classed as a proto-modern metaphysician of ‘presence’ as his 
realist readers do, but as a traditional Medieval metaphysician of ‘participation’, 
where participation is defined as a creature’s participation in behaviour that is fitting 
or true to its essence.345  Anselm’s theory of truth actually precludes the possibility of 
a total correlation between an instance and exemplar of truth, because God is the 
Exemplar of exemplars, and His fullness cannot be grasped until He reveals His 
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Truth and therefore reveals what all true things were made to be and indeed already 
are in the sight of the Truth that sees Itself.346   
THE HUMAN BEING 
According to Anselm, human beings have a unique way of being true.  They 
are true by knowing what is true.  Anselm refers to the knowledge of truth as 
‘justice’.  Justice is “the rectitude perceptible by the mind alone.”347  Human beings 
were created to know what is just so that they might ‘preserve justice’ or the proper 
order amongst true things.  Since God is the one who ordered creation, He is Justice.  
The human ability to maintain a just order therefore represents an ability to see 
reality from His perspective and to ultimately see Him.  If Anselm locates human 
beings on the top of the hierarchy of being, it is because they alone are fit to know 
God and govern what He has made.348   
Since it is not presently possible “to see anything about the supreme nature by 
means of what is proper to it,”349 but only through that which is ‘not God’, and 
because that which is other than God yet most closely resembles His nature is the 
rational nature, Anselm echoes Augustine’s conclusion that, “the efficacy of the 
mind’s ascent to knowledge of the supreme nature is in direct proportion to the 
enthusiasm of its intent to learn about itself.”350  What the rational creature must 
know about itself is that it is an image of the Triune God who knows and loves 
Himself.351  When the rational being knows itself as an image of the Trinity, it knows 
that what it ought to do, what it is indebted by its very nature to do, is to know and 
love God.352   
Because God is an eternal God, Anselm infers that human beings were made 
to know and love Him without ceasing.353  In the present life, he holds that they can 
participate in their eternal life by “loving the supreme essence above all other 
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goods,” 354 or by “loving other things for the sake of the supreme essence.”355  It is 
fitting for rational beings to prioritize the love of God above other loves, because He 
is good through Himself while everything else is good through Him.  When reason 
judges reality under the influence of belief that God is the Supreme Good, it can see 
“the difference between the just and the unjust, the true and the untrue…the good, 
the less good, and the no good.”356  In sum, it can see created goods in their proper 
place, as God sees them, and can therefore know God ‘by negation’, that is, by 
evaluating what it can see with faith in what it cannot see.357   
On Anselm’s account, the rational nature is comprised of two elements, 
which enable it to preserve justice, namely, the intellect and the will.  Anselm 
compares the relationship between the intellect and the will to the power of seeing 
and the direction of the gaze.  While the intellect has the power of preserving justice, 
the will dictates the manner in which this is done.  The intellect has the aptitude, but 
the will possesses the desire to exercise the aptitude.358  Because each one satisfies 
the condition of possibility of the other’s operation, neither the intellect nor the will 
is the whole of the rational nature.  The whole simply is the cooperative work of the 
intellect and the will.  These three elements—the intellect, the will, and the 
cooperation of the two—confirm to Anselm’s mind the status of human beings as 
images of the Trinity.     
Through the cooperative efforts of the intellect and the will, Anselm thinks 
the rational being is able to broaden the scope of its just perspective and reflect the 
image of God each time this happens.  Anselm describes the manner in which the 
just perspective expands in the following way.  The will that wills what leads to the 
happiness of knowing God incites the intellect to judge in a just manner.359  When 
the intellect judges justly, it proceeds from what is known to the knowledge of what 
was formerly unknown.360  Since the intellect that performs this act desires God, the 
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act of knowing increases its understanding of what the desired happiness entails.  
That growth further whets the will’s appetite for happiness and motivates it to lead 
the intellect to judge in accordance with the desire for God, such that the process 
begins all over again.361  By these means, the intellect and the will grow together in 
faith and desire for God, respectively.  They gradually actualize the potential of the 
rational nature to preserve justice and so prepare it to enter into the presence of 
Justice, which is the merciful Love of God.   
When the rational nature wills to preserve the justice it receives from God, 
Anselm writes that it wills “what God wants it to will.”362  It is in willing what God 
wants that Anselm believes the rational nature is truly free.  In his opinion, these two 
claims do not contradict one another, where one acknowledges that God willed that 
human wills should will as they pleased, so long as they did so out of the desire to 
know Him.363  Because God willed that natural effects should follow from human 
choices rather than from His, nothing that is willed or that consequently occurs in the 
natural order can fall outside the will of God.364  Whatever humankind wills is what 
God wills, since God willed that human nature should be rational and therefore 
free.365    
When He willed for human beings to possess a rational capacity, Anselm 
affirms that God bestowed an initial grace upon them, which does not interfere with 
the exercise of the rational capacity but empower it.  Whenever reason is employed 
for the purpose God intended, that is, with a view to attaining to the knowledge of 
God, Anselm states that this is made possible by an ongoing divine grace.366  In 
instances of just judgment, God’s grace can be said to produce whatever the rational 
being produces, since human beings could not reason unless the gift of rationality 
were given;367 and since reason could not judge what is good unless there were a 
Good by which to judge.368  Given that God satisfies these two conditions of 
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possibility of acting in accordance with human nature, His grace can be said to 
sustain nature.369  That is not to suggest that grace undermines or directly interferes 
with the operations of nature, however.  For Anselm, who presupposes Augustine’s 
influentia model of divine causality, it is to only to affirm that God alone can put 
human beings in the position to activate the natural capacity He gives them. 
Fall 
 The fall resulted from the failure of the first man and woman to preserve the 
just order God had given them.370  When they fell, Adam and Eve willed what God 
did not want them to will.  They failed to regard God as the ultimate source of their 
happiness and chose to believe what was not in fact the case, namely, that something 
besides God could afford ultimate happiness.  In this, they failed to will what would 
lead them to the happy life God had willed for them.   
 According to Anselm, the unjust actions of Adam and Eve were not the by-
product of the desire for good things but of the inordinate desire for good things.371  
Anselm emphasizes that their injustice did not attach to the actual objects they 
desired, because injustice can only be associated with a nature that lacks the justice it 
ought to have, which is a rational nature.372  On his account, the decision to sin was 
not a decision to exercise the freedom of the rational will but to abandon it, since sin 
is incompatible with the happiness for which rational beings were destined.   
For Anselm like Augustine, sinful choices are not positive ones, even though 
it is customary to name the effects and acts of the unjust will.  Sin is a privation of 
the good because it does not contribute to but diminish the desire and ability to 
behave in a manner which is fitting for human beings and which fosters human 
happiness.373  Sin reduces happiness because it makes human beings slaves to sinful 
desires and leaves them powerless not to sin, and thus undermines human 
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freedom.374  According to Anselm, every human being that reaches the age of reason 
is bound to activate the potential to sin with which every human being is born.  
Redemption 
In virtue of the nature God had given them, human beings owed a debt to 
themselves and thus to God to be rational, that is, to preserve justice.375  When they 
failed to do this, justice was nonetheless required of them, since God’s will for their 
lives is unchanging.  Not only were human beings still constrained to preserve justice 
after the fall, but they were also required to restore to themselves the ability to 
preserve it that they had lost.376  Since they no longer had the ability to do the former, 
however, they could not do the latter.377 
For this reason, Anselm insists that the rational will needed to be restored by 
the one who originally gave it.  Furthermore, it had to be reinstated by the Person of 
the Trinity through whom it was originally given, that is, the Son.  Because He 
eternally knows the Father through the Spirit, He was under no obligation to die for 
the loss of the rational will.  He alone was free to restore it.378   
Though only God the Son could restore the rational will, Anselm reiterates 
that the restoration needed to be accomplished by a man, since it was man and not 
God who owed a debt to God.379  This is why God the Son necessarily became a 
man.  On Anselm’s account, the Incarnate Son restored the human rational will as He 
exercised His divine nature through the medium of human nature.  There was 
nothing inherently contradictory about doing this, since human nature was destined 
to know the divine nature.  The Incarnate Son simply activated the potential God put 
in all human beings.   
When He showed how to live by a divine perspective in the created context, 
He simultaneously made it possible for human beings to do the same once again.380  
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Furthermore, He made it possible for them to do this in a fallen world where it is 
exceedingly difficult to preserve justice.381  Through his death on the cross, Christ 
demonstrated that difficult circumstances can actually facilitate efforts to preserve 
justice, that there truly is no circumstance that falls outside the will of God, when one 
evaluates all circumstances on the assumption that they can contribute to 
accomplishing the purposes of God.382 
 Since Christ has already accomplished the redemption of mankind, Anselm 
like Augustine addresses the question why human beings are not immediately caught 
up in the vision of God.383  His response to this query spells out one implication of 
his claim that God’s will never changes.  Anselm reminds the reader that God willed 
for human beings to habitually exercise the rational will of their own volition.  
Although Christ reinstated the potential to do this, He did not automatically cause 
human beings to reactivate the potential, because this would have undermined the 
will of God, who wanted human beings to use their ability as they willed rather than 
under compulsion. 
 On this basis, Anselm concludes that human beings remain in the fallen world 
so that they can become what God originally made them to be as they re-learn the 
skill of preserving justice they originally utilized automatically.  Were they to meet 
God prior to re-acquiring the skill of recognizing what is just, they would not be able 
to recognize Him.  They could not obtain the eternal life He intended for them to 
have in heaven unless they had already learned to enjoy happiness on earth.  In 
Anselm’s opinion, it is a sign of the magnitude of God’s grace that Christ did not 
actually redeem the whole of humankind as soon as He created the potential for 
redemption.  That grace which God eternally, unchangeably gives is something 
Anselm believes those striving to learn how to live in it experience in double 
measure, precisely because they knew what it was like to live without it. 
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Conforming to God’s Image 
Although Christ reinstates the potential to preserve justice, that potential 
remains to be actualized by human beings as they re-learn how to reflect God’s 
image.  In this section, I contend that the Proslogion and the famous proof for God’s 
existence it contains are the conceptual resources Anselm provides readers seeking to 
re-conform to God’s image.  Towards this end, I start by summarizing the statements 
Anselm makes at the very end of the Monologion that anticipate the project he 
undertakes in the twenty-six chapters of the Proslogion, the contents of which I will 
also summarize.  After outlining the relevant texts, I will mention some of the major 
interpretations of Anselm’s Proslogion.  I will explain why an interpretation of the 
tract that takes the context of Augustine’s De Trinitate into consideration has not yet 
been given and will finally offer such an interpretation. 
FROM MONOLOGION TO PROSLOGION 
 When Anselm set out to write the Monologion, he apparently had no plans to 
compose a sequel.  As he draws the discussion of God’s image to a close in the final 
chapters of the work, he discusses how to reflect the image.  It is one thing to profess 
belief in the Supreme Being and quite another to live in accordance with faith, he 
states.  To make faith effective, Anselm contends that one must believe the things 
that are relevant to making progress towards the end of understanding of God.384  
One must act like what one says about God is true.  Someone who does not do this, 
Anselm writes, “appears not to believe and possesses a dead faith.385  For this reason, 
Anselm urges his readers to live by the faith to which they claim to adhere.  After he 
published the Monologion, Anselm states he did not feel he had adequately shown 
his readers how to live in accordance with faith and thus to reflect God’s image.  He 
began to search for a single argument that his readers could use in their efforts to live 
by belief in God.386  He presents the argument he eventually discovered in the 
Proslogion. 
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THE ARGUMENT OF THE PROSLOGION 
 The Proslogion is written as a prayer.  In the first chapter of the work, 
Anselm confesses that his goal in the treatise is to learn how to know God, that is, 
preserve justice.  He acknowledges that he was made to seek God always, in order to 
eventually see Him.387  The ‘hard and cruel’ consequence of the fall is that he no 
longer knows how to seek and has therefore also lost the ability to attain that for 
which he was made.388  He recognizes that God created him in His image so that he 
might remember, understand, and love God.  But he admits that “this image is so 
effaced and worn away by vice, so darkened by the smoke of sin, that it cannot do 
what it was made to do unless You renew and reform it.”389   
Anselm expresses his heartfelt longing to reach the point of remembering, 
understanding, and loving God.  He discloses his desire for God’s image in him to be 
reformed so that he can be ready to gaze on the reality of God.  In order for these 
things to happen, however, Anselm acknowledges that he must first re-learn the skill 
of seeking to know God, which is to begin to seek already, for it is in learning to seek 
that the image is renewed.390  He thanks God for teaching him that the way to seek is 
to ‘believe in order to understand’, and he opens the second chapter of the treatise 
asking God to help him bring his faith to bear on his efforts to acquire understanding.  
From that point, he proceeds to delineate his famous proof for the existence of God, 
which is paraphrased below:  
1. God is a Being than which none greater can be thought. 
2. A Being than which none greater can be thought exists in the mind. 
3. There is a difference between existence in the mind and existence in reality, 
and it is greater to exist in reality than to exist only in the mind. 
4. God, a Being than which none greater can be thought, cannot exist only in the 
mind.  
5. For if He existed only in the mind and not in reality, He would not be a Being 
than which none greater can be thought, which is a contradiction. 
6. Therefore, God exists not only in the mind but also in reality. 
 
In chapter three, Anselm elaborates on the second premise of the above 
argument.  He argues that it is not possible to think that God does not exist if one 
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accepts premise one, according to which God is the Supreme Being.  If one professes 
that He is Supreme, then He necessarily exists in the mind.  Since existence in reality 
is the logical corollary to existence in the mind, one who believes in God should see 
reality in the light of that belief.  It is inconsistent, or foolish, as Anselm states in 
chapter four, to affirm God’s existence in the mind and deny it in reality.  While one 
may think of God as the Highest God, refuse to assent to the truth of that statement, 
and proceed to deny His existence in reality, one cannot logically assent to the 
thought of God as Highest Good and deny that thought in reality.  To do so is to live 
a lie, or to negate the truth of what one claims to believe is true.   
After he discusses the existence of God, Anselm explores themes related to 
the essence of God.  Chapters five through twelve seem to comprise the first of three 
sections included in this discussion.  In five, Anselm re-affirms that God is whatever 
it is better to be than not to be.391  If one assumes that He exists supremely, Anselm 
insists, then one can resolve a number of apparent contradictions pertaining to His 
nature, such as His omnipotence and His inability to sin, His mercy and 
impassibility, His justice and willingness to let good come to the unjust, and His 
justice and mercy.  In chapter twelve, Anselm sums up the section by reminding the 
reader that the Supreme Being is all the attributes He is said to have.  The attributes 
are one in Him, so there is no conflict between them.  He always and everywhere is 
what it is best to be.392 
In making the last claim, Anselm transitions into the next cluster of chapters, 
thirteen through twenty-one, in which he explains the implications of the belief that 
God is eternal and omnipresent.  Because He is not subject to the limitations of space 
and time but contains all places and times, Anselm testifies, the God who is more 
than the mind can understand can be indirectly seen at every place and time that can 
be understood, if those places and times are regarded in the light of the belief that He 
is the Supreme Being.393   
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At the outset of the last group of chapters, twenty-two through twenty-six, 
Anselm praises God for being what He is, that is, for eternally existing in exact 
accordance with His essence, which is all it is to be.  Creatures do not exist in such 
an a-temporal and immutable mode.  They come into existence at a point in time.  At 
that point in time, they have not instantiated their essences in full.  Those essences 
are not absolute but finite.  Finite beings are comprised of parts.  As those parts 
mature, creatures exist in the mode of existence dictated by their essences and thus 
approximate those essences.  Since their coming into and ongoing existence is 
altogether contingent, creatures are nothing like God, who is sufficient unto Himself, 
and who is therefore able, and willing, to give them whatever being they have.394  
In concluding, Anselm summons the reader to consider what joy is to be 
found in the Triune God who is the source of all goods.395  Anyone who learns to 
consistently love Him above the finite goods He has made will not wander about in a 
vain search for what cannot fully satisfy but will be able to identify the limited 
measure of God’s goodness that is in all things.  The ability to find the good in every 
circumstance will in turn afford the constant sense of satisfaction, or joy, that is a 
foretaste of eternal life with God. 
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PROSLOGION 
 There is more literature on the purpose of Anselm’s Proslogion than one 
could begin to mention.396   Most of that literature focuses on the second and 
sometimes also the third chapter of the work.  While some interpreters see chapter 
three as a supplement to the argument of chapter two, others believe it contains a 
distinct argument.397  The argument chapter two contains is frequently taken to be an 
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a priori proof for the existence of God, an argument that derives proof for the 
existence of God from the very thought of God, without recourse to revelation or 
experience.  Versions of this interpretation were advocated in the modern period by 
René Descartes and Gottfried Leibniz, most famously.398  
In his Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant became the first to give the 
name ‘ontological argument’ to that proof which inferred the existence of God from 
the definition of God, and he questioned the validity of such proofs.  His most 
famous objection was that ‘existence is not a predicate’.  That is to say, it adds 
nothing to the concept of God or any other being to say that it exists.  Today, 
philosophers of religion continue to debate the validity of Anselm’s argument on the 
assumption that it is an a priori proof for God’s existence.  Alvin Plantinga and 
Norman Malcolm have been some of the most well known proponents of ontological 
arguments; Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell are among the most avid critics.399   
In the next two chapters, I will implicitly contend that interpretations and 
criticisms of Anselm’s argument based on the assumption that is an a priori proof are 
untenable.  I will argue this on the grounds that the Arab scholar Avicenna, whose 
works were not introduced to the Latin West until after Anselm’s death, was the first 
philosopher to construct an a priori proof for the existence of God.400  Thirteenth-
century Franciscan thinkers appropriated the idea for an a priori proof from 
Avicenna and projected their view of theistic proofs onto Anselm in order to validate 
it.  Theirs is the understanding of theistic proofs as well as Anselm’s argument that 
has been inherited by modern thinkers. 
 On my argument, however, Anselm cannot have intended to offer an a priori 
proof.  Instead, as he himself testifies, the proof was formulated within the Medieval 
intellectual tradition founded by Augustine, in which resources for conforming to 
God’s image were provided.  In the past century, theologians and philosophers have 
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begun to notice that an aprioristic reading of Anselm seems inconsistent with his 
theological outlook.  Karl Barth was one of the first to distinguish Anselm’s proof 
from those offered by Descartes and Leibniz and to point out that the Kantian 
objections do not apply to it.401  Barth stressed that Anselm’s proof was intended for 
the faithful.  It was designed to render the belief that God is greater than can be 
thought intelligible to those that already adhere to it.  The development of the 
argument was not an enterprise in natural theology.  Incidentally, interpreters of 
Anselm who believed it was have charged him with separating knowledge of God 
from ‘real life’, as Augustine allegedly did with his psychological analogies.  In 
Barth’s then uncommon opinion, however, Anselm never supposed he could prove 
God’s existence by reason alone and without recourse to revelation. 
 Although Barth has been accused of swinging from rationalism to the other 
extreme of fideism in his interpretation of Anselm, his insights have encouraged 
those working in his wake to explore new ways of thinking about the argument.  
Anton Pegis, for one, pointed out that any interpretation of the Proslogion should 
take the rest of the treatise as well as the Monologion into consideration.402  Robert 
Sokolowski stressed that the most important thing about Anselm’s argument is that it 
highlights the distinctly Christian distinction between the nature of God and the 
nature of the beings He has made.403  According to Sokolowski, the statement of 
belief in God’s total otherness implicitly makes a statement about how beings are to 
be understood in terms of their dependence on God.  
In what follows, my goal is to build on these insights by stating precisely how 
the argument of the Proslogion guides the reader to make faith an intelligible reality, 
and how chapters two and three relate to the rest of the treatise.  I want to show 
exactly what sort of practical plan for re-conforming to God’s image Anselm outlines 
in this text.  I will do this by interpreting the work as Anselm indicates the reader 
ought to do, namely, in the light of Augustine’s De Trinitate, and especially its latter 
half.   
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If this approach has not been taken in the past, it is likely due to the fact that 
the interpretation of Anselm’s argument as an a priori proof that became canonical in 
the modern period only obtains when chapters two and three are read with no regard 
for the rest of the Proslogion or the intellectual tradition and literary genre in which 
the Proslogion itself was composed.  It is also likely that interpreters have avoided 
inquiring into the conceptual context De Trinitate provides for the Proslogion 
because De Trinitate itself was considered a difficult and controversial text until the 
scholars I mentioned in the last chapter demonstrated its coherent purpose.  The 
earlier explanation of the treatise as a guide for conforming to the image of God, 
which presupposed its coherence, will now facilitate the effort to evaluate how 
Anselm perpetuates the pedagogical literary tradition Augustine founded as he 
completes the project he began in the Monologion in his Proslogion.   
THE PROSLOGION AS A GUIDE TO CONFORMING TO GOD’S IMAGE  
The prayerful start to Anselm’s treatise is the first sign of its status as a guide 
to conforming to the image of God.  Like Augustine, Anselm realizes the importance 
of acknowledging that God is greater than the self—that He is in fact the Highest 
Good—at the outset of the quest to understand Him.  Such an attitude of 
characteristically Benedictine ‘compunction’ is indicative of faith or of the desire the 
human spirit has to glorify the Father through the use of gifts given by the Son.  In 
this prayerful attitude, one admits that one does not understand all things and 
therefore puts oneself in the right frame of mind to undergo the renewal of the image 
of God.  
On my understanding, Anselm’s argument in chapter two is the conceptual 
resource he provides those wishing to experience the renewal of the image of God.  
With that ‘single argument’ or ‘single formula’ as it can be translated, he outlines the 
chain of reasoning through which his readers could train themselves to consider 
whatever they might encounter from the perspective of faith in God as the Supreme 
Good.404  That chain of reasoning is presented in proper syllogistic form.405  The 
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conclusions follow from the premises, and the argument is valid.  Anyone with basic 
training in logic could easily memorize the cognitive steps Anselm delineates in what 
I will describe as a ‘formula for conforming to the image of God’.   
The first cognitive step, which premise one directs the reader to take, 
involves affirming that God is the Being that which none greater can be thought, or 
that He is the Highest Good.  Anyone who thus recalls in faith the thought of God 
that was forgotten at the fall reinstates His existence in the mind, as per premise two.  
That is not to say that the effects of the fall are immediately overcome, however, 
such that the person of faith automatically lives by faith.  As Anselm posits in the 
third premise, there is a vast disparity between existence in the mind and existence in 
reality.  That is to say, there is a difference between having a preliminary faith and a 
faith that is being made effective by being brought to bear in the evaluation of 
temporal circumstances.   
According to Anselm in premises four through six, it is fitting for the thought 
of God to take effect in real life and not only in the mind, because God Himself has 
both intellectual and real existence.  To strive to transform the belief in God into a 
reality by considering all the things that can be seen under the influence of faith in 
what cannot be seen is to strive to render thoughts and actions consistent with the 
professed belief that God supremely exists.  It is to think and act as though what one 
says is true and thus to think and act rationally.   
In the separate argument he presents in chapter three, Anselm seems to 
suggest that anyone who claims to believe in God but thinks or acts in a way that 
suggests otherwise thinks and acts inconsistently and thus illogically.  To put it in the 
precise words of both Augustine and Anselm, the person that gives assent to the faith 
but whose outlook and actions are incompatible with the faith is a fool.  Foolish 
people negate their own words and at the same time the validity of their lives.  They 
live a lie.     
In offering these two arguments, Anselm steers his readers away from 
foolishness by showing them how to bring the knowledge of God as highest Good to 
                                                                                                                                     
405 Toivo J. Holopainen, Dialectic and Theology, ch. 5; Brian Davies, “Anselm and the Ontological 
Argument,” in The Cambridge Companion to Anselm, 168-71. 
   123
bear in their evaluation of temporal circumstances.  His way of doing this, namely, 
through the formulation of a logical argument, has the added benefit of disclosing 
that the tools of logic and philosophy are not inimical to faith but can facilitate 
efforts to be transformed by it.  Anselm’s formula for conforming to God’s image 
was one his readers could easily put to use in the effort to train themselves to reason 
under the influence of faith.  All they had to do in evaluating any situation is briefly 
pause and run through the steps Anselm outlined, acknowledging that God is the 
Supreme Being (premise one); that they believe this (premise two); and that it is 
therefore fitting for them to think and act like they believe it in the present 
circumstances (premises three through six; also, the argument of chapter three). 
Anselm’s express desire was that his readers would utilize his formula for the 
sake overcoming the effect of the fall, which was the loss of the ability to bring the 
knowledge of God to bear on the knowledge of the world.  Each application of the 
argument would help form the habit of reasoning in faith and break the habit of 
reasoning without it, renewing the image of God in the same instance.  Through the 
committed use of the argument, Anselm promised that his readers would eventually 
learn to automatically reason in faith and thus experience the restoration of the image 
of God.  The purpose of the argument Anselm presents in a prayer, in summary, is to 
facilitate prayer, or the gradual-to-constant orientation of human thoughts towards 
the Father through the use of the intellectual capacity given by the Son to the human 
spirit.  Far from an a priori argument that makes no recourse to revelation and has no 
bearing on practical matters, Anselm’s formula is designed to transform the one that 
employs it into ‘living proof’ for the existence of God. 
 The subsequent chapters of the Proslogion describe what a transformed mind 
and life look like.  They indicate that the benefit of becoming living proof for God’s 
existence is the discovery of His essence.  For when faith that God supremely exists 
is brought to bear in efforts to understand reality, faith shapes the understanding of 
reality reason attains.  It prevents the mind from perceiving its objects as supreme 
goods and leads it to correctly assess the nature and extent of their finite goodness.  
In sum, faith leads reason to grasp the essence of the objects under consideration.   
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 Although such understanding in no way discloses anything about the essence 
of God, it does allow the one whose mind is affected by faith in God to see what sort 
of effect faith has on human understanding.  Where faith informs efforts to acquire 
understanding, for example, it reminds that God is unchangingly good, or whatever it 
is better to be than not to be, as chapters five through twelve indicate.  Bearing this in 
mind, one becomes able to resolve apparent tensions between God’s justice and His 
mercy, for instance, because one can interpret His mercy as justice, His justice as 
mercy, and the injustices that can never be attributed to Him as means of 
accomplishing the ends of both justice and mercy.   
 The person of faith that presupposes that God is always the Highest Good and 
that He always works things out accordingly learns to perceive the unity of His 
attributes—that they are all expressions of His Goodness—and ceases to be troubled 
by alleged contradictions between divine justice and mercy.  Whatever aspect of 
God’s essence is experienced in a given instance is taken as a sign of His supreme 
goodness.  Thus, when circumstances change so as to seemingly reveal more of His 
justice than His mercy, the belief in His supreme goodness prevents the mind from 
thinking Him unmerciful and preserves its confidence in His eternal goodness.  It 
fosters a perspective that can find Him who is seen at no one place and time working 
good at all places and times, as the second cluster of chapters suggest.   
 As is stated in the third section on God’s essence, this perspective is exactly 
the one that readies the mind to gaze on God.  For the outlook that is constantly 
informed by faith and thus always identifies its effects is the outlook of one who 
unfailingly knows God through the things He is not and is therefore ready for the 
vision of what He essentially is.   
Far from being an argument for God’s existence that makes no recourse to 
revelation or experience, Anselm’s formula for conforming to the image of God 
teaches the mind to apply the knowledge of the Triune God Christ revealed in 
ordinary circumstances.  His argument is no natural theological proof, in which the 
existence of God is supposedly established through the mere penning of words on 
paper.  It is a chain of reasoning designed to make it possible to prove that God exists 
in the only way possible, namely, through the person that lives as though the Triune 
   125
God really exists and that is able to give an account of His Triune existence, as it was 
revealed through the Person of Christ.  Since the formula is not an a priori proof, 
Anselm is not guilty of separating knowledge of God from real life by faith in Christ.  
These are very conceptual threads his argument ties together. 
Divine Illumination 
In the preface to the Proslogion, Anselm writes that his formula for 
conforming to God’s image came to him in a moment of illumination.406  Throughout 
the treatise, he frequently appeals to illumination as he explains how the argument 
facilitates the effort to conform to God’s image.  He does not pause to explain what 
illumination is.  The absence of a systematic explanation of illumination and human 
knowledge more generally highlights the extent to which Augustine’s views on these 
matters were presupposed by early Medieval thinkers such as Anselm.407  One can 
tell that Anselm is an Augustinian with respect to the theory of knowledge by 
illumination not because he gives an explicit account of illumination, but because he 
puts the theory to the same use as Augustine did, namely, in illustrating the cognitive 
process involved in conforming to the image of God. 
From the first chapter of the Proslogion, it becomes clear that Anselm 
conceives of illumination as Augustine did.  There, he states that as a result of the 
fall, human beings have been “deprived of light and surrounded with darkness…cast 
down from the vision of God into the present blindness.”408  Although he affirms that 
faith opens blinded eyes, he states that newly uncovered eyes are not accustomed to 
the light and must be initially protected from it.409  In order to gain the strength to lift 
up a downcast gaze and see things in the light, Anselm says that his readers must 
plead with God to enlighten them.410   
Anselm then presents the famous formula through which he teaches his 
readers how to regard reality in the light of the belief that God is the Supreme Good.  
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When anyone forgets to employ the argument, Anselm writes that they are bound to 
fall back down into their own darkness.411  Whenever they remember to apply it, 
however, they are certain to find the light of truth.  Through the ongoing use of the 
argument, Anselm states that the articles of faith that were believed at first are 
rendered intelligible by illumination.412  By these means, God reforms the human 
mind in His image.413   
As the image is renewed, the light by which the mind sees grows steadier, 
brighter, and broader.  Vision at one level of light exposes where sight remains 
darkened and thus propels the mind onwards to a higher level.414  So long as the 
mind bears in mind that the inaccessible Light of God is the one all-inclusive Light, 
Anselm writes that it will make progress in illumination and so simultaneously in the 
renewal of God’s image.  Considering things in His Light will prevent the mind from 
adhering to the false belief that anything else is so great a light by which to judge the 
world.  By persistently adhering to that Light, Anselm affirms, the mind eventually 
becomes able to evaluate and prioritize all things in it, in all places and at all times.  
This vision in the light is the vision of the Light that is attainable in this life.  
Although such vision does not allow for the vision of the Light itself, it predisposes 
the mind to it.415 
Anselm the Augustinian  
 To claim that Anselm is an Augustinian is not at all controversial.  Where 
scholars differ is in defining what it means to be an Augustinian.  There are many 
that suppose that Anselm’s metaphysics of exemplarity is an essentialist metaphysics 
that is accompanied by a correspondence of truth.  Adherence to such a metaphysical 
account is taken to be one sign of Anselm’s intellectual fidelity to Augustine.  The 
project of proving God’s existence through reason alone, which is made possible by 
turning inwards to reflect upon oneself as an image of God, is also considered to be 
an indicator of Anselm’s intellectual allegiance to Augustine. 
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 While I fully agree with the scholarly consensus that there is great continuity 
between Augustine and Anselm, I have identified the points of continuity rather 
differently.  In the first place, I located continuity at the theological level.  Anselm’s 
perfect-being theology clearly upholds Augustine’s views on Trinitarian theology, 
even if Anselm presents them in his own way.  A theological approach allowed me to 
identify philosophical continuity between Augustine and Anselm, inasmuch as it 
enabled me to demonstrate that Anselm like Augustine appeals to a participatory 
rather than an essentialist metaphysics.  Accordingly, he defines knowledge not as a 
matter of correspondence, but of the human subject’s gradually growing participation 
in God’s objective cognitive order, or God’s thought of Himself, which is itself 
enabled by the influentia or flowing in of the natural cognitive power from God.     
 In participatory cognitive acts, the mind that cannot currently see God regards 
the things it can see in view of the fact that God is the Highest Good.  Those efforts 
progressively reveal the profound significance and far-reaching implications of the 
articles of faith the mind affirmed from the very beginning.  The insights into reality 
the intellect attains in faith that God is the source of all reality do not have God but 
creatures as their attendant objects.  Inasmuch as ideas formed about creation are 
shaped by faith, however, God is known through the perspective on the world that 
belief in Him produces.  He is known, along Augustinian lines, by negation, and that 
knowledge of God by negation adjusts the eyes of the mind for the positive 
knowledge of Him that is to come.   
 For Anselm as for Augustine, illumination serves to illustrate the process 
through which the mind relearns how to regard reality in the light of faith, or how it 
undergoes the renewal of God’s image until a habit of reasoning in faith is formed 
and the image is constantly reflected through each cognitive act.  Anselm’s 
argument, far from an a priori proof that makes no recourse to revelation or 
experience, is the formula for conforming to God’s image that fuels movement 
through higher grades of illumination, much like Augustine’s psychological 
analogies.  
 Although Anselm does not always sound like Augustine, inasmuch as he 
experiments with new and more contextually relevant forms of philosophical 
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argumentation, for the sake of readers who wanted to know how to utilize recently 
recovered intellectual resources in the quest to know God, he acts like Augustine.  
From a genuinely Augustinian doctrine of the Trinity, he derives an account of 
human knowledge, which is an account of the illuminative process of conforming to 
God’s image, which is phrased in forms of words that his readers would find 
meaningful and helpful.  By virtually all accounts, Anselm’s methodological 
departure from Augustine does not negate his intellectual fidelity to Augustine.  On 
my account, it only confirms his desire to promulgate the Augustinian programme of 
knowledge by illumination and the theological assumptions that underpin it.  
Through his arguments advanced on the basis of ‘reason alone’, Anselm updated the 
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III. DIVINE ILLUMINATION IN TRANSITION  
(1109 – 1257) 
Introduction 
The years intervening between the death of Anselm in 1109 and the start of 
Bonaventure’s term as Minister General of the Franciscan order in 1257 were years 
of transition in the West.  They were also years which would bring change for 
Augustine’s illumination theory.  In this chapter, my goal is to explain the events that 
transpired between the time of Anselm and Bonaventure that had an effect on the 
historical reception of the illumination account.   
The chapter is divided into three main sections.  In the first, I give a broad 
overview of the twelfth and early thirteenth century developments that indirectly 
impacted the interpretation of illumination.  In the second, I discuss certain aspects of 
the thought of the Arab scholar Avicenna (980-1037).  In the third part, I trace the 
history of the Franciscan order from its origins to the start of Bonaventure’s term as 
General in 1257.  In this context, I explain how members of the early Franciscan 
school developed a new approach to interpreting Augustine in concordance with 
Avicenna in their efforts to define a distinctly Franciscan intellectual tradition.   
The Twelfth Century Renaissance 
At the dawn of the twelfth century, the West was entering into “a phase of 
extraordinary economic and demographic expansion which was to continue gathering 
momentum for the next two hundred years.”416  The increase in commercial and 
industrial activity had given rise to a class of tradesmen and artisans, whose work 
required them to congregate in urban settings.  The towns that rapidly proliferated as 
a result of these developments were more than centres of commerce, however.  They 
became centres of learning.  Although literacy was a privilege normally reserved for 
the upper classes in earlier Medieval times, late Medieval middle-class merchants 
needed at least some education in order to go about their daily business.  Families of 
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means began to send their young men to the independent schools that were being 
founded in major towns all across Europe.  
In the school he operated, Peter Abelard was redefining the way students 
studied primary texts.  In his Sic et non, Abelard collated key passages from 
authoritative sources, juxtaposing those that appeared to contradict one another.  His 
goal in doing this was not to undermine the authority of authorities.  The use of Sic et 
non actually presupposed familiarity with the meaning and context of the primary 
sources, as well as belief in their authoritative status.417  The work’s purpose was to 
help students establish in their own minds the cogency and significance of the truths 
they accepted on authority by inciting them to reconcile apparently opposing claims 
and clarify ambiguities.418 
Abelard required his students to go about this through a series of steps.  The 
first was to simply state an authoritative opinion.  The second step was to present 
arguments in support of the opinion under consideration and to raise possible 
objections to it, drawing on other authorities to do so, especially those whose 
opinions were listed in the Sic et non.  The third step was to deal with the objections 
and in the process bolster, nuance, and clearly define the contours of the originally 
stated view.  In developing and utilizing this quaestio or scholastic method of 
inquiry, Abelard trained his students in a controlled environment to know truth ‘by 
negation’, that is, to use what they did know to discover what they formerly did not 
know. 
Many traditional monastic thinkers, above all, Bernard of Clairvaux, were 
unsettled by Abelard’s methods.  Bernard called attention to the risk involved in 
fragmenting texts and authorizing students to critically evaluate them.  In his 
opinion, Abelard’s methods were likely to lead to the distortion of truth, or even to 
the rejection of it.  Although Bernard’s opposition resulted in the 1140 condemnation 
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of Abelard’s writings, the use of scholastic techniques became increasingly common 
in schools over the course of the second half of the twelfth century.419   
Though a number of scholars after Abelard published compendia of 
authoritative sententiae or opinions much like Sic et non, Peter Lombard’s four 
books of Sentences would prove to be the most exhaustive collection.  The first book 
contained key citations on the topic of God’s nature; the second included passages on 
creation and the fall; the third, redemption; and the fourth, the sacraments and 
eschatology.  Although Lombard published his work in 1159, the tradition of 
commenting on his Sentences did not begin until after the University of Paris was 
founded in 1200.420  In that year, the numerous schools that had congregated in the 
burgeoning city were officially recognized as a consortium. 
In the 1220’s, Alexander of Hales became the first to compose a Sentence 
commentary.  Additionally, he organized his lectures around the themes covered in 
the Sentences and used the work to facilitate the scholastic disputations that were by 
now the core of a university education.  In these ways, he effectively founded the 
discipline of systematic theology.421  Although Alexander’s uses of the Sentences 
were controversial at first amongst those that still believed the scholastic approach 
undermined the authority of Scripture, the theology faculty was eventually persuaded 
to name the Sentences their official textbook.422   
Subsequently, candidates for the degree of master in theology were required 
to write a commentary on the Sentences.  A commentary on Lombard’s books thus 
became the Medieval equivalent to the doctoral thesis.  In their commentaries, 
scholars were instructed to employ scholastic methodology to explain authoritative 
opinions on God’s nature, creation, the fall, redemption, and sacramental life.  While 
the composition of a Sentence commentary afforded the opportunity to shed new 
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light on received views or to state them in clearer terms, it also enabled scholars to 
innovatively re-define doctrines.  It simply was not the case that Sentence 
commentators merely rehearsed the views of others.  Instead, they presented their 
own ideas and bolstered them in the way Medieval scholars were expected to do, 
namely, on the basis of authoritative sources.  In the process of doing this, scholars 
proved they had come to terms with Christian doctrine and were able to teach it.  In 
some cases, the conclusions reached in a Sentence commentary became the research 
basis for a theological Summa.  
As a growing number of young men enrolled in courses of study at the 
universities and in the schools across Europe, a class of literate and critically 
thinking people emerged.  This development created a problem for the Catholic 
Church, which was still structured to meet the needs of a rural and relatively 
unlearned population.  While some parish priests had the chance to receive training 
in the cathedral schools, these were usually hired to uphold the bureaucratic 
structures of church and state.  The typical clergyman had little more education than 
his parishioners.   
The learned laity of the twelfth century quickly grew critical of the 
intellectual and in many cases moral ineptitude of the parochial clergy.423  The 
distance between the twelfth-century laypeople and the universal Church was 
increased by religious ideals that remained from earlier times.  In the early Middle 
Ages, the genuine spiritual life was regarded as one of retreat from the world, as in 
an enclosed monastery.  The ideal of withdrawal was not only impracticable for the 
laity; it also undermined their lifestyle and vocation choices, which kept them 
engaged in ‘worldly’ affairs. 
A lack of meaningful spiritual direction contributed to the rise of new and 
radical religious movements in the latter half of the twelfth century.  During this 
time, lay preachers, who neither solicited nor obtained ecclesial authorization, 
wandered about Europe and in many cases, spread false teachings.  The charisma and 
commitment of these itinerant preachers is what attracted the laity to them. 
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The greatest threat to Christian orthodoxy in this period was posed by 
advocates of the Cathar heresy.  The Cathars were dualists who believed in two 
divine forces, one good and one evil, and they saw the material world as the product 
of the evil power.  They drew mainly on Scripture and Aristotle’s natural 
philosophical works to rationalize their positions.  In France and Italy particularly, 
many people were persuaded to join the Cathars.  The leaders of the sect exhibited 
discipline, commitment, and intellectual rigor, the very qualities that the Catholic 
clergy were perceived to lack.  Indeed, it was the negligence of the prelates that 
governed regions of Europe heavily populated by Cathars that indirectly contributed 
to the success of their efforts to proselytize.   
By 1215, the religious situation in Western Europe had grown serious.  The 
fourth Lateran council convened to enact a comprehensive program to educate and 
reform the parish clergy and curb the spread of radical religious movements and 
heresies.424  The Council fathers also decreed that every Catholic should receive 
communion and go to confession once a year.  The plans that were made met with 
mild success.   
Around the time of the council, Francis of Assisi and Dominic Guzman 
founded new religious orders.  Francis and his followers received official papal 
approval in 1209 for their work of preaching repentance and serving the poor.  In 
1216, Dominic was sanctioned to recruit and train preachers to address the Cathar 
heretics and their converts.  By their very nature, the Dominicans were a scholarly 
order.  Dominic’s intention was to set up Dominican study centres in all towns where 
there were major schools.425  Early Dominican scholars, most notably Albert the 
Great, worked to derive an intellectual system from the same sources the Cathars 
employed to promote dualism, namely, Scripture and Aristotle.  In this, they forged 
the resources they needed to respond to the Cathars.   
Both the Franciscans and the Dominicans based their ministry in the towns.  
Inasmuch as Francis and Dominic abandoned enclosure for the sake of actively 
engaging in an urban evangelistic and pastoral ministry, their orders represented “a 
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radical breakaway from the monastic tradition of the past.”426  Unlike the 
Benedictines who owned property collectively, the two orders of mendicant friars 
took vows of poverty.  For the Franciscans, the vow was to own nothing whatsoever.  
For the Dominicans, taking the vow meant possessing only the resources required for 
ministry and relying on donations to obtain them.  For members of both orders, 
swearing vows of poverty entailed opting out of the struggle for ecclesial power in 
which so many members of the clergy were embroiled.   
Because the Franciscans and Dominicans sought to minister to the relatively 
educated inhabitants of towns, they determined to organize themselves to educate 
new recruits, the Dominicans from the beginning, and the Franciscans, within the 
first twenty-five years of their existence.  By the end of the thirteenth century, the 
Franciscans and Dominicans had become known as the ‘student orders’, and they 
dominated the theological scene at the new universities.   
Since the friars were trained and available for the pastoral ministry of 
preaching, administering the sacraments, and hearing confessions, but were intent on 
avoiding positions of ecclesial power and thus corruption, they quickly became the 
most trusted agents of thirteenth-century prelates and popes.  Ecclesial authorities, 
who had virtually abandoned their attempts to reform the clergy, came to rely 
primarily upon the friars to meet the pastoral demands of local parishes, enforce the 
Lateran mandates, and deal with any problem of a religious nature whatsoever.  As in 
the earlier Medieval period, the religious orders played a crucial role in sustaining 
the social, intellectual, and religious life of Western Europe.   
Further afield, another great movement was taking place, which would have a 
monumental impact on Latin intellectual life.  During the so-called dark ages, 
Islamic forces had overtaken some formerly Christian territories and had engaged 
during this time in rigorous scholarship.  As the West began to regain its strength in 
the twelfth century, Christian forces reclaimed certain strongholds from the Moors.  
When they recovered Sicily in southern Italy and Toledo, Spain, they gained access 
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to the wealth of Greek and Arabic scholarly resources that were available in these 
Islamic centres of learning.     
 Owing to its close relations with Byzantium, “Italy was the privileged land 
for Greco-Latin translations.”427  By 1160, James of Venice had translated Aristotle’s 
Physica, De anima, De sophisticis elenchis, Analytica posteriora, Parva naturalia, 
De memoria, De iuventute, De longitudine vitae, De vita, and De respiratione.428  By 
the late twelfth century, the translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysica was virtually 
complete, and the first three books of the Ethica Nichomachea and Analytica priora 
had also become available.429   
 Most of the Arabic to Latin translation work took place in Toledo.  Between 
1152 and 1166, Dominicus Gundissalinus, Archdeacon of Toledo, commissioned a 
group of scholars to undertake a huge translation project in which he himself 
participated.  Gundissalinus’ special interest was to oversee the translation of the 
immense philosophical encyclopaedia of Avicenna, which included treatises on 
medicine, psychology, astronomy, astrology, science and natural philosophy, logic, 
metaphysics, and theology.430  Gerard of Cremona was Gundissalinus’ most prolific 
translator.  Records indicate that he translated seventy-one Arabic texts.431  In 
addition to these, Gerard produced his own versions of a number of Aristotle’s works 
and translated the Neo-Platonic Liber de causis, probably an Arabic paraphrase of 
Proclus’ Elements of Theology.432  
At the time, neither Western scholars nor even Aristotle had anything 
comparable to the scientific and medical works of the Arabs.  In the early years of 
the translation movement, consequently, Medieval scholars were most eager to 
explore these resources that were formerly unknown to them.  They were especially 
interested in the seemingly exhaustive work of Avicenna.  Avicenna’s most 
influential text was his De anima, which was closely followed in popularity by his 
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Metaphysics.433  Although Medievalists often mistake these works for mere 
commentaries on the treatises by Aristotle that bear the same titles, they actually 
contain a system that is Avicenna’s invention.434   
All of Avicenna’s works appeared together in translation before the same 
could be said for Aristotle.  When the complete works of Aristotle did at last appear 
in Latin, the translations were so riddled with errors, that the scholars who did read 
them neither felt able nor obligated to correctly interpret them.435  The translations of 
Avicenna’s writings, by contrast, were impeccable, since they were produced by 
Westerners that had been brought up in Moorish Spain and were fluent in both Latin 
and Arabic. 
Because the translations of Avicenna were so superior to those of Aristotle, 
Latin scholars working between the middle of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries 
tended to trust Avicenna to interpret the teachings of Plato and Aristotle for them, 
even though the Arab’s interpretation of the two philosophers differed greatly from 
those which late antique and early Medieval Western thinkers had presupposed, and 
even from the plain sense of the primary texts.436  Although scholars did directly 
quote Plato and Aristotle, it was usually the case that Avicennian doctrines were 
being attributed to the philosophers.437  The views of Aristotle were further distorted 
during this period because the widely circulated Liber de causis was attributed to him 
until Thomas Aquinas traced the text to Proclean sources in 1268. 
 At the instigation of Albert the Great, scholars finally started to focus on 
Aristotle in his own right from the 1240’s onwards.438  Like many of his 
contemporaries, Albert appreciated the scholarship of Avicenna.  Still, he gave 
“greater weight to the authority of Aristotle”439 and rejected aspects of Avicenna’s 
philosophy on numerous occasions for reasons of doctrine.  In Albert’s wake, efforts 
to understand Aristotle for his own sake began in earnest.   
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These efforts were facilitated by two other developments in the translation 
movement.  In the 1220’s and 1230’s, Michael Scot had translated the Aristotelian 
commentaries of Averroes, who was still writing in Spain when the Toledo 
translation project began.440  Those commentaries provided both a model and source 
for thirteenth-century scholastic commentators on Aristotle.441  In the 1240’s, they 
began to be the subject of rigorous studies.  In the 1250’s, moreover, William of 
Moerbeke completed new and far more refined translations of Aristotle’s primary 
texts, making it possible for serious scholarly work on Aristotle to begin. 
While the received view amongst historians of the Middle Ages is that late 
Medieval Latin scholars were preoccupied first and foremost with incorporating the 
work of Aristotle, recent research has shown that there was a considerable lapse of 
time between the initial translation of Aristotle’s writings and their systematic 
employment by Latin authors.442  Although the Stagirite’s work became the canon of 
university of education in the middle of the thirteenth century, it was not the centre 
of attention in the preceding hundred years.443  During that time, scholars were 
absorbed in the thought of the Arab scholar Avicenna.   
Avicenna 
In this section, I will discuss the aspects of Avicenna’s account of God’s 
nature, the natural order, the human intellect, and divine illumination, which 
influenced early thirteenth-century scholars, and especially the founders of the 
Franciscan intellectual tradition.  
THEOLOGY & COSMOLOGY 
Avicenna was the first philosopher to explicitly define God as the Being 
whose essence is equal to His existence.  When he introduced the distinction between 
essence and existence, Avicenna codified a formula for expressing the belief that 
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God simply is what He is, which is all that is.444  That belief, as David Burrell has 
superbly demonstrated, is one that members of both Islamic and Christian traditions 
hold in common.445   
Avicenna describes the derivation of the natural order from God as a ten-step 
process, which is set in motion by the First Cause that eternally thinks itself.  In 
thinking itself, this cause emanates its Intelligence.  The First Intelligence generates 
its own realm of ideas.  That is to say, it becomes the mover of its own sphere of 
forms, which comprise a subsequent level of Intelligence that recapitulates the 
creative work of the first.  In this way, subsequent intellects and intelligible spheres 
are produced until the line terminates at the tenth intelligence.446  That intelligence is 
the so-called Active Intellect, which contains the forms of all natural beings, or “the 
rational principles by which things in nature are what they are.”447  Avicenna 
therefore calls the Active Intellect the ‘Giver of Forms’ (dator formarum).   
Avicenna describes the character of the forms as absolute.  Like God, “each 
of them is just what it is.”448  According to Avicenna, every form or essence is found 
in three different conditions: in itself or in the Active Intellect, instantiated in a 
concrete object, and in the human intellect.  The essences contained in the Active 
Intellect can, but need not necessarily be, instantiated by the Giver of Forms.  
Essence, in other words, does not entail real existence.  Instead, existence is a 
property God imparts to an essence when He instantiates the essence in the natural 
realm.  When He does so, Avicenna insists that the existing form fully conforms to 
its essence.  All that belongs to the definition of that essence, conversely, belongs to 
the existing thing.   
Since forms are fixed in Avicenna’s essentialist metaphysics, the logical 
corollary is that any creature with a plurality of properties must have a plurality of 
substantial forms.  Where there are distinct notions, Avicenna perceives distinct 
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forms.  Because he believes forms are unchanging, Avicenna does not locate the 
difference between creatures and their Creator at the level of a difference in the 
relationship between essence and existence.  On his reasoning, there is no need to 
develop into an essence through increasing participation in a particular mode of 
existence, because instantiations of forms are already complete instantiations.   
For Avicenna, created forms differ from God in virtue of the fact that they are 
compounds of at least two substantial forms, namely, the form of materiality or 
corporeality (forma corporeitatis), and the essential form that is provided by the soul.  
Even separate Intelligences are composites of spiritual matter and form, according to 
Avicenna’s doctrine of universal hylomorphism.  As for corporeal forms, Avicenna 
affirms that what underlies them is a substance called prime matter.  In his view, 
prime matter has positive existence and is ‘privative’ only in the sense that it is 
receptive to the impression of forms.  In fact, prime matter is effectively a large mass 
of formless existence.  Imposing forms on it was and is the way God confers 
existence to them.  Moreover, it is the way He ties all creatures together in an 
interdependent network.    
The second form every creature possesses, that of the soul, determines its 
complexity and therefore its level of perfection.449  There are three types of soul.  
The vegetable soul is responsible for a being’s reproduction, growth, and 
nourishment.450  All living creatures possess a vegetable soul.  “Life forms 
possessing the animal soul differ from those that only have the vegetable soul in their 
ability to move freely as well as in their capacity for sensual perception.”451  All 
animals have the five external senses and a set of five internal senses.  Only human 
beings possess a rational soul.  A creature’s soul gives it a certain sort of 
‘complexion’, which predisposes it to receive other substantial forms from the Giver 
of Forms.  If a being seems to change in colour or shape and so forth, it is not owing 
to increasing participation in a particular form.  Rather, change is brought about by 
the coming and going of forms. 
                                                
449 Ibid., 195. 
450 Peter Heath, Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1992), 60. 
451 Ibid., 61. 
   140
Because God is the efficient cause that impresses forms onto matter, giving 
existence to essences, every change a creature undergoes is directly brought about by 
Him.  Here, as Etienne Gilson has noted, Avicenna presents a novel notion of divine 
causality that “exhibits a tendency to invade the order of natural causality.”452  The 
age-old influentia model of causality had exhibited no such tendency.  On that 
model, God gives each creature a single from and thus instils in it the potential to 
actualize the essence He has given through participation in the mode of existence or 
characteristic behaviours that are determined by the essence.  Subsequent, direct 
involvement on His part is not needed in order for the creature to undergo natural 
development, even though God is always indirectly responsible for development, 
inasmuch as His primary causality was the force that first set secondary causes in 
motion.   
In the stead of the influentia model, Avicenna introduces what has been 
called the ‘concursus’ model of divine causality.453  In this model, God’s primary 
causality actually makes secondary causation happen.  Every creaturely change 
represents the removal of an old form or the impression of a new one by His hand.  
Whatever a creature appears to do as it grows or changes is in fact the product of its 
cooperation with God. 
PSYCHOLOGY 
The Animal Soul 
In his De anima, Avicenna gives an elaborate account of the operations of 
animal and rational souls.  The animal soul that human beings have in common with 
beasts is comprised of five external senses and five internal senses.  The external 
senses, which come into direct contact with the material world include sight, hearing, 
smell, taste, and touch.454  The five internal senses do not immediately perceive the 
external world, but apprehend images of material entities.455   
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The first of the internal senses is the common sense.  The common sense 
initially grasps information transferred from the five senses.  Its apprehension is an 
exact reflection of the object the external senses perceive.  The common sense not 
only receives empirical information about an object; it also coordinates the 
perception of the forms that constitute the object.  Without this sense, the animal soul 
would see each of the forms that comprise an object individually.  It would see 
hardness, roughness, brownness, woodenness, and so forth instead of a tree, for 
example.   
Although the common sense represents the forms that constitute sense 
objects, it cannot retain those forms.  The retentive imagination is the faculty that 
keeps the forms of things even after the external senses have lost contact with 
them.456  It preserves the knowledge of the object, together with all its determining 
attributes or accidents, the image of the tree, as well as its size, shape, and colour.      
The images stored in the retentive imagination are transmitted to the 
compositive imagination in animals, or the cogitative faculty, in humans.  This 
faculty distinguishes between the particular forms that can be identified in any given 
being.  The compositive faculty enables one to recombine forms that have been 
separated to make images of things that have not yet been experienced or that may 
not even exist.  
The faculty of estimation assigns positive or negative connotations to the 
forms that have been apprehended.  It identifies forms as helpful or dangerous, for 
instance.  The estimative faculty transforms the images of forms into what Avicenna 
calls intentions.457  An intention is the final product of external and internal 
sensation.  It is the image of a particular form that is derived from an encounter with 
a material object.  Although the internal senses enable the animal soul to consider the 
forms independently from material objects, Avicenna stresses that, at this phase, 
those forms are still evaluated in the particular mode.  While the process of 
abstracting a universal concept has begun, at least for one with a rational in addition 
to an animal soul, that process cannot be completed by the animal soul.  Instead, 
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intentions are stored in the fifth and final faculty associated with the internal senses, 
the memory, where they are made available to the rational soul.  
The Rational Soul 
The rational soul is the only soul capable of abstracting a universal form that 
is detached from all particular and material determinations, a form with purely 
intelligible or immaterial existence.  According to Avicenna, there are two ‘faces’ to 
the rational soul: the theoretical and the practical.  The former is oriented towards 
things above, namely, intelligible forms, and the latter to things below, or material 
bodies.458  The theoretical aspect acquires the knowledge of universals, while the 
practical intellect borrows the theoretical intellect’s knowledge of universals and 
applies them in dealing with particular problems.  For this reason, the practical 
intellect requires the cooperation of the body and the corporeal powers of the soul.459 
The theoretical intellect, by contrast, needs absolutely no help from the body, 
once it has procured intentions from the memory.  In fact, it is only hindered from its 
work by interference from the body.460  After all, the soul and the body are utterly 
distinct substantial forms.  Avicenna evidences his belief in the intellect’s 
independence from the body when he presents his famous ‘Flying Man’ thought 
experiment, which has been compared with the second meditation of Descartes.461 
In this thought experiment, Avicenna wonders whether a person who was 
created flying in the air, and who could not for that reason feel the body, would still 
affirm the existence of the rational soul.  Avicenna insists that s/he would.  Since the 
form of the soul is distinct from the form of the body, he reasons, it is possible to feel 
the former even when one cannot feel the latter.  Advocating mind-body dualism was 
Avicenna’s way of establishing the eternal life of the soul after the death of the body.  
The Arab does not seem sensitive to the problem of proving the possibility of 
communication between the sense and intellectual faculties that later became 
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associated with dualism.  He apparently assumes communication is possible in virtue 
of the fact that both the animal and rational souls are situated in the same entity, that 
is, the human being.   
After the discussion of the two faces of the soul, Avicenna explains his theory 
of the four intellects.462  The four intellects as he describes them are really stages in 
the process of actualizing the theoretical capacity to abstract a universal concept.  
The first three intellects constitute the ‘potential intellect’.  In other words, they 
represent different degrees of human potential for abstraction.  The first intellect is 
called the material intellect (intellectus materialis).  The material intellect is likened 
to the primitive intellectual state of human beings before they reach the age of 
reason, or more concretely, the potential an infant has to eventually learn to write.   
The ‘habitual’ intellect (intellectus in habitu) is analogous to the knowledge 
of the principles of writing, such as the letters of the alphabet or the proper use of 
writing instruments.  When the rational soul reaches the age of reason, the material 
intellect receives what Avicenna calls primary intelligibles.463  The primary 
intelligibles are innately known concepts.  The Giver of Forms who bestows all 
substantial forms impresses these intelligible forms on the habitual intellect.  The 
forms are not the universal concepts that will be abstracted.  Rather, they serve as 
guides for abstraction.  They are the a priori principles that anchor and orient human 
reasoning, ensuring the truth and certitude of the ideas that come to be known.464   
The first intelligible (primum cognitum) the habitual intellect intuits is the 
concept of Being (ens).  Avicenna argues that Being is the first object of the intellect 
on the grounds that the knowledge of any particular being presupposes the 
knowledge of the existence of a Being that is the source of all beings.  Since God is 
the cause of beings, Avicenna contends that it is possible to derive proof for His 
existence from the analysis of the very concept of God as the cause of all beings.  
That is to say, he thinks it possible to attain a priori proof for God’s existence, and 
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thus affirms that it falls within the domain of metaphysical inquiry to establish the 
existence of God. 
This view is to be contrasted with that of Averroes, who like Aristotle 
thought proof of the divine could only be provided a posteriori within the discipline 
of physics, and therefore strictly cosmologically, that is, in moving from the 
knowledge of effects to proof for the cause.465  By starting with proof of the cause 
without reference to its effects, Avicenna believed he could also implicitly 
demonstrate that the effects are indicative of the cause.  In other words, he assumed 
that his ontological proof for God’s existence contained a cosmological proof as 
well.     
Besides Being, Avicenna argues that the intellect knows the ‘transcendental’ 
properties of Being, such as one, true, and good.466  The intuitive knowledge of such 
primary intelligibles is the cognitive resource that is required to strip intentions of 
their particularizing features and so discern the essence—the qualities of unity, truth, 
and goodness manifested in a certain forms—at the core of any given intention.  That 
stripped down version of the intention is an abstract concept that Avicenna calls a 
secondary intelligible form.  The effective intellect (intellectus in effectu) is the one 
that acquires secondary intelligibles but does not actually employ them.  Avicenna 
likens the effective intellect to the state of one that has learned to write and has 
written in the past but is not presently doing so.   
When the intellect is in the act of knowing an abstract concept, it is called the 
acquired intellect.  This fourth intellect is the one that actually sees an intention 
stripped of its material determinations such as size, colour, place, and time, and “lays 
bare the essence of a singular of its individualizing determinations.”467  It “consists 
precisely in grasping essences just as they are in themselves and in their state of 
complete indetermination.”468  The secondary intelligible captures the kernel of truth, 
the essence, of the intention from which it was derived.  That abstract concept 
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corresponds to the essence as it subsists in itself.469  At this stage, the form under 
consideration truly does exist in its three conditions: in a concrete object, in the 
intellect, and in itself.  According to Avicenna, the intellect does not need to compare 
multiple forms in order to grasp an essence.  A single intention is enough, because 
every instance of an essence is in full possession of all of the characteristics of the 
essence, such that the same essence is necessarily discerned once other forms and 
attributes are detached from it.   
The process of abstracting a universal concept, as Avicenna understands it, 
can be summarized as follows.  The habitual intellect is impressed with certain 
primary intelligible forms, which are not acquired but are innately known.  These a 
priori rules equip the rational soul to strip extraneous forms away from one particular 
form so as to grasp the nature of the form as it subsists in itself.  Primary intelligible 
forms supervise acts of reasoning so that they will lead the intellect to see what is 
essential in the objects of experience, and thus to see a secondary intelligible form, a 
thing as it exists in the Active Intellect of God. 
According to Avicenna, any intellect that actualizes the potential to know a 
secondary intelligible form in this way necessarily does so on account of the intellect 
that always remains in act.  The Active Intellect is that intellect which, “actually has 
the disembodied conceptual forms of things.”470  To move from potency to act in the 
mode of the acquired intellect, therefore, is simply to establish a connection between 
the human potential intellect and the Active Intellect.  When the rational soul 
abstracts, in other words, it does not form an idea but receives one from the Giver of 
Forms.471  When the human being makes a discovery, it is owing to the fact that s/he 
has tapped into the potential to receive from God, who accomplishes all cognitive 
activity.  As per the concursus model, all human learning is a shared effort on the 
part of the human and divine mind. 
Since the knowledge of forms comes in consequence of a connection with the 
Active Intellect, Avicenna argues that there is no intellectual memory of secondary 
intelligible forms.  Each time the intellect considers an abstract concept, it 
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apprehends it anew by re-connecting with the Active Intellect.  Fortunately, it does 
not have to re-learn how to make the connection each time it thinks if it has already 
developed a disposition to receive a certain form, as this disposition is retained in the 
effective intellect.  
 While the process of connecting with the Active Intellect is laborious for 
many, there are some for whom it is virtually effortless.  These possess what 
Avicenna calls the sacred intellect, or the intellect of prophets, through which it is 
possible to bypass the phases of potency and constantly maintain an intuitive 
connection with the Active Intellect, and thus always have direct insight into the 
meaning of all things.472  
As he draws the discussion of the four intellects to a close, Avicenna 
illustrates the move from potency to act by appealing to the metaphor of the sun and 
illumination.473  On his account, the Active Intellect is to the human potential 
intellect as sun is to human vision.  The Active Intellect gives the primary intelligible 
forms, which he likens to the capacity for vision, and it imparts the secondary 
intelligible forms, which he compares to the objects the sun brings to light.  The 
Active Intellect thus illumines both the subject and the object of knowledge.  By 
means of the primary and secondary intelligible forms, the divine being works 
concurrently with the rational being, such that all human knowledge becomes 
directly attributable to divine illumination. 
AVICENNA VS. ARISTOTLE 
Avicenna’s De anima is the Arab philosopher’s own version of the theory of 
passive and active intellects Aristotle develops his work which goes by that same 
name.474  Although Avicenna employs much of Aristotle’s terminology and 
structures his discussion of the soul along the lines of Aristotle, his teachings 
represent a departure from Aristotle.  
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For Aristotle, the intellectual activity of abstraction begins at the level of 
sense perception.  The imagination makes images of sense objects.475  Those images 
are stored in the passive intellect, which is called passive on account of the fact that 
empirical data that comes to the intellect is in many respects beyond the intellect’s 
control.  On the basis of multiple images, the agent or active intellect abstracts a 
universal concept (intelligible species) that is stored in the memory, which Aristotle 
calls the possible intellect.476  Further experience may require that the concept be 
adjusted to account for the new images that are produced through experience.   
Because Aristotle conceives created forms as subject to constant evolution, he 
sees fit to define abstraction accordingly.  Although the concepts the intellect 
produces are said to represent reality, the representation, as Aristotle envisions it, 
does not involve a “correspondence between mental acts and the objects they relate 
to.”477  Moreover, the intelligible species is in no way identified with either “the 
direct object of perception or the immediate object of cognition.”478  In short, the 
species is not a ‘thing’.  Rather, it is a provisional concept the knower constructs for 
the sake of making sense of reality by connecting and distinguishing related and 
unrelated things, respectively, and broadening the horizons of its species in the 
process.479  Insofar as Aristotle’s account of cognition hinges on the mind’s ongoing 
cooperation with the faculties of sensation and imagination, there is no trace of 
dualism in it. 
In a number of recently published studies, scholars have drawn attention to 
the fact that Avicenna’s understanding of abstraction widely diverges from that of 
Aristotle and is in fact highly innovative.480  According to these studies, Avicenna’s 
doctrine of intentions revolutionized the definition of cognitive representation, and 
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indeed, brought the issue of representation to the fore of Medieval scholarly 
discussion in an unprecedented way.  For the first time in the history of the Medieval 
West, the focus turned towards the contents rather than the functional character of 
mental states.  The mental image or intention was supposed to capture the whole of a 
particular essence, notwithstanding the attachment of additional attributes. 
This ‘totalized’ concept of the content of mental states is the natural 
companion to an essentialist metaphysics, in which instances of forms are perceived 
as immutable.  In Avicenna’s account, abstraction is defined accordingly as the 
cognitive act in which mind determines the direct correspondence between the 
instance of an essence and the essence itself.  The emphasis is not on the ongoing 
activity of abstraction as in Aristotle, but on the abstract concept or ‘thing itself’. 
Although many Medieval historians have mistaken Avicenna’s theory of 
abstraction for Aristotle’s, new research is teaching scholars to distinguish the two 
standards of knowledge that came into circulation in the thirteenth century and to 
acknowledge that the representational standard Avicenna introduced quickly 
replaced the early Medieval theories of knowledge inspired by Augustine in 
academic contexts.481  The Avicennian standard was the one that became especially 
popular in Franciscan intellectual circles. The account of the early history of the 
Franciscan order I offer in the next section will help clarify why the friars minor 
found an Avicennian account of knowledge so appealing. 
The Franciscan Order  
THE HISTORY OF THE ORDER: 1209-1257 
When he was still a young man, Francesco Bernardone experienced the first 
of numerous visitations from Christ.  Hitherto, he had enjoyed a carefree and 
extravagant life as the son of a wealthy Italian cloth merchant.  As a result of this 
vision, however, Francis began to withdraw from the “rowdy, pleasure-seeking life 
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which he had led, and to spend far more time in quiet meditation and prayer.”482  
During one of his regular visits to the ruined church of San Damiano just outside his 
hometown of Assisi, Francis had yet another visit from Christ.  While praying before 
the altar, Francis heard the icon of the crucified Christ command him three times to 
repair the ruined house of God.   
After this encounter, Francis fully committed himself to a life of poverty and 
began to wander throughout the countryside, taking work and performing acts of 
service wherever he could.  In 1206 he heard a sermon on Matthew 10:9, the passage 
where Christ instructs his follows to go proclaim the gospel, leaving money and 
possessions behind them.  During this sermon, he claimed that Christ visited him 
again, telling him to preach a message of repentance.  By 1209, eleven men had 
joined Francis in renouncing their worldly goods and committing themselves to an 
itinerant life of service to the sick and poor.  Together, they composed a Rule for a 
new religious order, which was soon approved by Pope Innocent III.   
As they travelled around to preach and serve, Francis taught his disciples how 
to live in a Christ-like manner.  For him, the crucified Christ by whom he was 
periodically visited was the epitome of God’s loving nature.  To imitate Him, on 
Francis’ understanding, was to live and even die in total self-abandonment, and to do 
this by literally observing His instructions to forsake everything.483  By becoming 
humble for the sake of others, as Christ did, Francis thought his followers could learn 
to see even the lowliest of creatures as a perfect reflection of the divine love.  
Francis’ own intimate relationship with Christ and efforts to imitate Him allowed 
him to live in harmony with nature.  Legend has it that he once preached a sermon to 
a flock of attentive birds, drew water from a rock for a beggar, and tamed a rabid 
wolf.  His charisma and commitment captivated the large audiences that gathered to 
hear his compelling words.484   
At one such gathering, an Italian count was so moved that he donated his 
property on the mountain of La Verna to the friars as a place of prayer; and at many 
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other gatherings, the friars gained disciples.  These disciples established new 
Franciscan outposts in the major cities across Europe where the Franciscans 
preached.  By 1217, there were so many recruits that ministers had to be selected to 
oversee the eleven provinces in Western Europe now occupied by friars.  Around this 
same time, a cardinal called Ugolino took an interest in the order.  He believed that if 
the friars were better organized, they could compensate for the inadequacies of the 
clergy and do a great service to the Church.  At Ugolino’s request, Francis appointed 
the cardinal the Protector of the order.  Within a few years, Francis had delegated all 
his administrative duties to Ugolino and his good friend Elias.  The responsibilities 
involved in governing an order that had grown to include 5,000 members were 
neither his passion nor his gift.   
Elias and Ugolino saw Francis’ ideals as impracticable in such a sizeable 
order.  In their opinion, some provision had to be made for the basic needs of the 
friars.  While Francis was away on an Eastern missionary journey, they took 
measures to ensure that the friars had suitable accommodation and preaching 
facilities.  When Francis returned, he was horrified to find that the life of poverty he 
prescribed was being compromised.  He took pains to re-iterate that his friars should 
possess nothing and live from day to day on the goodwill of the faithful.  He refused 
to allow them the privilege of becoming ordained preachers and insisted that they 
continue to preach with the consent of the local clergy.   
With so many friars wanting to preach, however, Ugolino and Elias realized 
that obtaining permission to do so from the parochial clergy on a case-by-case basis 
was now a logistical impossibility.  The friars needed to found their own 
congregations and acquire the credentials to oversee them.  Additionally, unlearned 
novice friars needed to be prepared for preaching in the first place.  In light of all 
this, Elias and Ugolino asked Francis to revise his original rule, hoping he would 
sanction the changes they felt were necessary. 
When Francis returned from the countryside with the new rule he had written 
there, which he claimed Christ dictated to him, he presented Elias and Ugolino with 
an expanded statement of his original mandates.  He refused to allow study within 
the order, arguing that the life of study interferes with absolute poverty, since it 
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requires many resources, and with humility, since knowledge tends to elicit pride.  
Disregarding Francis’ wishes, Ugolino softened these mandates and had the pope 
approve the rule of 1223, which remains the rule of the order today.485  By this time, 
Francis was so frequently ill that he could no longer oppose the changes that were 
being made.  In 1224, he retreated to La Verna.  During this time, he had his famous 
vision of the six-winged seraph nailed to the cross.  He was marked with the 
Stigmata, from which he supposedly died in 1226.  
As soon as Francis had passed away, Elias determined to see that he was 
canonized as a saint of equal stature to the apostles.  Ugolino, who had recently been 
named Pope Gregory IX, granted Elias’ request.  The two then set out to construct a 
shrine for Francis’ body in Assisi.  At the Pope’s encouragement, donations poured 
in from all over Christendom for a basilica.  The construction of the basilica was part 
of Elias’ plan to make the order of friars minor the most renowned body in the 
Church and Assisi a centre of pilgrimage for the whole world.486   
Elias and Ugolino then worked together to re-define the rule and the 
Franciscan order overall in ways they could not have done while Francis was still 
alive.  In 1230, Gregory issued a bull Quo elongati, which declared that the friars 
were no longer bound to literally observe the vow of absolute poverty.  They were 
permitted to ‘use’ property such as housing and books, so long as all their belongings 
were technically in the ‘possession’ of the Holy See.  Quo elongati freed the friars to 
formally organize themselves as a learned order like the Dominicans.  The 
Franciscans began to acquire convents, and each convent was appointed a lector to 
oversee the new friars’ ministerial education.  The Pope recognized this education as 
the equivalent of an undergraduate course of the university, so that gifted students 
could proceed to higher education at one of the universities, and then become lectors 
at one of the convents.   
The literati, or the members of the order that had entered with previous 
clerical or scholarly training and supported the endeavours of Elias and Ugolino, did 
not feel that they undermined Franciscan ideals by institutionalizing the order.  To 
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the contrary, they claimed that they upheld those ideals by adapting them to the 
needs of a growing order.  As the literati began to overtake the order from within, 
with the reinforcement of the Pope, the ‘spiritual’ members that had been a part of 
the order from its early days began to protest the relaxation of Francis’ standards.487  
The more the literati qualified Francis’ commands, so that they did not have to 
follow them, the more the internal factions became pronounced.  Yet the Pope would 
not hear the complaints of the spirituals.  In 1231, he issued another bull, Nimis 
iniquia, which gave the friars the authority to perform the duties of the parish clergy 
and to take from them whatever they needed to conduct their ministries.   
Since Francis’ death, several men had served terms as Minister General of the 
Franciscan order.  In 1237, John of Parma was selected to fill this role.  Although an 
educated man, John was a spiritual, who was fully committed to a life of poverty and 
simplicity.  Together with the spirituals, John was an avid proponent of the theology 
of the Cistercian monk Joachim of Fiore (1132-1202).  Joachim had claimed to 
receive a special insight into the meaning of Scripture.  He taught that there are three 
stages in the history that correlate to the three Persons of the Trinity.   
The first stage, he said, is recorded in the Old Testament and is the 
dispensation of the Father.  The second stage is recounted in the New Testament and 
includes the first thousand years of the existence of the Church, during which time 
the world was under the dispensation of the Son.  In the third stage, Joachim foretold 
that the Church would become corrupt, but that two new religious orders would be 
founded. Members of these orders would live in poverty and would “inaugurate the 
new era in which there would be no need for authoritative institutions since men 
would now live according to the spirit of God.”488 
 Most spirituals believed that St. Francis had ushered in the age of the Spirit.  
Consequently, they considered the literal imitation of Francis to be the very essence 
of the spiritual life.  As much as possible, John wanted to restore the original 
simplicity of the order.  However, he had come too late.  By his time, the Franciscan 
order was already embroiled in ecclesial politics and in the life of the new 
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universities.  By 1219, the Franciscans had arrived in Paris, where they set up a 
house on the outskirts of the city.  The Dominicans had already been in town for two 
years and had founded their own training school with regular lectures and 
disputations.  When they first arrived, the Franciscan friars had no plans to set up a 
school.  For some time, they attended lectures at the university itself.  By 1229, 
however, they had started their own programme.   
Around this same time, members of the university faculty began to join the 
order.  When they did so, they transferred their students and support from the 
university to the Franciscan school.  This caused no little controversy amongst the 
university masters, who felt that they were being deprived of collegial support, 
students, income, and prestige.  Nevertheless, the friar school continued to grow to 
such an extent that King Louis donated an expansive convent in central Paris, where 
the friars moved in 1231.489  In 1245, Pope Innocent IV issued a bull Ordinem 
vestrum, which granted friars the power to hold money not only for necessity, but 
also for the sake of convenience.  His goal in doing this was to abolish any obstacle 
to the growth of the Franciscan order and the education of their recruits.   
As privileges poured upon the friars from the Roman Curia, the university 
masters grew increasingly infuriated. The friars were given all the rights and powers 
of university officials, yet they were exempt from all the attendant responsibilities 
because they were directly responsible to the Holy See.  The breaking point came in 
1250, when the Pope decreed that any friar who finished a masters degree in 
theology should automatically be awarded a license to teach by the university 
chancellor.  The masters responded by passing a statue to counter the papal mandate, 
in what was effectively an attempt to preserve their own jobs.  This statute stated that 
only one master from each of the friar schools would be permitted to take a post in 
the university faculty.   
After 1250, by which point the Franciscan order had reached a membership 
of approximately 30,000, the masters set out on nothing short of a quest “to discredit 
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the friars and drive them out of the schools altogether.”490  Their efforts came to a 
head in 1253, when they declared a strike and ordered all teaching to cease.  The friar 
instructors on the university faculty, who were not subject to university discipline, 
refused to obey the university mandate and were therefore justifiably expelled from 
the consortium.  The strike was followed by a decree that no one could act as a 
master in any university faculty until he had taken an oath to obey university 
statues.491 
The masters’ next course of action was to attack the mendicant friars on 
theoretical grounds.  The Franciscan friars in particular were charged with upholding 
the opinions of the Joachites, which were condemned as heretical in 1256.  Countless 
tracts were written attacking them as false teachers.  Soon, pamphlets appeared that 
challenged the mendicant way of life more generally, especially the Franciscan vow 
of absolute poverty, which was described as dangerous, impractical, and inimical to 
the faith.492  An all-out pamphlet war over the issue of evangelical poverty ensued.  It 
became dangerous for the friars to appear in the streets, and on several occasions, 
students were injured or killed in riots.  Eventually, the friars had to appeal to the 
new Pope Alexander IV to authorize their ministry.   
With the charges that were being levelled by the university masters in view, 
the Pope realized that he could not allow a self-proclaimed Joachite like John of 
Parma to remain head of the Franciscan order.  By 1257, it had become obvious that 
a new Minister General was needed, one who could resolve the tensions between 
rival factions within the order and alleviate the situation with the university masters.  
For that job, Bonaventure was unanimously chosen. 
THE FRANCISCAN INTELLECTUAL TRADITION (1220-1257) 
 In the late 1230’s, Pope Gregory IX commissioned a Franciscan theological 
Summa, which would come to be called the Summa fratris Alexandri or the Summa 
minorum.  In view of the challenges the order faced during this decade, one can see 
why he saw fit to do this.  Although the masters looked unfavourably upon the 
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presence of all mendicant friars in the university setting, they were especially 
suspicious of the friars minor.  Unlike the Dominicans who had a strong sense of 
intellectual purpose from their inception, the Franciscans came with no scholarly 
identity but to shun scholarly endeavours.  In order to sustain the life of the 
Franciscan order in the University of Paris, Ugolino saw the need to define a 
distinctly Franciscan intellectual tradition.  The Franciscan Summa was to achieve 
this by translating Francis’ spiritual vision into theological and philosophical 
doctrines and by grounding the account in authoritative sources.493   
 The man chosen to oversee the project was Alexander of Hales, one of the most 
sophisticated and innovative theological minds of the day.  In 1220, Alexander had 
been given a chair in the university faculty of theology.  At that time, he became 
largely responsible for the education of the Franciscan friars that attended lectures in 
theology.  As the most celebrated theological scholar at the university of Paris, 
Alexander greatly impressed his Franciscan students.  Yet they also left a deep 
impression on him.  Eventually, he concluded that the Franciscan outlook was “not 
only compatible with his theological positions but [also] reinforced them.”494  In 
1236, he decided to join the order himself, and thence became regent master of the 
Franciscan school.495  
 Although Alexander supervised work on the Franciscan Summa and gave his 
name to it, he was not solely responsible for its production.  He collaborated with his 
Franciscan colleague Jean de la Rochelle.  Other Franciscan masters contributed as 
well, and when both Alexander and Jean died in 1245, Bonaventure may have been 
among those that gave the work its finishing touches, as late as 1257.  Even though 
Alexander and Jean did not personally write every section of the Summa, research 
has shown that the treatise represents a compilation and partial reworking of works 
mainly written by Alexander of Hales and Jean de la Rochelle.496   
 Research has further demonstrated that the content of the Summa, not to 
mention the original writings of Alexander and Jean, bears the mark of Avicenna’s 
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influence.  In his study of the reception of Anselm’s argument amongst thirteenth-
century Franciscans and Dominicans, for instance, Scott Matthews has shown that 
Alexander of Hales recast the argument as an a priori proof God’s existence in his 
Sentence Commentary and has traced this use of the argument into the Franciscan 
Summa.  According to Matthews, Alexander’s goal in appropriating the Avicennian 
proof was to give an account of the intuitive awareness of God Francis always 
enjoyed.497  That ‘habitual’ awareness of God, as the Summists called it, entailed the 
innate knowledge of Being and its trinity of transcendental properties: unity, truth, 
and goodness.498  It was in virtue of the knowledge of the transcendentals that the 
intellect was able to abstract accurate ideas of reality and see creatures, with Francis, 
as perfect reflections of God’s nature.499   
 Matthews regards the use of Anselm’s argument and the theory of knowledge 
that underlies it by early Franciscan masters as a polemical attempt to prove that the 
Franciscan mindset, far from being opposed to the acquisition of knowledge, is the 
very precondition of valid intellectual activity.500  Although he shows no signs of 
awareness that the theory of knowledge he finds in the writings of the Summists was 
derived from Avicenna, he rightly stresses that the theory was developed in an effort 
to transform Francis’ intimate experience of God and his perfect insight into the 
nature of reality into a normative cognitive standard.    
 In his study of the late Medieval reception of Avicenna’s De anima, Dag Hasse 
demonstrates that the views on knowledge such as Matthews found in the writings of 
the Summists were in fact inspired by Avicenna.  Focusing on Jean de la Rochelle, 
Hasse shows that the scholar clearly advocated the Avicennian theory of four 
intellects in his Summa de anima, which was one of the main sources for the 
Franciscan Summa.501  Jean was also one of the foremost proponents of the 
Avicennian doctrine of God as the Agent Intellect, Hasse notes.502  On the basis of 
passages like Soliloquia 1.8.15, Jean felt justified in imputing the doctrine of the 
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separate Agent Intellect to Augustine.503  Although Hasse acknowledges that it is 
unclear whether all the authors of the Franciscan Summa accepted this doctrine, and 
it is unlikely that Alexander of Hales himself did so, he shows that Jean’s general 
appropriation of the Avicennian doctrine of four intellects travelled through to the 
Franciscan Summa.  Another scholar has discussed the Franciscan preference for an 
Avicennian doctrine of abstraction and the Franciscan appropriation of Avicenna’s 
dualist theory of the two faces of the soul.504 
 The research mentioned above reveals that early Franciscans were interested in 
employing the conceptual resources the Arab had to offer, which promised to help 
them give an account of reality and human knowledge as Francis understood it.  In 
incorporating Avicenna’s ideas, Franciscans transformed Avicennian positions into 
philosophical principles consistent with Franciscan spirituality.  When they went to 
articulate their principles, both Matthews and Hasse acknowledge, they did so with 
turns of phrase they borrowed from Augustine and Anselm.  They were able to ‘find’ 
their vision in traditional forms of argumentation because scholastic methodology 
left room for redefinition.  The invocation of such great spiritual authorities was, to 
Matthews’ mind especially, a deliberate polemical move on the part of early 
Franciscan authors to immunize their order against external threats.   
 In his groundbreaking work on late Medieval thought, Etienne Gilson had 
already pointed out that Franciscans developed a new method of interpreting 
Augustine in accordance with Avicenna.505  With the exception of the doctrine of 
God as Agent Intellect, however, Gilson thought the Avicennian interpretation of 
Augustine legitimate.  He referred to the heterodox philosophy of the Franciscans 
that espoused the doctrine of the separate Agent Intellect, including Jean de la 
Rochelle, Roger Bacon, John Peckham, and Roger Marston, as ‘Avicennized 
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Augustinianism’.  The Franciscans that rejected this doctrine, even while drawing on 
the rest of Avicenna’s thought, by contrast, produced an Augustinianism which he 
regarded as the most precise version of Augustinianism that had been formulated to 
date.  For Gilson, Franciscan thought was the apex of Augustinian thought. 
 Gilson’s research has greatly facilitated the effort made here to identify the 
Avicennian elements that became distinctive features of Franciscan thought.  What 
has been said thus far, however, should suffice to arouse the suspicion that the 
intellectual tradition the early Franciscans influenced by Avicenna founded, albeit in 
the name of Augustine and Anselm, actually signals a departure from the 
longstanding Augustinian tradition.  In the following chapter on Bonaventure, I will 
seek to substantiate what I have suggested here.   
                                                                                                                                     
Marston: un cas d’augustinisme avicennisant,” Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen-
Age  8 (1933): 37-42. 




In this chapter, my purpose is to demonstrate that Bonaventure is not an 
Augustinian with respect to the theory of knowledge by divine illumination.  The 
main reason why I want to distinguish Bonaventure from Augustine in this regard is 
that doing so will help me explain why Franciscans working in the generation after 
Bonaventure rejected Augustine’s illumination theory, as Bonaventure presented it.  
According to the scholarly consensus, Bonaventure is not only an Augustinian, but 
also the last and best representative of traditional Medieval Augustinian thought.506  
His illumination theory is commonly described as the hallmark of his 
Augustinianism.507  Moreover, his place at the end of the line of Medieval 
Augustinian thinkers is confirmed by his use of Anselm’s ontological argument.508   
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While there are certainly scholars that recognize the Seraphic Doctor’s 
distinctiveness as a Franciscan thinker and that celebrate the uniqueness of his 
intellectual synthesis, few would deny that he is fundamentally an Augustinian, and 
an Augustinian on fundamentals.  In fact, where the uniquely Franciscan features of 
Bonaventure’s thought are underscored, the scholarly habit is to affirm that 
Augustine is the inspiration behind the views he presents and that Bonaventure’s 
doctrines give full and final expression to Augustine’s views.   
The prevalence of these opinions has much to do with the fact that Etienne 
“Gilson’s image of Bonaventure gained something of a classic stature”509 in modern 
scholarship.  Where some of Gilson’s contemporaries interpreted Bonaventure as an 
‘incipient Thomist’, Gilson himself discerned the distinctive spirit of Bonaventure’s 
philosophy.510  Noticing the Seraphic Doctor’s tendency to employ the terms of 
Augustine, Gilson formed the opinion that Bonaventure not only used Augustine’s 
terms, but also utilized them in the same sense the bishop had originally intended.  
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Professor Gilson went so far as to suggest that the Seraphic Doctor explained more 
elaborately than Augustine himself what the terms meant.511  His concept of 
Bonaventure as the last and best Augustinian thus rested on the assumption that 
Augustine was a proto-Bonaventurian.   
On Gilson’s account, Augustine never developed a systematic theory of 
knowledge and illumination, but mainly alluded to the divine light in references that 
are scattered throughout his writings.512  Not until Bonaventure was Augustine’s 
understanding of illumination clearly expressed.  According to Gilson, Bonaventure 
sought to codify a genuinely Augustinian doctrine of knowledge in order to fortify 
the longstanding Augustinian tradition against the challenge that the influx of 
Aristotle’s writings posed to its authoritative status.   
Admittedly, Gilson has a case.  The Augustinian arguments Bonaventure 
invokes do seem to accommodate the meanings he assigns to them.  In other words, 
it is possible to ‘find’ Bonaventure’s vision in Augustine, at least so long as the 
primary focus is on what both authors say as opposed to what they mean when they 
say the same things.  Because the arguments of Bonaventure and Augustine sound so 
similar when they are taken at face value, it is unlikely to be immediately obvious to 
the reader far removed from the intellectual context in which the two theologians 
worked that they do in fact differ.  For this reason, I have argued that it is essential to 
attend to the theological doctrines that imbue philosophical terms with meaning.   
In the late nineteenth century, Theodore De Régnon called attention to the 
fact that two distinct lines of Trinitarian thought emerged in the late Medieval West.  
He drew one line from Richard of St. Victor and more remotely Pseudo-Dionysius 
through Alexander of Hales to Bonaventure, and another from Augustine to Anselm, 
Lombard, Albert, and Aquinas.513  Although Michel René Barnes has recently 
criticized De Régnon’s characterization of Eastern and Western Trinitarian doctrines, 
the latter’s observations about the two distinct traditions that emerged within the 
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Western tradition itself have gained wide recognition in recent years.514  A 
straightforward reading of the relevant texts confirms that Franciscans like 
Bonaventure replaced Augustine’s Trinitarian theology with Richard of St. Victor’s, 
while Thomas Aquinas upheld the Augustinian tradition.   
Though many scholars acknowledge this, they continue to affirm the 
Augustinian nature of Bonaventure’s philosophical views and the proto-
Bonaventurian character of Augustine’s.  Perhaps this is because the new research on 
Augustine’s thought has not been brought into conversation with research projects on 
Bonaventure.515  In the first chapter of this work, I presupposed much of that 
research as I showed how Augustine derives his illumination theory from his 
Trinitarian theology through a series of steps.  In the present chapter, I do the same 
for Bonaventure, explaining how his account of the created order, the imago dei, the 
effects of the fall and redemption on the image, the process of conforming to the 
image, and finally, divine illumination, follow from his description of God’s Triune 
nature. 
By evaluating the philosophy of Bonaventure as a function of his Trinitarian 
theology in the light of the conclusions reached in the chapter on Augustine, I aim to 
show that the Seraphic Doctor does not mean what Augustine meant by Augustine’s 
own terms and metaphors, above all, illumination.  Though for the most part, I do not 
question Gilson’s renderings of Bonaventure’s doctrines themselves, I do seek to 
demonstrate that those doctrines are quite unlike the doctrines as Augustine 
formulated them.  Far from being preoccupied with ‘rescuing’ the Augustinian 
tradition, Bonaventure was exploiting scholastic methodology for the sake of lending 
authoritative support to Franciscan views, in hopes of firmly establishing the newly 
founded Franciscan intellectual tradition. 
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While the chapter on Augustine built on new studies in the bishop’s thought, 
the project of differentiating Bonaventure from Augustine I undertake here has very 
little precedent.516  Admittedly, then, the project is in its early stages, and for this 
reason, I make no claim to say all that needs to be said about Bonaventure’s system, 
much less its relationship or lack thereof to Augustine.  My more modest goal in this 
context is to present a new way of thinking about Bonaventure in anticipation of the 
work others will do to fill out the picture of him as the foremost promulgator of 
classic Franciscan thought. 
In his first theological work, a commentary on Lombard’s Sentences, 
Bonaventure confesses that his allegiances lie first with St. Francis of Assisi.  The 
Seraphic Doctor states in his commentary that his primary objective as an author is to 
bolster the opinions he learned from his Franciscan teachers, above all his ‘master 
and father’ Alexander of Hales.517  In his life of Francis or Legenda major (1261), 
Bonaventure later explains the reason why his commitment to the order runs so deep.  
As a child, he had contracted a severe illness, and as he lay on his deathbed, his 
mother vowed to commit his life to Francis if he survived.518  From the moment of 
his miraculous recovery forward, Bonaventure devoted himself to Francis.  In 1243, 
he took the Franciscan habit and began theological studies under Alexander of Hales, 
who is on record as having said of his student that, “it seemed as though Adam had 
never sinned in him.”519   
By 1248, Bonaventure had earned his bachelor’s in Scripture, and he 
proceeded to lecture on the Bible for the next two years.  From 1250-52 he lectured 
on Lombard’s Sentences and composed his commentary to satisfy the requirements 
for the degree of master in theology, which he earned in 1253, the same year he 
assumed responsibilities as regent master of the Franciscan school in Paris.  
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Although both he and Aquinas should have been appointed positions in the faculty of 
theology at the University of Paris upon the completion of their degrees, as per the 
papal mandate, the university masters would not allow them to fill their posts until 
1257, when the Pope ordered them to admit the friar scholars to the consortium.   
In the meantime, Bonaventure occupied himself directing the school for the 
friars minor and producing works such as his famous sermon Christus unus omnium 
Magister (1253), the Quaestiones disputatae de perfectione evangelica (1254), 
Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi (1254), and Quaestiones disputatae de 
mysterio trinitatis (1255).  In the same year he was allowed to take his position in the 
university theology faculty, Bonaventure was elected Minister General of the 
Franciscan order.  His sudden election curtailed his academic career and made him 
responsible for reckoning with the problems that were threatening the survival of his 
order at the time.  Most of those problems had to do with the fact that the spirituals 
and the university academics were still not willing to accept the scholarly status of 
the order.   
Admittedly, the spirituals had a valid case.  Bonaventure’s predecessors had 
not been adequate to the undoubtedly monumental task of devising and enforcing a 
standard code of educational and ministerial practice for the large international order.  
For this reason, many Franciscans began to abuse the papal privileges they received 
to facilitate ministry and study by leading lackadaisical and self-indulgent lives.  This 
development in the early history of the order reinforced the spirituals’ point that a 
life of study is not conducive to the life Francis instructed his followers to lead.   
Bonaventure therefore made it his first task to reform the order.  As part of 
this effort, he developed a theological training program for Franciscan students.  
While the ‘horse sized’ Summa fratris Alexandri was accessible as a comprehensive 
theological encyclopaedia and reference tool, it was not the brief and coherent 
synthesis of the Franciscan spiritual vision the average initiate needed to prepare for 
ministry.  The Breviloquium (1257) was just such a concise summary of key 
Franciscan doctrines, as Bonaventure had presented them in the Sentence 
Commentary.  As such, this brief work represents the Seraphic Doctor’s counterpart 
to Aquinas’ voluminous Summa Theologiae.   
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Even after Bonaventure had standardized theological education and taken 
measures to prevent friars from taking undue advantage of their privileges, he had 
more to do in order to convince the spiritual party that scholarly life and all that it 
included, namely, the ‘use’ of large convents and libraries, was compatible with the 
ideal of poverty put forward by St. Francis.  He did this initially in his Quaestiones 
disputatae de perfectione evangelica.  In that work, his line of contention is that 
poverty is a means to learning humility, never an end in itself.520  On the grounds that 
the crucified Christ is both the exemplar of humility and the wisdom of God, and that 
study is the pursuit of wisdom, Bonaventure concludes that the life of study does not 
undermine but fulfil the Franciscan ideal of poverty. 
That ideal is precisely the one the university masters were calling into 
question in their efforts to undermine the legitimacy of the friars’ participation in the 
life of the university.  When he addressed the masters, Bonaventure’s strategy was to 
show that Franciscan ideals were not only conducive to intellectual life, but also 
necessary for its success.  In composing works such as the Itinerarium mentis in 
Deum (1259), Collationes in Hexaemeron (1273), and De reductione artium ad 
theologiam (c. 1273), in which he qualifies the Franciscan vision so that it entails 
academic endeavours, Bonaventure did not feel he betrayed Francis, but adapted the 
poverello’s vision so that it could be realized in a new era.521  In the new phase of 
Franciscan history that Bonaventure saw himself as ushering in, the Franciscans 
would continue to play a key role in salvation history as they counteracted the 
deficiencies of the Church and revived true spirituality.522  The success of the 
Seraphic Doctor’s efforts to confirm the student status of the order of friars minor is 
one main reason why he has been called the order’s second founder. 
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Trinity 
 For all intents and purposes, Augustine’s Trinitarian doctrine had no rival in 
the West until the twelfth century.  In the third quarter of that century, however, the 
mystical mind of Richard of St. Victor developed “a new and original style of 
Trinitarian reflection.”523  Like the other scholars at the Augustinian abbey of St. 
Victor, a renowned centre of learning in twelfth-century Paris, Richard was well 
acquainted with the works of Augustine, not to mention Anselm.  Along with the 
general membership of his school, however, he was also keen on appropriating the 
insights of the sixth-century mystic Pseudo-Dionysius.  Even though Richard took 
Augustine’s trinity of ‘lover, beloved, love’ as his conceptual point of departure, he 
ultimately articulated a Trinitarian doctrine that widely diverged from the tradition of 
theological reflection Augustine had founded. 
The mystical and voluntarist orientation of Richard’s thought greatly 
appealed to Alexander of Hales.524  When Alexander determined to adopt Richard’s 
Trinitarian doctrine, he set a precedent for all Franciscan Trinitarian thought in the 
future.525  Bonaventure follows Alexander who follows Richard who echoes Anselm 
when he speaks of the Triune God as the Supreme Good.526  With Richard, however, 
the Seraphic Doctor looks to Dionysius to explain what this claim means.  On the 
grounds that a Good that is contained is not genuinely good, Dionysius had argued 
that God is self-diffusive by definition.527  For Dionysius, in other words, the 
goodness of the Good lies in its active or dynamic nature, that is, in its power to re-
produce itself.  
 On the basis of Dionysius’ contention that divine goodness is fundamentally 
self-duplicating and self-giving, Richard concludes that love is the supreme content 
                                                
523  Zachary Hayes, introduction to Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity (DQMT) by 
Bonaventure (St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 2000), 15.  
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526 Zachary Hayes, introduction to DQMT, 19. 
527 Pseudo-Dionysius, “The Divine Names,” in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works (Mahwah: 
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of the Good, and Bonaventure does likewise.528  This conclusion founds the efforts of 
both to argue for a plurality of divine Persons, since love is something that must be 
shared by at least two parties.  Neither Richard nor Bonaventure thinks it appropriate 
to affirm as Augustine does that the third member of the Trinity simply is the love 
exchanged between the first two Persons, however.  Wanting to establish that the 
nature and measure of the love in question is exactly the same, and thus supremely 
perfect, they contend that the first two Persons of the Trinity direct their love towards 
one and the same third party.  Where two love a third Person in harmony, they write, 
there is not the dilectio of Augustine, but condilectio.529  
 Bonaventure speaks of the Father as the monarchical principle of the Trinity, 
the fontal source (plenitudo fontalis) of divine love from which the others flow.  He 
thus emphasizes the primacy of the Father to a degree that is “foreign to the thought 
of either Augustine or Aquinas and similar to the theology of the classical Greek 
Fathers.”530  The Seraphic Doctor affirms the maxim of the Liber de causis that what 
is first is most fecund.531  From this point, he infers that God’s self-communication is 
perfect and complete.  When He gives Himself, the Father holds nothing in 
reserve.532  Since the Father is the first principle (principium primum533), 
Bonaventure further argues that His self-giving is non-compulsory, a totally 
voluntary and gratuitous overflow of divine love.534    
 In Bonaventure’s words, the Son is the exact likeness, mirror image, word, or 
exemplar of the Father.535  In short, He is the objective expression of the Father’s 
love.  For Bonaventure, the relationship between the Father and the Son is the first 
relation that becomes the basis for all other relations, and in this case, the relation 
between the Son and the Spirit.  The Son receives the fountain fullness of the 
Father’s love and passes it on exactly as He receives it.  The Spirit simply stands as 
                                                
528 Richard of St. Victor, “Book Three of the Trinity,” trans. Grover A. Zinn (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 
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the fullest possible manifestation of the love that proceeds from the Father and the 
Son.536  Given His role as the efficient cause of divine love, Bonaventure 
appropriates the trait of unity to the Father, that of truth to the Son, who is the formal 
or exemplary cause, and that of goodness to the Spirit, who is the final cause of 
God’s love.537 
 Bonaventure summarizes these teachings when he describes the Father as the 
Person of the Trinity who produces but is not produced; the Son as He who both is 
produced and produces; and the Spirit as the one that is produced but does not 
produce.538  In this account, the First Person is utterly active, the third Person is 
completely passive, and the Second Person is both active and passive.  For this 
reason, Bonaventure states that the Son is the very centre of Trinitarian life.  Because 
He has something in common with both the Father and the Spirit, who themselves 
have nothing in common, the Son is distinct from the other two and yet is uniquely 
suited to unite them.  He is the image of the Trinity precisely because He shares 
something with the first and third Persons and makes those irreconcilable opposites 
coincide so as to sum up in His own Person what the three of them are.539    
 Following Dionysius, Bonaventure illustrates the inner life of the Trinity with 
the picture of a circle.540  The Father is both the start and the end point on that circle.  
All perfect things, Bonaventure writes, have a beginning, middle, and an end, and in 
the most perfect Being, it is fitting that the beginning is also the end.541  The Son is 
the midpoint or centre on the circle that begins and ends with the Father’s love.  He 
receives that love, and when He expresses what He received, He closes the circle in 
the Spirit.  
                                                                                                                                     
535 Ibid., 3.8.  
536 On double procession, see Commentaria, liber primus, 11.1; see also John F. Quinn, “The Role of 
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 The Victorine account of the Trinity appealed to Franciscans like 
Bonaventure because it allowed them to capture Francis’ concept of God as a good 
and loving Father and to emphasize the self-emptying and humble or ‘impoverished’ 
nature of His love.542  Additionally, it enabled them to describe the divine nature as 
fundamentally dynamic, in keeping with the Franciscan tendency to prioritize the 
active over the contemplative life, love over knowledge.  On Gilson’s view, such 
voluntarism is consistent with Augustine’s emphasis on the guiding power of love.543  
 While Bonaventure takes his cues from Alexander on most matters relating to 
Trinitarian doctrine, he stressed the centrality of Christ in a way that was 
unprecedented.544  Although Christocentrism was latent in the Victorine doctrine of 
the Trinity and indeed in Francis’ cruci-fixation, the development of a Christocentric 
outlook “comes entirely from Bonaventure’s own world of thought and can be traced 
to no outside influence.”545  Early signs of Bonaventure’s Christocentric perspective 
can be detected in his Sentence Commentary and in the sermon Christus unus 
omnium Magister.  
As new challenges arose for the Franciscan order over the course of 
Bonaventure’s career, he continued to appeal to the primacy of Christ in his efforts to 
address them.  He invoked Christocentricity, for instance, in the attempt to dissociate 
the Franciscan order from the heretical Trinitarian teachings of Joachim of Fiore.  
Most of the spiritual Franciscans accepted Joachim’s view that a prophetic man, 
whom they took to be Francis, would initiate an age of the Spirit that would surpass 
the age of the Son.  Bonaventure also saw Francis as an eschatological figure and 
was highly sympathetic to the belief that the Franciscan order had a vital role to play 
in preparing the world for the final phase of its history.  Yet he was well aware of the 
unorthodox implications of the claim that the life of Francis rather than that of Christ 
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signals the culmination of salvation history.  He separated Franciscans from 
Joachim’s teaching on the spiritual age by affirming that Christ, who is the literal 
centre of the Trinity, also stands at the centre of human history, such that His gospel 
is eternal and irreplaceable.546   
In this and other ways, Bonaventure extrapolated the conceptual 
repercussions of his Christocentric perspective over the course of his academic and 
ministerial career.  As he spelled out the corollaries of the Victorine doctrine in 
innovative ways, Bonaventure gave mature expression to the Trinitarian theology of 
his Franciscan predecessors and popularized it.547  Indeed, it was the Seraphic 
Doctor’s version of the doctrine, with all its emphasis on the primacy of Christ, 
which would be handed down to later Franciscans such as Duns Scotus.  For reasons 
like these, scholars have recently qualified De Régnon’s account of the history of 
Trinitarian doctrine, insisting that Bonaventure rather than Richard deserves the 
credit for founding a second tradition of Western Trinitarian theology.548   
Creation in God’s Image 
THE NATURAL ORDER 
When God created the world, Bonaventure writes that He expressed Himself 
externally as He does internally.  The Father communicated all of Himself to the 
Son, “except for the character of His first-ness.”549  In imparting the knowledge of 
His infinite Being to the Son, He simultaneously gave the Second Person of the 
Trinity an infinite number of ideas for the creation of the world.550  Those ideas were 
like all things that come from the Father; they were perfect and complete expressions 
of His mind.  Because the divine ideas are one with the very essence of God, the 
Seraphic Doctor states that their instantiation by the Son makes God immediately 
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present in creation.551  Following Dionysius, Bonaventure argues that God literally 
duplicates or diffuses Himself in the natural order, as He does within the Godhead, 
such that all beings become a ‘theophany’, or as Augustine put it, a ‘trace’ of the 
divine.552  Despite the pantheistic undertones of this cosmology, the Seraphic Doctor 
avoids such an extreme by arguing that the Son instantiates only a finite number of 
the forms He represents and by constantly “insisting on the contingency of the 
created order as well as on God’s freedom with respect to the created.”553  
According to Bonaventure, God’s first creative act took place before the 
dawn time, when He drew something called prime matter out of nothing.554  On 
Bonaventure’s description, prime matter is the large mass of formless existence 
through which God finitely redoubles His infinite existence.  Since it was formless, 
prime matter had the latent potential to receive forms.  In virtue of its potentiality, it 
would be the principle of change in creation.  When God created the world in time, 
Bonaventure states that He imposed forms on prime matter.  In doing this, He 
conferred the property of material existence to some of the infinite number of 
essences or forms that exist immaterially in His mind.  Although Bonaventure 
affirms that there has never been a time when prime matter has not been formed, 
which is why it cannot be examined in its own right, it nonetheless underlies all that 
exists.  It binds all things together, and it binds them all to God. 
By contrast to matter, Bonaventure does not conceive forms as potential but 
as actualized entities.555  In other words, he does not believe forms change.  From his 
‘essentialist’ metaphysical perspective, forms always are what they are.  In virtue of 
that fact, they are like God, and they positively disclose some finite aspect of His 
Being.  Although he denies the mutability of forms themselves, Bonaventure does 
not deny that creatures change.  To account for the possibility of change, he 
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introduces a doctrine of the plurality of substantial forms.556  According to this 
doctrine, every distinct feature that can be identified in a creature represents a 
distinct form.  Creatures are composites of numerous substantial forms that are 
joined together without confusion, but without separation, as in a formal distinction 
(distinctio rationes).557   
Bonaventure’s contemporary Aquinas strongly objected to this theory, 
arguing that a plurality of substantial forms would result in a plurality of creatures.558   
Aquinas’ own opinion was that each creature has but one substantial form, which 
gives the creature the potential to become a certain kind of being.  By participating in 
behaviours dictated by the form, the creature exists, and as it exists, it actualizes its 
potential or instantiates its essence.559  In this process, the form develops and 
changes; yet for Aquinas, those changes are accidental.  They occur as a result of 
increasing participation in the single substantial form.   
Bonaventure preferred the doctrine of a plurality of substantial forms because 
he felt that the forms God creates ought to be defined as exact even if limited 
reflections of the divine form, which is immutable.560  After all, what comes from 
God must be like God.  On the assumption that creatures are finitely and materially 
what God is infinitely and immaterially, Bonaventure denied that the difference 
between creature and Creator comes down to a difference in the essence-existence 
relation as it did for Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas.561  For him, in other words, 
creatures are not unlike God because they are characterized by a real distinction 
between essence and existence, where essence and existence in God are one and the 
same.  Instead, they differ because they are comprised of matter and form while God 
is pure form.  For Bonaventure, all creatures are composites of matter and form.  
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Even angels are comprised of ‘spiritual’ matter and form, according to his doctrine of 
universal hylomorphism.562   
Since every creature is a composite of matter and form, it has at least two 
substantial forms: a ‘form of corporeality’, which causes the creature to be 
embodied, and the form that is provided by a vegetable, animal, or rational soul.  
While vegetable and animal souls are inseparable from matter, the rational soul is 
spiritual.  Though it is presently united to matter, it is ultimately separable from 
matter and capable of union with God (capax dei).563  For this reason, Bonaventure 
writes that the rational soul is united to the body “not as to a perfectible but as to a 
prison.”564  The soul, whether it is vegetable, animal, or rational, is the highest form a 
creature has.  This form predisposes the creature to receive other forms.  When a 
creature changes, it is because it is either gaining or losing a form.   
Presupposing that God alone is able to impart the property of existence to an 
essence, Bonaventure contends that the coming and going of forms in creatures is the 
result of the direct and ongoing efficient causal action of God.  In this way, he 
exhibits his preference for a concursus model of divine causality, according to which 
the secondary efficient causality of creatures is a shared effort on the part of divine 
and created beings.565  This way of putting things enabled Bonaventure to emphasize 
the dynamic and ongoing nature of God’s involvement in the created order.  It 
allowed him to stress that every single moment of a creature’s existence is a gift, 
since “it is only by God’s concurrence that things are sustained in being.”566  Because 
God’s cooperation “derives not from any obligation but from the liberality of the 
divine bounty,”567 Bonaventure insists that creation is radically contingent.  All 
things both depend upon and are indicative of the sustaining love of God.   
Borrowing traditional Augustinian terms, Bonaventure refers to the forms or 
divine ideas as eternal reasons or exemplars.568  In what he calls his metaphysics of 
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“emanation, exemplarity, and consummation,”569 the Father stands at the start of a 
metaphysical circle and emanates His exemplars to the Son.  When the Father 
communicates His exemplars, He communicates in His absolute manner, such that 
the Son, who is the locus of the divine exemplars, represents all things in the most 
perfect way.570   
Although the exemplars in the Son’s mind are one with the essence of God 
and are thus essentially one, Bonaventure again insists that they are formally 
separable.571  That is to say, there are an infinite number of clear and distinct ideas 
which are present in His intellect.  The more traditional view of Aquinas was that 
there is but one exemplar which is known to God, namely, the exemplar of His 
simple nature.  Insofar as all things are patterned after the exemplar of divine 
simplicity, God’s universal knowledge of Himself pre-contains particulars.  Wanting 
to reinforce the Franciscan belief that every individual being is perfectly, intimately 
known to God and perfectly, if finitely, reflects His nature, Bonaventure argued that 
God possesses an idea of every particular reality, which can be formally 
distinguished from His ideas of all other particular things.   
On those grounds, Bonaventure concludes that there is a reciprocal 
relationship between created instances of exemplars and the divine exemplars 
themselves.  Creatures resemble ideas as exact copies of them, and the divine ideas 
resemble creatures in virtue of being their exemplars.572  Augustine, Anselm, and 
Aquinas imagined no such reciprocal relationship.  For them, creatures resemble a 
God who does not resemble them.  There is but one exemplar with many 
instantiations, instead of many exemplars that are one in virtue of being contained in 
one mind. 
According to Bonaventure, creatures actually come to exemplify a particular 
exemplar when the Son chooses to create in the Spirit.573  As He is a theological 
centre within the Godhead, the one who reconciles the extremes of Father and Spirit, 
so the Son is the metaphysical centre that unites the Creator to the created.  He 
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completes the circle of creation by patterning creatures after the exemplars that 
emanate to Him from the Father, such that they are consummated to their attendant 
exemplars.574  Through Him, the fountain fullness of the Father’s love gratuitously 
overflows into the countless instances of forms that make Him immanently present in 
creation. 
A number of scholars have noted that Bonaventure’s account of creation 
appears to presuppose a univocal concept of being, even though the Seraphic Doctor 
employs the normal terminology of analogy.575  On this concept, two parties enjoy 
the same mode of being, such that thoughts and words can be applied to them in 
exactly the same sense.  Although Bonaventure admits that it is impossible to breach 
the gap that separates the finite from the infinite, the material from the immaterial, he 
affirms that created forms do in fact exist in the same mode as the divine form, 
namely, in act.  For this very reason, they positively reveal God’s nature, albeit in a 
finite respect.576  There are several ways Bonaventure describes the univocal 
relationship between creatures and Creator.  In addition to exemplarity, he speaks of 
creatures as mirrors of the divine nature (speculum intellectuale) that give direct 
insight into some aspect of God’s love.577  Following the lead of Hugh of St. Victor, 
he also describes the natural order as a book and creatures as words that testify to His 
existence.578   
For the Seraphic Doctor, a creature’s univocal relation to God is its mode of 
participation in Him.  Though many have assumed that Bonaventure upholds the 
ancient metaphysics of participation on the grounds that he invokes it, others have 
noticed that the Seraphic Doctor recasts the meaning of participation when he 
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employs the term, as he does when he discusses analogy.579  In his thought, 
participation is construed as “the reverse of exemplary causality.”580  A creature 
participates in God when it perfectly reflects one of His ideas and positively reveals 
something of His essence.581  Here, participation is not an activity, that is, 
engagement in the mode of existence through which an essence is actualized, but 
something substantive.  For this reason, participation is not something that can be 
done to greater and lesser degrees.  A creature either does or does not participate in 
full.  In advocating this definition of participation, which builds on a univocal 
concept of being, Bonaventure highlights “the bonds of kinship that connect the 
creature to the Creator”582 and establishes that every creature symbolizes the divine 
in a unique way.  
According to Bonaventure, creatures can symbolize the Creator in one of 
three levels: as a vestige, an image, or a likeness.583  Every created form is a vestige, 
no matter whether it has a vegetable, animal, or rational soul, in virtue of the fact that 
it emanates from the efficient cause, is patterned after an exemplary cause, and is 
ordained to a final cause.584  Put differently, every creature is a vestige because it 
originates in the Father, is modelled after an idea in the mind of the Son, and reflects 
that idea in the Spirit.  In virtue of the triple causality of the Father, Son, and Spirit, 
the creature exhibits the qualities of unity, truth, and goodness, which correspond to 
its measure, number, and weight, respectively.  It is in virtue of measure, number, 
and weight that Bonaventure believes creatures are positive traces of God’s Triune 
nature, as Augustine had taught.585  
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According to Bonaventure, the label ‘image’ only applies to rational 
creatures, because they alone are both corporeal and spiritual beings.586  Owing to 
their spiritual nature or capax dei, rational beings can do more than merely manifest 
the goodness of God in the way of a vestige.  They can also know that creatures 
proclaim His goodness.  The third level of reflection, that of a likeness, will be 
discussed in the section on conforming to God’s image.587   
Although vestiges are ordered towards images and governed by them, 
Bonaventure does not think this negates the fact that every being is equally close to 
God, inasmuch as “every single creature from the angel to the grain of sand has its 
direct model and foundation in the Word Himself in the eternal reasons.”588  
Although the mode of relation to God may differ, depending on whether a creature is 
a vestige or an image, the resemblance between creature and divine exemplar is no 
less exact.  When he affirms this, Bonaventure, who had already flattened the levels 
of participation within classes of beings with his univocal theory of being, tends to 
further collapse the hierarchy according to which Augustine had ordered the classes 
of beings themselves.  With Francis, Bonaventure regards even the lowliest of 
creatures as brothers and sisters of equal stature.589 
Despite the differences between Bonaventure’s essentialism and Augustine’s 
participatory mindset, the Seraphic Doctor insists that he learned his metaphysics of 
exemplarity from Augustine, and scholars have taken his testimony as a sign of his 
unwavering intellectual fidelity to Augustine on metaphysical matters.590  Gilson, for 
instance, contends that Bonaventure’s essentialist metaphysics and the various 
doctrines it entails, such as the plurality of substantial forms, universal 
hylomorphism, and the conflation of existence and essence in creatures, precisely 
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formulate Augustinian views.591  Recent researchers have shown, however, that 
interpreting Augustine in an essentialist manner was one of the greatest of Gilson’s 
rare mistakes.592   
The points of dissimilarity that I have mentioned here serve to suggest that 
Bonaventure is not genuinely Augustinian (nor by implication Platonic) when it 
comes to metaphysical matters.  Though he employed the Augustinian language of 
exemplarity, eternal reasons, measure, number, and weight, and so on, he used the 
terms to introduce positions that actually preclude truly Augustinian ones, positions 
that originally entered the Latin tradition through Avicenna’s interpretation of Plato 
and Aristotle.  The irony of the situation is that scholastic methodology made it 
possible for Bonaventure to supplant Augustine’s views on the authority of 
Augustine himself.   
THE HUMAN BEING 
Human beings differ from all other beings on Bonaventure’s account because 
they are comprised of both a body and a rational soul.593  Since they possess these 
two natures, humans have something in common with creatures as well as with the 
divine.  They are positioned midway between the two extremes and are therefore 
capable of reconciling them.594  The whole human task, as the Seraphic Doctor 
explains it, is to cognitively refer creatures to their corresponding exemplars in the 
divine mind.  Since vestiges are unable to close the circle of their creation of their 
own accord and are therefore inept to achieve the union with God which is the 
purpose of all beings, they depend upon human beings to humbly serve them by 
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working on their behalf in this regard.595  When human beings consummate creatures 
and their exemplars, they fulfil their own purpose and image the work of the Son, 
who makes the opposites of Father and Spirit, Creator and created coincide by fully 
representing the one to the other, that is, by standing at the centre of creation. 
According to Bonaventure, human beings have the capacity to reconcile 
creatures and the Creator because they have cognitive faculties associated with their 
two different natures.596  Five external senses (sight, taste, touch, smell, and hearing) 
and five internal senses equip them to apprehend embodied beings.597  The rational 
soul itself allows them to form abstract concepts.  Bonaventure states that there are 
two faces to the rational soul, which he describes in terms of Augustine’s higher and 
lower reason.598  Higher reason is designed for the contemplation of God and is 
responsible for abstraction.599  Lower reason makes use of the concepts higher reason 
abstracts in order to assess reality.600  In what follows, I will explain how 
Bonaventure envisions the operation of these faculties. 
Although Bonaventure never mentions Avicenna, his account of the faculties 
bears striking resemblance to that of Avicenna, even if this is rarely recognized.  
There are a number of reasons why Bonaventure may have chosen not to 
acknowledge his debt to Avicenna.  One reason is likely that Avicenna’s doctrine of 
the separate Active Intellect had recently fallen into disrepute.  It was probably the 
case that Bonaventure was trying to dissociate himself from any philosophical 
doctrine that was being challenged by his contemporaries.    
Another reason for the silence on Avicenna is that scholarly interests had 
turned away from Avicenna towards Averroes and Aristotle himself by 
Bonaventure’s time.  The popular practice was now to cite Aristotle rather than 
Avicenna, even when Avicenna’s views were being espoused and attributed to 
Aristotle.  Finally, acknowledging Avicenna may not have been necessary for 
Bonaventure, inasmuch as the work of transforming the Arab’s thought into a 
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distinctly Franciscan tradition of thought had already been done by the first 
generation of Franciscan scholars.  By the time of Bonaventure, the Avicennian 
structures of Franciscan thought were already in place and could simply be 
presupposed. 
Despite the lack of explicit references, the contours of Avicenna’s thought are 
clearly identifiable in Bonaventure’s account of the five internal senses.  The first of 
the internal senses on his list is the common sense, which initially grasps the objects 
the external senses perceive.  The apprehensive faculty retains the likenesses of the 
objects the common sense obtains.601  The next phase in internal sensation is 
‘pleasure’.  Here, the human being distinguishes the various features of an object, 
such as its sweetness, beauty, symmetry, or colour.602  After pleasure comes 
judgment.  In judging, the rational being determines “not only whether something is 
white or black…not only whether it is wholesome or harmful…but also why it is 
pleasurable.”603   
Judgment is the first step in the process of abstraction, for it is in judgment 
that reason dissociates the sensible form from the place, time, and circumstances 
under which it was originally encountered and lays bare what it really is, albeit as a 
particular.604  The judging faculty produces what Avicenna had called an intention, 
and what Bonaventure refers to as a ‘created reason’ or exact likeness of the sensible 
form, which is impressed on the memory.605   
On Bonaventure’s account, created reasons are the proper objects of 
science.606  Although the formation of a created reason represents a crucial step in the 
process of abstraction, it is not yet abstraction.  Bonaventure does not even think the 
‘animal’ faculties are suited to accomplish the act of abstraction.  Nor does he think 
that the intellect, which is equipped to abstract, requires any help from the animal 
faculties once it has obtained the created reason from the memory.607  
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According to Bonaventure, these views are consistent with Augustine’s 
‘active’ theory of sensation, according to which the rational soul does not passively 
receive sense data, but merely uses the body to acquire the information it requires to 
complete its operations.608  On the assumption that Augustine entertains such a view, 
Bonaventure concludes that the bishop is also a dualist who holds that the rational 
soul is unaffected by the body and operates independently of it.609   
While Augustine admittedly argued that the intellect performs its operations 
independently, he did not by that same token suggest that cognition is in no sense 
passive or that the faculties of sensation and imagination are altogether cut off from 
the intellect.  To the contrary, he acknowledged that what comes to lower reason 
from the external environment is in many respects beyond its control.  While the 
work of higher reason is indeed active, it nonetheless depends upon what is passively 
received by lower reason.  Lower reason, moreover, is not a subset of higher reason 
for Augustine, as Bonaventure construes it.  Rather, it simply is the faculties that 
operate on sense objects, which Bonaventure attempted to detach from the intellect.   
Far from dichotomizing body and soul, Augustine seems to believe that the 
form of the rational soul entails embodiment.610  Although he accepts that the 
corporeal body will one day be discarded, he does not suggest in the same instance 
that the work of the external and internal senses is of no eternal significance.  To the 
contrary, he claims that there is continuity between corporeal and incorporeal 
embodied life, inasmuch as the faculties of sensation and imagination which are 
ordered to operate on physical bodies will one day be replaced by comparable 
faculties suited to operate with respect to spiritual ones.   
When he turns to explain the abstractive work of higher reason, Bonaventure 
introduces Augustine’s psychological analogy of memory, understanding, and will.  
On his account, the memory preserves the created reasons the judging faculty has 
produced.  Yet it also retains a number of eternal reasons that the Son has innately 
impressed upon the mind, namely, the concept of Being and its trinity of 
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transcendental properties, one, true, and good, which constitute the image of God.611  
Since the reasons are one with the very essence of God, they give the mind an 
immediate connection to God, such that He rather than His handiwork is the first 
thing the intellect knows.   
Because what is impressed is only the image of God, Bonaventure insists that 
the reasons do not reveal God Himself.612  Even though they are not the direct 
objects of knowledge, Bonaventure describes the reasons as the ‘moving causes’ of 
knowledge.  Where the will is oriented towards God, the reasons retained in the 
memory regulate efforts to acquire abstract understanding of a created reason.  That 
is to say, they enable the intellect to strip a created reason of all additional 
attachments and see what its essence really is, which is to see how it corresponds 
with an eternal reason in the mind of the Son.613  When Augustine said that all things 
must be known in eternal reasons that are above the mind, through the cooperation of 
memory, understanding, and will, Bonaventure claims, this is exactly what he had in 
mind.614  On this count, scholars have taken the Seraphic Doctor at his word.615  
Although Bonaventure affirms that each person possesses an individual 
intellect and denies that God performs acts of abstraction on behalf of the mind, 
along the lines of the doctrine of the separate Active Intellect, he nonetheless 
maintains that the Son exerts a direct influence on the human agent intellect.616  
Christ oversees human cognition through the eternal reasons He implants, which 
supervise and sustain the work of human reason.617  On account of the presence of 
the eternal reasons, the active work of the intellect is not wholly active, but is a 
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cooperative effort on the part of the human person and the inner teacher, Christ.618  
Human beings, like Christ Himself, play a role that is part active and part passive. 
Without the supernatural support they passively receive from Christ, 
Bonaventure asserts,  human beings would be unable to perform their natural 
cognitive operations and thus know reality.  On his account, the stipulations for true 
and certain knowledge are immutability on the part of the object known and 
infallibility on the part of the knower.619  Because the eternal reasons in the mind of 
the Son render knowable forms immutable, the meaning of all things can only be 
found in Him.  Consequently, the human mind that seeks “infallible, indubitable, 
irrefutable, indisputable”620 understanding of reality must have access to the same 
unchanging rules that stabilize and lend meaning to it.621  Unless the Son who 
sustains all things in being also sustains the work of the mind, there is no way the 
mind can identify the principles through which God has ordered reality in order to 
truly and certainly know it.622 
The received view amongst Medievalists that Bonaventure’s insistence on 
this divine concurrence in human knowledge is consistent with Augustine’s 
‘pessimistic’ claim that human reason can do nothing without divine help and needs 
grace to sustain nature.623  Yet there is a subtle difference between the views of 
Bonaventure and Augustine on the relation between grace and nature.  The influentia 
model of divine causality compelled Augustine to define the gift of the natural 
cognitive ability and the freedom to use it as grace.   
Bonaventure’s concursus model, by contrast, led him to posit with 
characteristically Franciscan self-deprecation that nature amounts to nothing without 
grace.  From his perspective, nature is not truly or at least totally the gift of God, 
because it is virtually useless until grace is super-added to it.  The real gift of God is 
the extrinsic grace which renders a useless nature useful.  Although this certainly is a 
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pessimistic view of human reason, which is consistent Francis’ emphasis on the 
mind’s absolute dependence on God, Augustine’s was not ‘pessimistic’ in the same 
sense.  The bishop only worried about the competence of human reason to the extent 
that the mind refused to prioritize God and thus relinquished the objectivity of its 
perspective.   
With the direct involvement of Christ and only under those conditions, 
Bonaventure believes human reason is adequate to perform its natural abstractive 
function and thus to achieve what he calls the ‘full analysis’624 (plena resolutio) of 
forms.  The full analysis on his description is the knowledge of a form in relation to 
is divine exemplar which is made possible by the intuited reasons through which the 
intellect strips superfluous determinants away from a created reason.  To 
Bonaventure’s mind, it is possible to fully analyze a form on the basis of a single 
instance of it, on account of the fact that forms are fixed and are instantiated as such, 
and because the powers of the mind, like the forms it knows, are always fully 
actualized.625   
Another term Bonaventure uses to refer to full analysis is contuition.626  
Again, contuition is defined as the co-recognition or co-knowledge of a created form 
together with its correlative idea in the mind of God, and it is enabled by the intuition 
of the transcendentals.627  In contuition, the knowledge of creature and Creator, 
natural and supernatural, is coextensive, as it was for Francis.  
In offering his definition of abstraction in terms of ‘full analysis’ or 
‘contuition’, Bonaventure reveals his preference for an Avicennian understanding of 
abstraction, although scholars tend to assume his account is Aristotelian simply 
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because he attributes it to Aristotle.628  For Aristotle, not unlike Augustine, 
abstraction is the act of relating and uniting diverse images to produce a concept, 
which can help in the comprehension of new experiences, which in turn affect the 
expansion and revision of the original concept.629  The power to engage in this 
unifying mode of cognition is the power to cognize in the way characteristic of the 
divine.  It is a potential power that is actualized through participation in a unifying 
mode of cognition.  Through participation, the human being increasingly participates 
subjectively in an objective cognitive order, which is God’s knowledge of Himself.   
For Bonaventure, abstraction is not a matter of engaging in the cognitive 
activity described above so much as it is the act of gripping the abstract concept 
itself, as it subsists in the mind of God.  This is not an originally Aristotelian but 
Avicennian understanding of abstraction.  In performing the act of abstraction, the 
Seraphic Doctor states that mere science is transformed into wisdom.  Although he 
acknowledges that Plato paved the way of wisdom, which proceeds according to 
eternal reasons or exemplars, he states that the philosopher nonetheless destroyed the 
way of science, which proceeds according to created reasons, inasmuch as he denied 
the importance of empirical knowledge.   
The way of science was exactly the one that Aristotle enabled his readers to 
take, though he denied the reality of eternal reasons in doing so.630  Augustine was 
the master of both science and wisdom, in Bonaventure’s opinion, because he not 
only acknowledged that knowledge arises from the senses and that the created reason 
is indispensable to human knowing, but also recognized that the created reason 
cannot achieve complete accuracy and certitude until it is informed by an eternal 
one.631  The bishop saw the importance of science, but he also recognized that there 
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could be no science outside the wisdom of God.632  Bonaventure thus praises 
Augustine for his ability to bring together the best insights of Plato and Aristotle, as 
they had originally been interpreted by Avicenna. 
In Bonaventure’s thought as in Avicenna’s, the human ability to abstract or 
contuit is always the by-product of intuition, or the primary knowledge of Being and 
the transcendentals.633   On the basis of the belief that Being is the first thing the 
mind knows, Bonaventure argues in his disputed questions on the Trinity that it is 
possible to establish the self-evidence or indubitableness of God’s existence in three 
ways that correspond to the threefold existence of all things, namely, in the mind, in 
creation, and in God, or through that which is interior, exterior, and superior to the 
mind.  Scholars generally agree that the Seraphic Doctor learned these three ways 
from Augustine and Anselm, in whose tradition of thought it was always “maintained 
that in some way the existence of God is self-evident,”634 by contrast to the tradition 
of Thomas Aquinas.635   
The first way proves God’s existence from what is most accessible to a 
person, namely, the intuitive knowledge of Being and its properties.  Since this 
knowledge represents the very image of God, Bonaventure affirms that the existence 
of God is bound to be self-evident to the rational being that reflects upon itself as an 
image.  The Seraphic Doctor bolsters this contention with help from Augustine, who 
taught that it is only by attending to the interior life, or the image of God within, that 
one can come to know God.636 
As in the thought of Avicenna, the first a priori or ontological approach to 
proving God’s existence opens up the second way of doing so cosmologically.  
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According to the Seraphic Doctor, God can be known as soon as a creature is known 
inasmuch as the contuitive knowledge of any being presupposes the intuitive 
knowledge of the Being that is the source of all beings.  Because the existence of an 
infinite Being satisfies the condition of possibility for the existence of the finite 
beings that are encountered, Bonaventure concludes that all beings bear incontestable 
witness to the existence of the divine Being.637  To support this contention, he recalls 
Augustine’s claim that ‘this and that truth’ must be seen in the first Truth.638 
In the third way, God’s existence is shown to be self-evident through an 
analysis of the very definition of God.  Bonaventure defines God as the Supreme 
Being, or that than which nothing greater can be thought.  Since this supremely 
existing Being exists in the mind by intuition, and it is greater to exist in reality as 
well as in the mind, the Seraphic Doctor concludes that God supremely exists in 
reality.  He validates this argument by citing the Proslogion of Anselm.639  The 
common scholarly assumption is that Bonaventure’s advocacy of the argument that 
“the existence of God considered in itself is absolutely evident” proves that “he 
remained the faithful disciple of Anselm.”640   
Although Bonaventure establishes the self-evidence of God’s existence in 
these three ways, it is important to note that all the ways unfold from the first way, or 
from the intuitive knowledge of Being.  Owing to that intuition, the intellect can turn 
within itself, outside itself, or above itself and know that God exists with absolute 
certitude, since the Being manifested in all three instances is the same one, which is 
God.  In summary, the interior awareness of the cognitive resources one possesses in 
the knowledge of Being, which confirms the status of the human being as the imago 
dei, is subjective foundation for all further knowledge of realities outside the self.   
Bonaventure’s understanding of interiority is often mentioned as one of the 
chief signs of his indebtedness to Augustine.641  While it is true that Augustine urges 
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his readers to look inward and reflect upon the fact that they are made in the image of 
God, self-reflection has a different outcome in his thought than it does in that of 
Bonaventure.  When Augustine encouraged inwardness, he prompted his readers to 
maintain a negative attitude towards the objects of knowledge, or to view them a 
means to the knowledge of the Good rather than as ultimate goods.   
For Bonaventure, by contrast, reflection upon the self as an image means 
coming to the realization that the mind has certain innate powers that render the 
subject the adequate foundation for the acquisition of positive or immediate 
knowledge of creatures and even God.642  This is the sort of proto-Cartesian turn to 
the subject that contemporary scholars consider problematic.  While it is not the 
notion of interiority Augustine entertained, it is indeed the idea of the interior life 
that can be traced to the thought of Bonaventure’s Franciscan Augustine. 
In the thought of this Franciscan Augustine, a theory of knowledge by direct 
representation supplants a theory of knowledge by participation, a concursus model 
of divine causality replaces the influentia account, and as these and other 
substitutions are made, an emphasis on the all-sufficiency of the knower—whose 
sufficiency comes from God—and an interest in the infallible truth and certitude of 
knowledge that is foreign to the thought of Augustine comes to feature on the 
philosophical scene.  All these changes were brought about by Bonaventure in his 
effort to formulate a theory of knowledge that translated Francis of Assisi’s 
experience of the natural and the supernatural into philosophical categories, and to 
make these innovative moves on the authority of traditional thinkers, above all, 
Augustine and Anselm. 
Fall 
Unlike Augustine and Anselm, Bonaventure does not believe that the fall 
effaced the image of God on the intellect.  He does not hold that it undermined the a 
priori awareness of the transcendentals, which constitutes the human power to know.  
After the fall, he affirms, the cognitive powers remained fully activated as ever.  
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God’s existence, consequently, was still self-evident to the intellect, through 
creatures, and in itself.643  From Bonaventure’s perspective, the claim that the fall did 
in fact ruin the imago dei implies that there is some defect in God, since the image of 
God is immediately joined to God and the capax dei, in a sense, is God.  That claim 
suggests that God Himself is somehow responsible for the fact that human persons 
fail to see Him in themselves, in creatures, and in Himself.  But this is manifestly not 
the case.  There is no defect in the divine being, and He is not responsible for human 
failures.  Echoing Anselm’s words in the third chapter of his Proslogion, 
Bonaventure writes that God exists so supremely that He cannot be thought not to 
exist.644  
Since the fall was not caused by a defective intellect, the Seraphic Doctor 
concludes that it must have been brought about by an impaired will.645  While the 
work of the intellect is always a collaborative effort on the part of God and human 
beings, the will and the will alone belongs wholly to the knower.  For this reason, 
God cannot be implicated in the fall of the will.  Such a fall, on Bonaventure’s 
explanation, entails a refusal to act as though God is the efficient, exemplary, and 
final cause of the mind’s work.  Instead of this, the will compels the intellect to 
behave as if it is the source of its own potency, to live according to its own norms, 
and for its own ends.646  In short, the fall of the will inverts the proper order of 
things.  Rather than conforming ideas of things to the divine rules, human beings 
reduce the principles of knowledge to their own ideas.  Putting the point in 
Augustine’s words, Bonaventure writes that they prefer temporal goods to the eternal 
Good.  They are overcome with pride.647  
Although the ‘disorientation’ of the will does not abolish the intellect’s ability 
to contuit, Bonaventure affirms that it renders the intellect ignorant of its ability.648  
According to Bonaventure, Anselm had said as much when he criticized the ‘fool’ 
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for failing to acknowledge the manifestly obvious existence of God.649  Because the 
fool’s access to the a priori transcendentals that are impressed upon higher reason is 
restricted, lower reason fails to recognize the unmistakable fact that creatures bear 
witness to God’s existence and forms concepts about reality that fall short of absolute 
truth and certitude.650  
In Bonaventure’s account of the fall, the theological difference between him 
and Augustine becomes especially pronounced.  The main source of the difference 
lies in a difference of opinion concerning the nature of the intellect’s first object.  
While Augustine seems to admit that God was the first thing the mind knew in the 
original order of creation, he certainly does not think this remained the case after the 
fall.  At that time, creatures became the first things the intellect took into 
consideration.  Only in faith does Augustine think God is restored to His rightful 
place as the concept that governs the intellect’s operations.  Even then, however, 
Augustine insists that the knower must re-learn how to evaluate creatures in the light 
of the knowledge of God until the habit of doing so constantly is re-formed.  
Although Augustine never would have denied that, objectively speaking, God 
exists and all things testify to His existence, he believed the problem was precisely 
that, subjectively speaking, human beings lost the ability to discern the evidence for 
the existence of God.  In contrast, Bonaventure affirms that the subjective awareness 
of God never ceases.  The power to know Him is not a potential that waits to be 
actualized through the process of re-conforming to His image.  It is an actualized 
ability that is fully switched either on or off depending on the direction of the will.651  
On this assumption, Bonaventure concludes that the world is populated by two 
classes of people, those like Francis that live in a state of primeval innocence and 
those that have been wholly overcome by sin and should not therefore be trusted by 
the person of faith.652  
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Redemption 
Because Bonaventure does not think the imago dei was ever effaced, he does 
not believe the Son of God became incarnate so that human beings could learn to 
gradually recover the intellectual capacity they relinquished at the fall.  In point of 
fact, he envisions the nature of Christ’s redemptive work in a way that totally differs 
from the way of Augustine and Anselm.  For Bonaventure, Christ mainly came to 
complete His creative work.  Only incidentally did He make atonement for sins.653 
Wherever he unfurls his doctrine of redemption, Bonaventure explains why 
the Son needed to come for the completion of creation.  In His initial act of creation, 
the Seraphic Doctor recalls, the Son objectified the ideas He received from the Father 
in the natural order, causing the Father’s totally gratuitous love to overflow into 
reality, making it immediately present in created beings.654  In doing this, the Son 
destined all creatures for union with the Father, from whom they originally 
emanated.   
According to Bonaventure, the destiny of all beings cannot be fully realized 
short of the Incarnation of the Son because the status of creatures as immediate 
communicators of God’s nature cannot be activated until the one who perfectly 
represents the whole world in Himself and makes God immediately present in it 
becomes immediately present in the world Himself.  This is exactly what the 
Incarnate Son of God did.  The ‘metaphysical’ centre of creation, who is positioned 
midway between Creator and creation, actually assumed His position there.  When 
He returned to the Father after His crucifixion, He completed the circle of the 
creative act He began when He instantiated the ideas He learned from the Father.655  
He joined the last to the first, reconciling the opposite extremes.656 
As He had created human beings for union with God, Bonaventure affirms 
that the Son saw fit to come in the form of a man as opposed to any other being.  
When He held the extremes of human and divine nature together in His Incarnate 
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Person, “touching God with one hand and humanity with the other,”657 He brought 
the creation of human beings full circle.  In realizing the human capacity for union 
with God, He made it possible for the rest of the created order to be brought to 
completion through the service of human beings.  That is to say, He allowed human 
persons to occupy their own “middle place and to unite the extremes of material and 
spiritual reality,”658 to represent things in their own minds as those things are 
represented in the mind of the Son.  In short, the Second Person of the Trinity made 
human beings microcosms of His macrocosmic order.  In this, He realized through 
human persons the pre-disposition in matter for union with God.659  As Bonaventure 
concludes, the Incarnation makes for the perfection of the human and consequently 
for the perfection of the entire universe.660   
 To Bonaventure’s mind, the most significant events in the earthly life of the 
Son were those that surrounded His crucifixion.661  Although the Seraphic Doctor 
acknowledges that the cross was an achievement of the whole Trinity, he reiterates 
that the Trinity is summarized and focused in the Son.662  Inasmuch as the creative 
work of the Second Person is a sign of the totally voluntary, self-abandoning nature 
of God’s love, Bonaventure argues that its completion had to be accomplished at the 
moment in Christ’s life when He made the sacrificial nature of that love most 
evident, namely, at the moment of his death on the cross.663  Hanging there, Christ 
conveyed the nature of God most clearly even as He modelled most effectively how 
He intended human beings to behave in His order.  He showed that they were to live 
as poor and humble servants of the most poor and humble beings. 
An incidental consequence of Christ’s voluntary abandonment of His will 
was the correction of the self-centred tendencies of the fallen human will, or the 
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forgiveness of sins.664  According to Bonaventure, the decision to love Christ equates 
with a decision to abandon the will to Him.  Furthermore, it is a decision that 
reactivates the awareness of the a priori power of knowing, or the image of God, and 
thus restores access to the divine rules that are stamped there, through which reality 
is truly and certainly grasped.  
While the rules of judgment were reduced to human whims under the 
guidance of the fallen will, the reordering of the will reinstates the proper 
‘hierarchical’ order of things in the intellect.  Bonaventure refers to Christ as the true 
Hierarch, because He orders the lower in accordance with the higher, in and outside 
the Trinity.665  Through His influence, which comes by way of the a priori 
transcendentals, the human intellect is re-awakened to the imago dei or 
‘hierarchized’, as Bonaventure calls it, borrowing a term from Pseudo-Dionysius.  As 
a result of its ‘hierarchization’, the mind reverts to the primal order that was 
overturned at the fall.666  Through the experience of hierarchization within, the 
intellect reacquires the ability to preserve the hierarchical order in the external world, 
that is, to contuit creatures with their divine exemplars.  Hierarchization thus re-
situates human persons at the centre of creation, setting them and all things on a 
trajectory for union with God.   
Conforming to God’s Image 
By the time Bonaventure had served two years as Minister General, he had 
become well aware of the problems he faced as leader of the Franciscan order.  He 
had dealt firsthand with the complaints of the spirituals and had witnessed the extent 
to which the charges of the university academics were undermining the intellectual 
legitimacy of the friars minor.  With these problems weighing on his mind, the 
Seraphic Doctor retreated to Mt. Alverna in 1259 to pray for guidance.  While there, 
Bonaventure writes that he reflected upon the three ways the mind ascends to God.667  
In a flash of insight, he says he suddenly realized that the vision of the six-winged 
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seraph Francis had on that very mountain illustrated the route by which his rapture 
could be reached. 
Before Bonaventure and even Francis, both Dionysius and Richard had used 
the seraph to symbolize the mind’s transcendence of the realm of knowledge and 
attainment of the Love of God.668  Dionysius describes the seraphim as the ‘fiery’ 
angels that are closest to God and that are capable of approaching Him without 
intermediaries.669  They emanate the intense and purifying heat of love, which lifts 
them up to the direct vision of Love.  According to Dionysius and Richard, the 
seraphim are the agents through which human beings are purified and elevated to the 
same vision.  
Uniquely, the fiery seraph that was seen by Francis appeared in cruciform.  
To Bonaventure’s mind, Francis’ vision reinforced the fact that the crucified Christ is 
the fullest expression of divine love and that sacrificial love for Him is needed to 
gain access to the three ways of knowing Him, which are represented by the three 
pairs of wings.  The first pair of wings that covers the seraph’s feet symbolizes the 
knowledge of God that comes through contact with the exterior world; the second 
pair, crossed over the body of the seraph, symbolizes interior knowledge; the last pair 
extends upwards, gesturing towards the knowledge of what is superior, and thus 
towards God Himself.   
When Bonaventure caught his own glimpse of Francis’ seraphic vision, he 
immediately realized that it was the key to solving the problems that plagued his 
order.  When he descended from Alverna, he composed his Itinerarium mentis in 
Deum with the discoveries he had made on that mountain in mind.  The Itinerarium 
is often described as the last and even the greatest attempt to give a traditional 
Augustinian explanation of the ‘ascent’ into God that is brought about by 
engagement in three modes of knowing.670  In my words, it is seen as the final 
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Medieval statement of the process involved in conforming to the image of God that 
had been outlined in works like Augustine’s De Trinitate and Anselm’s Proslogion.   
Although Bonaventure refers to three types of knowledge, he does not seem 
to simply rehearse the traditional account of what it means to conform to the image 
of God.  Admittedly, he articulates his account in a standard format, at least in some 
respects, and invokes the authority of Augustine, Anselm, and Dionysius in doing so.  
Yet my contention is that Bonaventure gives expression  by these means to an idea of 
Christ likeness that is unprecedented, inasmuch as it follows from the innovative and 
decidedly Franciscan concept of God and His image he had elaborated elsewhere.  
On my argument, it cannot be the case that Bonaventure attempts to offer resources 
for conforming to God’s image like the ones Augustine and Anselm had previously 
provided, because he does not hold that the image was damaged at the fall, much less 
that re-conforming to it is necessary.   
In the case of Christ likeness as in others, I maintain that Bonaventure 
introduces new ideas under the auspices of the Augustinian tradition.  For this 
reason, I do not classify his Itinerarium in the category of Augustinian theological-
pedagogical works.  Rather, I regard it as the locus classicus on Christ likeness, as it 
was conceived in the recently founded Franciscan intellectual tradition.  In what 
follows, I offer an interpretive exposition of the seven chapters of the Itinerarium, 
where Bonaventure gives his account of Christ likeness under the Dionysian rubric 
of purgation, illumination, and union.671   Subsequently, I analyze the new concept of 
Christ likeness that is developed in it. 
PURGATION 
 In the prologue to the Itinerarium, Bonaventure insists that any attempt to 
know God must begin with prayer, because prayer purges the will of pride and 
teaches it humility.672  The sign that the will has been purified is love for Christ.  
Love in turn is demonstrated in the way Christ demonstrated love when He 
abandoned His will to the Father and humbly turned Himself over to suffer and die 
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on the cross.673  That is to say, love is evidenced by an active lifestyle of self-
abandoning service.  Anyone who commits to a life of poverty undergoes the 
purification of the will, through which the mirror of the mind is ‘cleansed and 
polished’.674   
As its primeval holiness is recovered, the intellect regains awareness of itself 
as an image of God.  It is hierarchized.  While all human beings retain the image of 
God, Bonaventure insists that only those with rightly ordered wills are conscious of 
the image and are therefore properly called likenesses of God.675  In those that 
become likenesses through the purification of the will, the innate intellectual powers 
are again infused.676 The powers consist in the a priori knowledge of the eternal 
reasons that “are beyond error, doubt, and judgment,”677 which lend meaning to all 
things and which lay the foundation for all true and certain knowledge.   
Inasmuch as intellectual holiness reinstates access to the rules whereby mere 
science is transformed into wisdom, it gives the mind an “immediate disposition 
towards wisdom.”678  Without holiness, Bonaventure does not think any scientific 
endeavour can attain the status of wisdom and thus achieve absolute truth and 
certainty.679  Since love for Christ is what motivates the intellect to lead a holy life, 
the intellectual life of one who lacks love of a distinctly Franciscan sort, and 
therefore holiness, can never prosper.680 
Those who love Christ and evidence this through a life of poverty, by 
contrast, gain total and instant access to the rules that are in Christ, that is, to the a 
priori knowledge of Being and the transcendentals.  In this way, the pure in heart are 
awakened to the three ways of knowing the Being of God that unfold from the 
intuitive knowledge of Being.681  Since the Being known is univocal, or the same in 
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all cases, Bonaventure concludes that the restoration of the interior awareness of 
Being predisposes the mind to be directly illumined with the knowledge of Him 
wherever it turns to look, namely, to that which is exterior, interior, or superior to the 
mind itself.  In other words, it enacts the possibility of knowing like Christ, with the 
help of Christ.   
Quite different from the gradual journey towards an ultimate intellectual goal 
Augustine and Anselm envisaged, the mind’s journey into God as Bonaventure 
understands it is a journey with an end the intellect has always already reached.  
Coming to this realization is entirely a matter of the will.  If the will is abandoned to 
Christ and this is evidenced by a life of poverty, the three immediate routes to God 
are instantly opened up.682 
ILLUMINATION 
Exterior 
 In the first two chapters of the Itinerarium, Bonaventure discusses the way 
the one with a pure heart is illumined with the knowledge of God through vestiges, 
or through the experience of external, empirical objects.  He reiterates the point he 
made in his earlier questions on the Trinity that the existence of finite beings 
presupposes the existence of an infinite Being.683  On the basis of the contention that 
this Being is the first object of the intellect, Bonaventure concludes that the mind 
cannot help but see that creatures bear witness to the existence and nature God 
through their own existence and natures.684  
Interior 
 Although Bonaventure discusses the way to God through creatures first, in 
keeping with the traditional order of things, he suggests in the prologue to the 
Itinerarium and states explicitly in other writings that interior knowledge necessarily 
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precedes the knowledge of exterior and superior things.  On his account, it is by 
turning inwards that one ‘remembers, understands, and loves’ the self.685  In 
remembering oneself, he reiterates in chapters three and four, one remembers that 
one’s mind is innately impressed with the knowledge of Being, or the image of God, 
which immediately joins the intellect to God Himself and makes His existence self-
evident to the mind.686   
Insofar as the discovery of God within reinstates awareness of the a priori 
rules of judgment, it further enables efforts to ‘fully analyze’ reality through the 
cooperation of memory, understanding, and will.687  In addition to enabling the mind 
to find God in the first order knowledge of beings, as described above, Bonaventure 
states that the intuitive knowledge of Being enacts the possibility of second order 
philosophical reflection on beings.  The Seraphic Doctor distinguishes between three 
types of philosophical reflection: the natural, the rational, and the moral.688  Natural 
philosophy includes metaphysics, mathematics, and physics; rational philosophy 
includes grammar, logic, and rhetoric; and moral philosophy deals with individual, 
domestic and political issues.   
The middle chapters of the Itinerarium represent Bonaventure’s first major 
attempt to bring his Christocentric perspective to bear on his assessment of 
philosophy.  His basic line of contention is that it is practically impossible to engage 
in any genuine philosophical reflection on reality without love for Christ, inasmuch 
as love for Him gives access to the ideal forms of all things that are located in His 
mind and that disclose the true meaning of all reality.  This intellectual manoeuvre 
represents Bonaventure’s attempt to justify study within the Franciscan order and 
even to present the Franciscan perspective as the condition of possibility of all valid 
intellectual pursuits.    
In subsequent years, the Seraphic Doctor would extrapolate the implications 
of his Christocentric outlook even further in the process of mounting an attack on a 
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group of radical Aristotelians that became influential in the University of Paris early 
in the 1260’s.  As I discuss these developments in the university’s history and the 
Seraphic Doctor’s response to them, I aim to give a fuller picture of the assessment 
of philosophy he offers in the Itinerarium. 
 The radical Aristotelians, who were led by a master of arts called Siger of 
Brabant, were not followers of Aristotle so much as they were proponents of an 
extreme Averroist interpretation of Aristotle.  To Bonaventure’s mind, the most 
problematic view they espoused was the theory of ‘double truth’.  Siger and his 
followers believed there were truths of reason and separate truths of faith.  While 
they thought it possible to demonstrate the validity of philosophical truth, they did 
not think the same could be said for the truths of faith.  For this reason, they 
concluded that truths of faith should always be subjected to philosophical 
verification.   
 Bonaventure believed just the opposite.  In his opinion, science answers to 
the rules of wisdom, not the other way around.  True philosophical understanding can 
only be found in the context of faith.  Where Thomas Aquinas attempted to correct 
the errors of the Averroists by producing more accurate interpretations of Aristotle’s 
writings, Bonaventure’s strategy was to undermine their arguments altogether.  A 
series of lectures he began in 1267 eventually led to the official condemnation of 
Siger’s teachings in 1270.  A final series of lectures Bonaventure delivered at the 
university in 1273, called the Collationes in Hexaemeron, have been described as his 
“summa on Christ the centre.”689  In these lectures, the Seraphic Doctor explains 
most elaborately how Christ can and must be seen as the centre of all lines of 
theological, philosophical, and practical inquiry.690  He exhaustively elucidates the 
implications of his belief that Christ represents the ideal forms of all realities and 
their meaning must be sought in Him.   
 The criticisms of Aristotle that Bonaventure presents in his Collationes are 
founded on that belief.  The chief criticism applies to the Aristotelian denial of 
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exemplarity,691 where “the supreme Exemplar is Christ.”692  Because the radical 
Aristotelians refused to acknowledge that knowledge depends upon divine 
exemplars, Bonaventure charges them with being “unable to consider how things 
originate, how things are led back to their end, how God shines forth in them, [and 
therefore to] achieve true understanding.”693  In sum, he claims that their denial of 
exemplarity leaves them hopelessly prone to err.694  For this reason, the Seraphic 
Doctor counsels his readers to maintain a critical attitude when evaluating the work 
of such thinkers.  After all, he writes, the ability to gain true and certain 
understanding of reality is “the privilege of the highest contemplatives, not of natural 
philosophers.”695   
 Bonaventure’s critique of Aristotelian philosophy has given rise to a 
scholarly controversy concerning his view of philosophy.696  Etienne Gilson’s 
contention was that Bonaventure had almost nothing positive to say about Aristotle 
and philosophers more generally from the very first days of his career.697  Gilson 
perceived two main ways of dealing with the introduction of Aristotelian thought in 
the late Medieval West: the way of Bonaventure, who rejected Aristotle out of a 
conservative desire to remain faithful to the Augustinian tradition, and the way of 
Aquinas, who boldly determined to accept much of Aristotle’s thought.  For Gilson, 
the attitudes of Bonaventure and Aquinas towards Aristotle were indicative of the 
posture they assumed towards philosophy as theologians.   
While Bonaventure considered the relationship of philosophy to theology to 
be heteronomous, Aquinas thought philosophers capable of coming to valid 
conclusions autonomously.698  Although Bonaventure never explicitly challenged 
Aquinas for embracing the thought of non-Christian philosophers, he certainly did 
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intimate that Thomas was “in danger of putting too much confidence in Aristotle.”699  
In fact, his Collationes may have contributed to Thomas’ implication in a second 
condemnation of radical Averroism in 1277.   
Unlike Aquinas and much like Augustine, albeit as Gilson understands 
Augustine, Bonaventure had no confidence in the competence of human reason to 
gain understanding apart from faith.700  Indeed, for Bonaventure, this is precisely 
what the motto fides quaerens intellectum suggests.701  On the basis of belief in 
Gilson’s claims, scholars accept Bonaventure’s negative assessment of philosophy as 
a sign of his commitment to Augustine.702 
In Gilson’s own day, the professor’s thesis was challenged by Fernand Van 
Steenberghen, who argued that Bonaventure had a great affinity for Aristotle.703  
Although this contention soon proved to be based on a limited understanding of 
Bonaventure’s writings and intellectual agenda, there was some truth to it.704  
Bonaventure did not refuse to acknowledge or even cite philosophical authorities, 
even though he did always subject them to the faith. 
With the insights of Gilson, Van Steenberghen and others in view, Joseph 
Ratzinger balanced the views on this matter.  He distinguished Bonaventure’s 
general critique of Aristotle, which can be found in the earlier writings, from the 
outright rejection of radical Averroist Aristotelianism that surfaces in the later 
works.705  Although Bonaventure always distinguished himself from Aristotle on 
certain issues, above all, exemplarity, Ratzinger notes that this did not prevent him 
from referring to Aristotle where Aristotle’s ideas were not inimical to the faith.  
Although the Seraphic Doctor did reject the radical interpretation of Aristotelian 
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philosophy that was developed in the 1260’s, he did not fail to acknowledge the 
intellectual advances that had been made by the historical Aristotle.706   
The tempered account of Bonaventure’s relationship to Aristotelian 
philosophy Ratzinger formulated has since become the common view.707  With this 
one qualification, however, Gilson’s account of the heteronomous relationship of 
philosophy to theology in Bonaventure’s thought still stands, since it truly does 
capture the ‘spirit’ of Bonaventure’s philosophy.708  Contrary to popular belief, 
however, it is not an accurate depiction of Augustine’s views.  Admittedly, 
Augustine explained how all sciences can contribute to growth in Christian wisdom 
in De Trinitate, his early Cassiciacum dialogues, and elsewhere.  By that same token, 
however, he did not deny the legitimacy of scientific endeavours undertaken outside 
the context of Christian wisdom, as Bonaventure tended to do.   
Instead, the bishop accepted the fact that faithless reasoning is the practical 
consequence of the fall.  The theory of knowledge he developed from his Christian 
standpoint, far from excluding the perspectives of those that adhere to other 
philosophical and religious beliefs, engaged other perspectives conversationally.  
Augustine considered non-Christian thinkers, especially Platonists, capable of 
attaining great insight into the truth.  Unlike Bonaventure, he did not think the 
philosophers could not know at all.  He simply believed they did not always know 
what they know—the Triune God—or how they know it—through the Incarnation of 
God’s Son.709   
Inasmuch as philosophical minds grasp the truth, Augustine affirmed that 
they grasp God’s Truth and that their understanding can therefore inform the 
Christian understanding of the Triune God.710  Augustine urged his readers to allow 
their understanding to be informed in this way, knowing that faith is brought to bear 
on ‘pagan’ reasoning in the process.  As faith and reason are thus reconciled, the 
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faith of the one reconciling them is bolstered and the power of faith to perfect reason 
is obviated in the sight of the faithful as well as the faithless.   
By embracing the perspectives of those outside the Christian circle, 
Augustine believed the redemptive work of Christ could be carried forward.  Far 
from formulating an account of Christian wisdom that refuses to recognize the 
‘wisdom’ of the philosophers, the bishop explained how to embrace it, and thus 
showed how to know Christ and make Him known in a world where He is not 
universally known.  To assume Bonaventure’s attitude towards philosophy would be 
for Augustine to deny the real effects of the fall and thus to foreclose the possibility 
of redemption, which was the diametric opposite of his intent.  
In the Itinerarium, Bonaventure concisely states his view on the role of 
philosophical studies in the context of giving an account of the way God is known at 
the intellectual level.  In showing that there is in fact a place, and only one place, for 
intellectual pursuits, that is, within the Franciscan context of love for God, he 
emphasizes that gaining understanding “is more a matter of affective experience than 
rational consideration.” 711  No matter how much philosophical knowledge a person 
has, Bonaventure’s opinion is that knowledge amounts to nothing if it is not 
subjected to the wisdom of Christ.  Moreover, knowledge can only be referred to 
Christ if the intellect has been purified by a passionate love for Him, which manifests 
itself in a life of poverty and suffering that imitates Christ’s own passion.  In 
summary, the Franciscan lifestyle is the precondition of all valid academic 
endeavours. 
Superior 
 In chapters five and six, Bonaventure treats the knowledge of God that can be 
achieved simply by analyzing the thought of God Himself.  Since God is the 
Supreme Being, Bonaventure affirms that He is good without qualification, or that 
than which no greater can be thought.  Appealing to Anselm’s Proslogion, he argues 
that the Supreme Being that exists in the mind must also exist in reality, because He 
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is whatever it is better to be than not to be, and to exist is better than not to exist.712  
Because God is Being itself, and the existence of Being is implicit in the innate 
knowledge of Being, His existence is so certain in itself that He cannot be thought 
not to be.  Indeed, God is closer and more intimately known by the mind than the 
mind knows itself.713   
Bonaventure closes this section by explaining his belief that this Being must 
be Triune, for He would otherwise be unable to diffuse Himself in the created order 
and make all things expressions of His love, as He manifestly does.  The Seraphic 
Doctor further recalls that the Triune nature of God is summed up in the Person of 
the Son, who fully reveals the poor, humble, and self-giving nature of God’s love 
upon the cross.   
A stronger commitment to loving Christ and to expressing love as He did 
through a life of poverty, humility, and self-abandonment, gives easier access to the 
knowledge of God that comes through that which is exterior, interior, and superior to 
the mind itself.  Since what is known in all instances is God’s loving nature, 
Bonaventure concludes that the one whose love is perfect knows God perfectly and 
therefore does not know at all but transcends the realm knowledge, abandoning the 
intellect and indeed the whole self to achieve ecstatic union with God. 
UNION 
In the seventh chapter of his Itinerarium, Bonaventure presents Francis’ 
experience on Alverna as the paradigm case of ecstatic union.  Because of the self-
deprecating humility he exhibited in increasing measure, Francis became consumed 
with love for Christ, and for that reason, he was finally fully conformed to Christ’s 
likeness on that mountaintop.  Since his lifestyle was so literally patterned after 
Christ’s, he was visibly marked with the wounds of Christ, which were the ultimate 
signs of a humble and self-emptying nature.  Because of those wounds, Francis, like 
Christ after His crucifixion, was transported in death to the bosom of the Father.714  
When he crossed over into ecstasy, Bonaventure states that the saint “invited all truly 
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spiritual men to this kind of passing over and spiritual ecstasy.”715  Anyone wishing 
to be like Christ, he sums up, should follow in the footsteps of Francis, the alter 
Christus.716   
CHRIST LIKENESS IN THE ITINERARIUM  
 In the Itinerarium, Bonaventure clearly does not present a traditional 
Augustinian account of conformity to Christ’s likeness.  For Augustine and Anselm, 
conforming is a matter of the intellect and the will, knowledge and love.  Since the 
divine object of knowledge and love is not immediately present, Augustine affirms 
that the full knowledge and love of Him can only be anticipated in faith and desire, 
respectively.   
 For Bonaventure, likeness to Christ is primarily a matter of the will or love 
for Christ, where love is defined in a self-abandoning or even self-deprecating sense.  
On Bonaventure’s account, such love is best expressed in the poverty and humility of 
the Franciscan lifestyle.  In order to assert the primacy of love with reference to 
knowledge, Bonaventure defines love in an absolute sense, or in a sense that 
precludes knowledge.  For him, self-abandoning love is the precondition of 
intellectual operations, and it is the goal of intellectual operations.  In both cases, 
however, love leaves room for no intellectual operations.  In the first instance, the 
indicator of love for Christ is the voluntary abandonment of the will, which pays no 
regard for reason.  In the second, love entails the transcendence of reason and thus 
the ultimate act of self-abandonment that accompanies ecstatic union with God.   
 By affirming that the Franciscan life of love is both the point of entry and 
goal of cognition, at least cognition that is true and certain, Bonaventure 
accomplishes the two-fold polemical task he set for himself when he ascended 
Alverna, which was to persuade the spirituals that there is a place for study if the life 
of the Franciscan and to vindicate the intellectual life of the friars minor in the eyes 
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of the university masters.717  In demonstrating that there is a place, and only one 
place, for the acquisition of knowledge, namely, between purgation and union, 
Bonaventure demonstrates that the acquisition of knowledge can lead to the 
fulfilment of Franciscan goals and that a Franciscan mindset is actually required for 
intellectual success, vis a vis the spirituals and university masters, respectively.  
 On Bonaventure’s account, love is the way into knowledge because it gives 
access to Christ’s wisdom concerning all things that are outside, inside, and above 
the mind.  In other words, it awakens the mind to the innate knowledge of Being that 
renders the human subject the adequate foundation for perfect and complete 
knowledge of all realities.  The reason for the mind’s adequacy is the concursus of 
Christ, whose reasons keep the cognitive power fully actualized after access to the 
power itself has been gained through love, such that love is not actually required for 
the ongoing use of the power.  Like his definition of love, consequently, 
Bonaventure’s understanding of knowledge is an absolute one.  Bonaventure 
conceives knowledge in an immediate or totalized sense in the effort to give an 
account of knowledge consistent with Francis’ experience of reality, himself, and 
God.   
 Knowledge attained by these three means is knowledge of the ways in which 
God’s love is immediately present in the real world order.  In virtue of the univocal 
interconnectedness of the love that is manifested in all instances, such knowledge is 
bound to quickly usher the one that truly loves God into the presence of Love itself 
and thus into a realm that is beyond knowledge, which is of no importance once 
ecstasy is attained.   
 For Bonaventure, in summary, likeness to Christ is mainly a matter of 
manifesting His love, which entails the abandonment of the self and eventually 
reason.  Ascending to God, in other words, means ‘condescending’ in humility to 
serve the lowliest of beings, until one descends so low as to lose oneself.718  
Becoming like Christ is definitely not a cognitive process as it is for Augustinians.  It 
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is hardly a process at all, owing to the fact that love and knowledge are absolutes that 
do not admit of gradual growth.  If conforming to Christ is a process in any respect 
for Bonaventure, then it is a process of becoming more freely self-abandoning.  It is 
in giving up one’s will in the absence of reasons that one gains access to the power of 
reason that is itself given up when the will is fully conformed to Christ and thus 
passes over with Him in ecstasy to the bosom of the Father. 
 Although Augustine is often described as the intellectual source of 
Bonaventure’s voluntarism, his account of conforming to God’s image resists such 
an interpretation of him.  For Augustine, conformity to Christ is brought about by the 
intellect and the will together.  Desire, which anticipates the fullness of love, 
motivates acts of reasoning in faith, which anticipates total knowledge of God.  
Through those acts, the image on the mind is gradually renewed and both faith and 
desire are increased until one forms a habit of reasoning in faith and in the desire for 
God.  Any intellectual growth is the result of that desire.  Conversely, actions or 
expressions of love are indicative of intellectual growth.   
 In this account, neither love nor knowledge is described in an absolute sense.  
Rather, they are conceived as subject to gradual growth.  For Augustine, the non-
absolutist character of knowledge and love as they are experienced in this life 
through faith and desire is not detrimental, because the deficit is precisely what 
encourages the human person to overcome it through acts of knowing by negation, 
which require the cooperation of faith and desire, and which ultimately lead to the 
positive encounter with God that is only attainable in the life to come.  While 
Augustine admittedly argues that the process of knowing by negation is set in motion 
by love for God that is initially expressed in self-negation, he does not consider the 
terminus of self-negation to be self-abandonment but self-recovery.  In his opinion, 
only the fully recovered self can begin to know how to serve and thus to love others.  
Such a self is fully conformed to the image of Christ. 
Plainly, Bonaventure did not intend to promulgate an Augustinian account of 
conforming to Christ’s likeness in the Itinerarium.  Far from it, he sought to explain 
Christ likeness in a manner that was not only consistent with the Franciscan vision 
but that would also help him resolve the problems that plagued the order at the time.  
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When he retreated to Alverna, he did so in hopes of coming up with a plan for 
persuading the spirituals that study is not inconsistent with Franciscan principles and 
for convincing the university masters of the friars’ intellectual legitimacy.   
By transforming Francis’ spiritual experiences into a normative standard and 
showing the role knowledge can play in meeting that standard of ecstatic union, 
Bonaventure accomplished both feats simultaneously.  His account of Christ likeness 
effectively trumped the arguments of both the spirituals and the masters against 
intellectual endeavours within the order, inasmuch as he showed that there is no way 
to achieve intellectual and spiritual perfection but the Franciscan way, which entails 
knowledge, at least for at time.  Those that opposed the intellectual life of the friars 
minor could have no rebuttal to this line of contention, according to which 
Franciscans need intellectual pursuits for their success, and intellectual pursuits need 
Franciscans for theirs.  Even if there were opponents, they could not question the 
authority of Augustine, Anselm, and Pseudo-Dionysius, all of whom Bonaventure 
had enlisted in the service of St. Francis for the purpose of perpetuating his vision 
and putting it in a position to philosophically prevail.   
Divine Illumination 
A tendency to take arguments about illumination at face value has led 
scholars to the unanimous conclusion that “there is no essential difference between 
Augustine and Bonaventure’s theories of illumination.”719  Admittedly, both 
Augustine and Bonaventure employ illumination to metaphorically illustrate the 
work of the intellect that works like Christ.  The arguments I have presented thus far, 
however, serve to indicate that the two theologians understand the work of the 
intellect that works like Christ in very different, even incompatible, ways.   
Bonaventure’s version of the illumination account illustrates his concept of 
human cognition.  In earlier sections of this chapter, I identified what that concept of 
cognition entails and how it differs from Augustine’s by tracing the way 
Bonaventure derives it from his doctrine of God and concomitant doctrine of the 
image of God.  In this section, I will focus on the two texts in which Bonaventure 
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states his views on illumination very explicitly, namely, the fourth of his Quaestiones 
disputatae scientia Christi and the short tract, De reductione artium ad theologiam.  
In treating these and other supplementary texts, I highlight how the description of 
illumination Bonaventure gives in them corresponds to the description of his theory 
of cognition I have already provided on the basis of his other writings.   
One of the first points Bonaventure establishes in his fourth question is that 
all human beings possess an innate ‘cognitive light’, which infused by Christ when 
one’s will is converted to Him.720  This light, he states, is the knowledge of Being, 
and it “sends out three primary radiations:”721 unity, truth, and goodness.  These rays 
shine without fail.722  Like Christ who irradiates them, they are “beyond error, doubt, 
and judgment.”723  
The Seraphic Doctor refers to these rays of light as the eternal reasons.  He 
stresses that the reasons are not the objects of knowledge, but only the lights by 
which the intellect evaluates reality (lumen intelligendi).724  They are necessary for 
human knowledge, “because there can be no certain knowledge except where there is 
immutability on the part of the object known and infallibility on the part of the 
knower.”725  Since Christ contains the eternal reasons that render created forms 
immutable and knowledge of them infallible, His light can be equated with the 
human cognitive light.   
 According to Bonaventure, the inner light of Christ makes it possible for the 
mind to be directly illumined with the knowledge of God in the three main ways, 
namely, through an exterior light (lumen exterius), through the interior light itself 
(lumen interius), and through a superior light (lumen superius).726  By means of the 
eternal reasons Christ imparts, which constitute the inner light, the human mind 
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becomes competent to compare its ideas about created forms with His, and thus to 
achieve absolutely true and certain knowledge about them.727  When the mind judges 
created reasons by those eternal reasons, it cooperates with its ‘inner master’, Christ, 
who therefore renders human knowledge of external reality ‘perfect’.728   
Owing to the fact that the mind presupposes awareness of the divine Light in 
all its efforts to perceive reality by the light, Bonaventure concludes that, “nothing 
can be understood at all unless God immediately illumines the subject of knowledge 
by means of the eternal divine truth.”729  Despite the fact that God Himself is beyond 
reach, Bonaventure indicates here, He “is closer to the mind even than the mind is to 
itself,”730 inasmuch as He is the mind’s own power.  Whenever the mind considers 
its power in the knowledge that it is a sign of God’s presence within, it truly knows 
itself.  In the same instance, moreover, it cannot help but know God, given that His 
Light shines forth in the mind “in a manner that cannot be stopped.”731 
The interior awareness of Christ’s illumining presence through the 
transcendental concepts thus renders the human subject the adequate foundation for 
all knowledge of realities outside, inside, or above itself.  In his De reductione artium 
ad theologiam, Bonaventure elaborates this line of contention.  There, he argues that 
all illumination received through exterior and interior lights must be traced back or 
‘reduced’ to the superior light of Sacred Scripture, which communicates the fullness 
of God’s wisdom in the story of Christ’s passion and crucifixion.732   
If the sciences through which the external world are studied (weaving, metal-
working, architecture, agriculture, hunting, navigation, medicine, and drama733) and 
the philosophical lines of inquiry pursued by the intellect (natural philosophy, 
rational philosophy, and moral philosophy734) are not considered with reference to 
the superior light, or the relevant forms in the mind of Christ, inquiry into them 
cannot produce wisdom.  It cannot illumine.  Christ must be situated at the centre of 
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all study if study is to have any meaning whatsoever.735  On Bonaventure’s account, 
human sciences exist for the sole purpose of promoting union with Christ, which is 
not achieved through knowledge itself but through love.   
If anyone pursues knowledge without love, Bonaventure cautions, their 
efforts are bound to be in vain.736  The one who loves Christ and seeks to see how 
His love is made manifest by undertaking various lines of inquiry, by contrast, will 
eventually achieve the union with love which is the “supreme illumination…beyond 
the range of investigation of the human intellect.”737  In this, Bonaventure writes, the 
mind is “carried above every sense and every rational operation” 738 as it enters into 
“to the super-essential ray of the divine darkness.”739  
This investigation of illumination in Bonaventure’s thought confirms that his 
version of the account illustrates his broader views on knowledge.  Illumination is a 
metaphor for Christ’s gift of the transcendental concepts, through which the human 
subject becomes fit to represent all realities with perfect accuracy and certitude.  
Incidentally, this unprecedented level of interest in the representational accuracy and 
certitude of ideas by no means denotes any genuine concern regarding the possibility 
of knowledge.  Rather, the preoccupation with cognitive certitude in Bonaventure is 
indicative of a polemical interest in establishing that a Franciscan outlook is required 
for the attainment of all genuine knowledge.740   
Inasmuch as acts of cognition supervised by the innate concepts that generate 
true and certain ideas are acts of cognition under the direct guidance of Christ, 
illumination is an extrinsic influence that affords the cognitive capacity, enters into 
the process of cognition, and acts as the guarantor of cognitive certitude.  In these 
respects, it is something super-added to what the human person would possess of 
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their own accord.  Without the super-addition of grace to nature, nature would be 
incapable of performing its ‘natural’ operations. 
In contrast to this view, Augustine conceived illumination as the source of an 
intrinsic or natural capacity to increasingly participate in a unifying or abstractive 
mode of cognition, which is proper to human beings and which mimics God’s 
knowing of Himself.  Inasmuch as the capacity operates of its own accord—engaging 
in the process of cognition, producing concepts, gaining certainty—illumination 
enters into those other aspects of cognition as well.  Although Augustine affirms that 
the mind is illumined in these respects by an inner master called Christ, he does not 
suggest by this statement that Christ interferes with knowing in any way.  He only 
flags the fact that the knowing agent is aware that the purpose of independently 
performed cognitive acts is to illumine God.   
Not only does Augustine’s understanding of the sort of knowledge that is 
attained by illumination differ from Bonaventure’s, but his view of the means by 
which is it achieved also differs.  Where Bonaventure defined knowledge as the 
subjective representation of reality, Augustine saw it as a matter of objective 
participation in God’s knowledge of Himself.  While Bonaventure believed 
knowledge by representation was produced on account of the concursus or extrinsic 
conditioning of Christ, Augustine affirmed that knowledge by participation was 
obtained through the ‘flowing-in’ (influentia) or intrinsic gift of the intellectual 
capacity that comes from Christ.  Far from being essentially indistinguishable, the 
theories of knowledge by illumination Augustine and Bonaventure present are, for all 
practical purposes, irreconcilable.   
Bonaventure the Augustinian? 
 In this chapter, I set out to challenge a received view and show that 
Bonaventure is not an Augustinian with respect to the theory of knowledge by 
illumination.  My strategy was to trace the difference between the theories of 
illumination the two theologians espouse to a fundamental theological difference.  
Bonaventure advocated a Victorine doctrine of the Trinity, which both motivated and 
enabled him to give a new account of creation in God’s image.  In his metaphysics, 
essentialism replaced participation, and for this reason, a univocal concept of the 
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relationship between created beings and the divine being substituted for the 
traditional analogical theory of being.   
 The Victorine doctrine also had an impact on Bonaventure’s idea of the imago 
dei and its intellectual operations.  When he expressed that idea, I showed that he 
codified a new standard of knowledge by subjective representation which diverged 
from Augustine’s theory of knowledge by participation.  The Seraphic Doctor’s 
standard had the effect of supplanting Augustine’s view of the knowledge of God ‘by 
negation’ in favour of a theory that allows for positive and direct insight into the 
nature of God. 
 Where cognition had been enabled by the gift of an intrinsic cognitive capacity 
in Augustine’s thought, acts of knowing as Bonaventure defined them depended 
upon the extrinsic conditioning of certain a priori or transcendental ideas.  Those a 
priori ideas lay the proper foundation for the subject’s efforts to perfectly represent 
realities within, outside, and above itself.  On this assumption, Bonaventure re-
construed Anselm’s ‘formula’ for conforming to God’s image as an a priori proof for 
the existence of God.  Inasmuch as he defines Christ’s illumination as an extrinsic 
influence rather than an intrinsic one, the Seraphic Doctor evidently presupposes a 
concursus model of causality rather than the influentia model of Augustine. 
 Because Bonaventure’s standard of knowledge presupposed that the cognitive 
capacity is always fully actualized, or that there are no noetic consequences of the 
fall, he did think the redemptive work of Christ served to help human beings 
overcome those effects and re-conform to the image of God.  Although his 
Itinerarium is usually placed in a line of traditional Augustinian works that outline 
the process of re-conforming, it cannot legitimately be coupled with those works, 
inasmuch as it rejects the negative theological project that is undertaken in them and 
introduces an altogether innovative idea of Christ likeness.   
 In Bonaventure’s account of Christ-likeness, the will that loves takes absolute 
priority over the intellect that knows.  Love and knowledge are assigned new 
connotations.  Love is not self-recovering as in Augustine but self-deprecating; 
knowledge is not a matter of increasing participation but of subjective representation.  
Furthermore, in Bonaventure, both love and knowledge are defined in an absolute 
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sense, such that they tend to preclude one another.  On the assumption that neither 
love nor knowledge could be actualized in the present life, Augustine by contrast 
contended that human persons can only increasingly anticipate the attainment of love 
and knowledge through desire and faith.  For this reason, he believed that the will 
and the intellect stand in a mutually inter-dependent relationship and that both enter 
in to every act of knowing.   
 While in Bonaventure’s account, the Christ-like person would lead a 
Franciscan life of poverty and self-deprecating humility, the conformed person on 
Augustine’s understanding could be a person of any kind who had discovered how to 
harness the intellect and the unique talents God had given for the purpose of knowing 
Him and making Him known, that is, for the expression of His love.  Where 
Augustine’s motive was to teach readers with various gifts and with a strong 
commitment to Christ to use any and all the abilities they had for the purposes of 
faith, Bonaventure’s intent was to present Francis of Assisi the paradigm case of 
Christ likeness.741 
 In this effort, as I have shown, the Seraphic Doctor conceptually departed 
from Augustine in virtually every theological and philosophical area, not least in his 
use of the illumination account.  The fact that Bonaventure continued to employ 
traditional Augustinian and Anselmian arguments has masked the fact that he makes 
a distinctly Franciscan departure.  When one traces the philosophical arguments back 
to their theological source, however, the differences between the Franciscan 
Augustine of Bonaventure and Augustine himself come into relief.   
 In distinguishing Bonaventure from Augustine, I have not intended to imply 
that there is anything inherently problematic about thinking differently from 
Augustine at the theological or philosophical level.  In fact, I consider it acceptable 
practice to attempt to forge a new intellectual path, especially where there is a need 
for particular intellectual resources suited to accomplishing particular intellectual 
tasks.  Even Bonaventure’s attempts to ‘disguise’ his innovative views in the 
arguments of Augustine and Anselm are perfectly acceptable, since it was common 
practice in the thirteenth century to appeal to authorities in advancing one’s own 
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views, and this indeed was what the scholar was expected to do.  In highlighting the 
non-Augustinian character of Bonaventure’s thought, I had one goal in mind, 
namely, to do the preliminary work that is required to properly identify the cause of 
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If Bonaventure is not the late Medieval representative of the Augustinian 
tradition, then one may wonder who is.  In this chapter, I submit that the thirteenth-
century proponent par excellence of Augustine’s illumination theory is the Seraphic 
Doctor’s Dominican counterpart, Thomas Aquinas.  This claim may come as a 
surprise to some, for despite the fact that his doctrines of God and God’s image are 
widely recognized as Augustinian, Thomas’ philosophy is usually labelled 
‘Aristotelian’.742  Moreover, his philosophical Aristotelianism is often thought to 
preclude philosophical Augustinianism.  The evidence that Aquinas rejects 
Augustinian philosophy can supposedly be found in his arguments against 
illumination and a priori proofs for God’s existence, the twin pillars of Augustinian 
thought which Franciscan thinkers upheld.743   
The Aristotelian interpretation of Aquinas’ philosophy was popularized 
during the late nineteenth century.  By that time, Catholic theologians had grown 
dissatisfied with the usual fideistic responses to modern philosophical challenges.  
Amongst them, there was a growing interest in the project of formulating rational 
Christian rebuttals to the rationalist philosophies that prevailed during the period, 
most of which were variations on Cartesian and Kantian thought.  Pope Leo XIII 
believed that the recovery of Aquinas would make it possible to offer such a 
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response.  In his 1879 encyclical Aeterni Patris, he called for a renewed focus on the 
thought of Aquinas.   
His call was issued on the assumption that Thomas regarded philosophy as an 
autonomous discipline and therefore believed natural reason was fully competent to 
operate apart from faith.  These were the very conclusions Augustine, Bonaventure, 
and virtually all Medieval thinkers in between them would have roundly refused to 
accept.  Aquinas’ efforts to emancipate reason from faith were allegedly inspired by 
Aristotle, whose thought the Angelic Doctor adopted in full.  Following Aristotle’s 
lead, Aquinas used natural reason to demonstrate the existence of God from what is 
known in the natural order, a posteriori, and thus without recourse to revelation or to 
the a priori arguments commonly invoked in the Franciscan tradition.  
When Aquinas innovatively developed such a natural theology, many 
Leonine Thomists believed, he gave Catholic theologians the resources they needed 
to defend the rationality of faith on grounds rationalist philosophers such as 
Descartes and Kant would find acceptable.744  In conjunction with the summons 
issued in Aeterni Patris, consequently, Catholic theologians began to appeal to 
Aquinas in their attempts to address modern thinkers on their own terms.  As a result, 
numerous interpretations of Thomas’ thought developed which were mostly based on 
the aforementioned assumptions about the overall shape of his thought and his 
indebtedness to Aristotle.745  In time, such assumptions came to be taken for granted 
in the broader academic context, especially amongst philosophers of religion that 
made it their business to rationally establish the existence of God.746  
Although this movement of thought was always gaining momentum, it did 
not escape opposition.  Karl Barth famously rejected the Catholic natural theological 
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project.747  Resistance also came from within Catholic circles.  Etienne Gilson, for 
instance, emphasized the Christian character of Aquinas’ philosophy against those 
that described it as pre-theological.  As an avid Neo-Thomist himself, however, he 
continued to depict Aquinas as an Aristotelian and as an innovator who departed with 
good reason from the longstanding Augustinian tradition.748 
In his rigorous studies of Aquinas’ texts, Marie-Dominique Chenu paid close 
attention to context, content and structure.749  These researches revealed to his mind 
that many of his contemporaries were distorting Thomas’ thought and misconstruing 
his relationship to authorities.  Far from rejecting Augustine and forging a totally 
unprecedented conceptual path, Chenu found that Aquinas remained a faithful 
follower of Augustine on theological as well as many philosophical matters.750  
Because Chenu’s writings challenged the viability of the reading on which the Neo-
Thomist agenda rested, they were condemned by the Roman curia.  For decades, 
interpretive efforts like his were frowned upon, if not forbidden. 
Since the second Vatican council of 1965, Catholic thinkers have regained 
the freedom to read Thomas outside the auspices of institutional interpretations of his 
thought.  As this freedom was exercised, scholars more generally were inspired to re-
evaluate Aquinas’ writings and qualify his relationship to Aristotle and other 
authorities.  Fergus Kerr has greatly helped to usher in a new era in the scholarship 
on Aquinas.  As he tells the story of the late nineteenth-century revival of Thomism, 
gives an account of the development of numerous versions of Thomism since that 
time, pointing out where interpretations prove more or less accurate when compared 
to the spirit and structure of Aquinas’ work, he makes it possible to set new 
interpretive trends in thought on Aquinas.751  
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Mark Jordan has also contributed significantly to this effort.  He highlights 
the way and extent to which Thomas’ works were deliberately misread and rewritten 
by theologians seeking to use them for institutional purposes.  Even more, he outlines 
a way of reading Thomas’ works, which actually entails reading them.752  As part of 
this project, Jordan nuances Aquinas’ relationship to Aristotle and philosophical 
authorities.753  Outside of his commentaries on Aristotle’s works, Jordan points out 
that Aquinas did not prioritize Aristotle, but cited him alongside many other 
sources.754  Moreover, he subsumed the authorities he cited into a framework that 
was not theirs but his.755  In many cases, he used one thinker’s arguments in order to 
elucidate the ideas of another which we wanted espouse himself.   
Because Aquinas invokes some authorities explicitly and others implicitly, 
Jordan insists that it is impossible to identify his real relationship to authorities 
without attending to the sense he wished the arguments he borrowed to convey.  For 
this reason, Aquinas’ “actual inheritance of Aristotle must be studied topic by topic, 
passage by passage.”756  To reduce Thomas’ thought to Aristotelian thought in 
Jordan’s opinion is to betray the real Thomas, who had learned all sorts of conceptual 
languages in order to give the most effective explanation of his ideas and at the same 
time open up the lines of communication with thinkers from all kinds of intellectual 
traditions.757  Bearing all this in mind, one can readily conclude that Thomas Aquinas 
did not regard Aristotle’s arguments “as solid units to be transported whole [but] as 
sources or occasions for invention.”758 
The inventive work that needed to be done was that of articulating Dominican 
ideals so as to enable Dominicans to achieve the goals of the order.  Dominic had 
founded his order in response to the Cathar heresy.  From the moment of its 
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inception onwards, consequently, the Dominican order concerned itself with 
apologetic tasks.759  To accomplish these tasks, Dominicans had to be well versed in 
the Scriptural and philosophical texts adherents of non-Christian monotheisms 
invoked.  Furthermore, they needed to be outstanding moral examples.  The 
credibility of their witness depended upon it.   
As Alasdair MacIntyre has shown, Aquinas found in Augustine the resources 
he needed to give his account of moral inquiry, and he put Aristotle’s eudemonism to 
work in the effort to freshly reiterate Augustine’s ethical views.760  In recent years, 
other scholars have called attention to areas in which Aquinas owes an obvious debt 
to Augustine.761  Jean-Pierre Torrell contends at the start of his two-volume work on 
Aquinas’ life and teachings that the Angelic Doctor perpetuates the Augustinian and 
Anselmian tradition of ‘faith seeking understanding’.762  Other academics have 
focused on correcting misperceptions of the general shape of Aquinas’ thought, some 
with and others without extensive reference to his use of authorities.763 
As this brief survey of some pertinent scholarship illustrates, the effort to 
rectify the scholarly perception of St. Thomas’ thought is well underway.  One can 
only hope that it will soon be possible to say the same of Bonaventure.  Although 
much progress has been made, there is more work to be done in order to reverse the 
interpretive trends that were set by certain Neo-Thomist thinkers.764  Thomas’ voice 
has yet to be heard over the voices of his re-writers on many issues, and illumination 
is one of them. 
If Neo-Thomist arguments were to carry weight, it had to be true that 
Aquinas abandoned Augustinian illumination in favour of Aristotelian abstraction.  
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In this case as in many others, the message of Thomas’ texts was re-construed for 
polemical purposes, and as a result, a crucial aspect of his thought was neglected.  
Out of curiosity, one Aquinas scholar once had a graduate student search through 
every book and journal article on every available bibliography related to the study of 
St. Thomas for references to illumination.  His assistant found only a handful of 
articles that even touched on the topic.765  That was almost thirty-five years ago, and 
scholarly attentions have yet to make a significant turn towards the topic of 
illumination, even though major advances in this area have recently been made.766 
The irony of the situation is that Aquinas’ major works are virtually littered 
with references to illumination, very few of which are negative.  While it is true that 
Thomas argues against illumination in some passages, I will show that his charges 
are only levelled against the version of the account that belonged to Bonaventure, 
even if he does not name his opponent, in accordance with the academic custom of 
the day.  The same holds true in the case of Aquinas’ alleged ‘rejection’ of Anselm’s 
‘ontological’ argument.767  In both cases, Thomas was not questioning the views of 
predecessors but contemporaries, who were successfully championing 
misinterpretations of the original views in question.  Scholars that take Aquinas to be 
objecting to Augustine and Anselm themselves overlook the fact that he immediately 
moves from correcting a false interpretation to explaining what he believes is a true 
one.   
In this chapter, I give a relatively brief explanation of Aquinas’ treatment of 
knowledge and illumination, limiting my discussion to the Summa Theologiae.768  
From this point in the thesis onwards, I will not demonstrate how any thinker 
including Aquinas derives his illumination theory from Trinitarian doctrine.  In this 
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chapter as in the next, I will simply explain the account of knowledge and 
illumination that is given by a particular thinker.  Here in the case of Aquinas, I will 
highlight the similarities between his thought on illumination and that of Augustine 
and will suggest that this is indicative of continuity on the preliminary theological 
levels.  That Aquinas works on continuity with Augustine as it concerns the doctrines 
of God, God’s image, and so forth, is not questioned.  The goal here is simply to 
show that continuity of thought on divine illumination follows logically from 
continuity of thought on these theological matters.  Where relevant, I will point out 
how Thomas incorporates Aristotle in giving his account of knowledge.  In doing 
this, I seek to further bolster the contention that Aquinas employs Aristotelian not to 
mention other forms of argumentation for the sake of innovatively conveying the 
sense of Augustine’s ideas. 
Thomas’ account of human knowledge and illumination is situated within his 
treatise on human nature (articles 75-102).  That treatise is itself nestled between his 
accounts of the knowability of God’s existence and essence and His Triune nature, 
all of which falls within the first part of the Summa, and the account of Christian 
virtue he gives in the second.  The latter section is followed by a third in which 
Aquinas develops his theology of the Incarnation.  Once I have explained his account 
of cognition and the way illumination features in it, I will discuss the relationship 
between ‘ordinary’ knowledge, the knowledge of the Triune God’s existence and 
essence, and the moral life lived in imitation of Christ, as the structure of the Summa 
suggests should be done.   
Through this discussion, I aim to show that Aquinas, far from rejecting 
illumination, composed his Summa Theologiae with the whole goal of fuelling an 
increase in illumination.  Not unlike Augustine’s De Trinitate and Anselm’s 
Monologion and Proslogion, his treatise is a manual for conforming to the image of 
God.  Since Aquinas conceived the Triune nature of God and His image in roughly 
the same way as Augustine and Anselm, he envisioned the process of re-conforming 
to the image in a similar fashion as well.  Although his explanation of the process 
differs from the others, the discrepancies are usually in form and length as opposed 
to content.  Those discrepancies do not undermine Aquinas’ intellectual fidelity to 
Augustine and his tradition but rather confirm it, for when he translated the 
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traditional theological content into other forms of expression, Aquinas made the 
timeless message intelligible in a new context and by a different audience, which 
nonetheless resembled the readership of Augustine and Anselm.   
Aquinas’ readers were his Dominican charges, who like the understudies of 
Augustine and Anselm, were “already familiar with Christian theology, its concepts 
and principles and the philosophy it presupposes, but who stood in need of the 
intellectual habituation by which the principles in the field, the articles of faith, 
became the foundation and cause of their thinking.”769  In summary, Aquinas’ 
readers were intellectually gifted persons who had taken Dominican vows and were 
seeking to learn how to engage all their abilities in the effort to better understand and 
testify to their faith.770   
In Aquinas’ day, there was a special need for a theological-pedagogical text 
which would assist them towards these ends.  Prior to his time, Dominicans had 
tended to separate the Scriptural and philosophical treatises they needed for their 
apologetic work from the moral manuals by which they endeavoured to live.771  This 
created a bifurcation of work and faith which was contrary to the Dominican spirit 
itself.  In the Summa, consequently, Aquinas sought to bring the two types of treatise 
together.  Although the Summa has long been regarded as a dry philosophical treatise 
ready-made to be fragmented, Jordan shows that it is actually a single chain of 
reasoning through which Aquinas teaches his readers how to cultivate the habit of 
thinking theologically about their work, or how to become wise.772  To put it in my 
own words, the Summa a guide to conforming to the image of God.   
In the process of conforming Aquinas outlines over the course of his treatise, 
illumination has a key role to play.  Although I argue this, my purpose here is not to 
give a comprehensive account of illumination or any other aspect of Aquinas’ 
thought.  I have included a chapter-length excursus on Aquinas’ ideas about 
knowledge and illumination because it was germane to investigation of illumination 
in Augustinian and Franciscan thought.  The inquiry into Aquinas reinforces that a 
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genuine Augustinian does as Augustine did, not necessarily what Augustine did.  
When the thirteenth-century situation is regarded from this perspective, the reverse 
of the common opinion turns out to hold true: Aquinas rather than Bonaventure can 
be seen to uphold Augustine’s theory of knowledge by illumination.773  In arguing 
this, I take an indirect approach to throwing the non-Augustinian character of 
Bonaventure’s thought into relief.  In the same instance, I give a preliminary 
indication of the central place illumination holds in Aquinas’ thought and so 
implicitly issue a call for more research that does justice to it. 
Knowledge & Divine Illumination 
Before he explains how illumination informs the work of the intellect, 
Aquinas discusses how the senses, imagination, and intellect cooperate in the act of 
knowing.  On his understanding, knowing begins at the level of sense perception; the 
first objects of the intellect are empirical rather than transcendental.  Once the five 
external senses have obtained sense data, the internal sense or imagination forms a 
phantasm of the object that is under consideration.774  Those phantasms are stored in 
the memory.   
The intellect is responsible for abstracting intelligible species, or ideas, from 
phantasms.  Aquinas describes the intellectual capacity as a power, that is, something 
the human being has as opposed to what the human being actually is.775  It was in 
equating the intellectual capacity with the essence of the human being that 
Bonaventure bolstered his view that the capacity is always actualized or equipped for 
the perfect and complete comprehension of objects.  His understanding of the 
intellect led him to define abstraction as knowledge of the exact correspondence 
between thought and essential reality.   
By defining the intellect as a power, in contrast, Aquinas construed the 
intellect as the source of the potential to gradually actualize the essence of what it is 
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to be human, through ongoing participation in the unifying way of thinking that is the 
mode of existence proper to human beings and indeed to God.776  Thomas’ 
understanding of abstraction therefore differed greatly from Bonaventure’s.  It was 
an Aristotelian as opposed to an Avicennian understanding, according to which the 
work of the active intellect is to infer a universal concept from numerous related 
phantasms so as to make them intelligible or ‘light them up’.777  When the intellect 
abstracts an idea, Thomas writes, the class of objects under consideration takes on 
immaterial ‘existence’ within the knower.778  The idea is impressed upon the memory 
or ‘possible intellect’ of the knower, where it remains available to assist in efforts to 
render new experiences intelligible.779   
On Aquinas’ account, new experiences are what incite the intellect to revise 
and expand the original species, to cognitively encompass more of reality by means 
of its growth, and thus to increasingly participate in it.  Since the power to know is a 
potential one, Aquinas stresses that the clarity and accuracy of the intelligible species 
must be achieved by degrees.780  Unlike Bonaventure, Aquinas does not believe that 
perfectly clear ideas can be immediately attained.  In his view, only God and angelic 
beings have recourse to such intuitive knowledge.   
For him, formulating a species means forging a conceptual resource to 
facilitate new discoveries rather than grasping a reality in a fixed and final way.  
Because discovery is ongoing, the three main faculties—sensation, imagination, and 
intellection—are in constant co-operation.  There is not even a hint of dualism in 
Aquinas’ theory, where it is acknowledged that human knowledge must be refined 
through experience and effort.  Those efforts, which are made in abstraction, allow 
what is objectively the case to be increasingly, subjectively realized.  In affirming 
this, Aquinas prioritizes the objective order over the knowing subject, by contrast to 
                                                                                                                                     
775 Joseph Owens, “Aquinas on Cognition as Existence,” in Thomas and Bonaventure (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 74-85. 
776 Thomas Aquinas, ST, vol. 11, 1.79.1-2.  
777 Ibid., 1.79.4.  See David Burrell’s chapters on, “Aquinas and Scotus: Contrary Patterns for 
Philosophical Theology” and “especially “Creation, Will, and Knowledge in Aquinas and Duns 
Scotus” in Faith and Freedom.  Burrell superbly explains Aquinas’ account of knowledge and 
contrasts it with the Franciscan one espoused by Scotus. 
778 Thomas Aquinas, ST, vol. 12, trans. Paul T. Durbin  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 1.84.2. 
779 Ibid., vol. 11, 1.79.6 
   227
Bonaventure.781  Moreover, he articulates an account of cognition consistent with 
that of Augustine, albeit in Aristotelian terms.782  
After explaining abstraction, Thomas turns to consider the relationship 
between the ideas the mind forms in abstraction and the ‘eternal reasons’ that are 
received through divine illumination.783  He starts by distinguishing between two 
senses in which the reasons could conceivably be known.  In the first place, they 
could be the actual objects of knowledge; in the second, they could serve as the 
principles of knowing, much like the sun is the principle of vision.  In agreement 
with Bonaventure, Aquinas rejects the notion that the reasons can be seen directly in 
the present life and affirms that they now act only as the principles that make 
intellectual vision possible.   
When it comes to defining what sort of reasons the principles provide, 
however, Aquinas disagrees with Bonaventure.  The latter believed the reasons are 
the innate transcendental concepts acquired through illumination.  For him, the 
transcendentals are the principles of cognition inasmuch as they govern acts of 
abstraction to ensure the truth and certitude of the ideas the intellect produces.  
Through those concepts, Bonaventure argued that God cooperates with the active 
intellect, helping it form ideas that correspond to His.   
Since Thomas holds that sensible rather than transcendental objects are the 
mind’s first objects, he denies that illumination affords a priori concepts.  Although 
he challenges Bonaventure’s interpretation of illumination, Aquinas by no means 
rejects the theory altogether.  Instead, he clarifies what he thinks illumination does in 
fact involve.  For him, the divine light is the source of the innate cognitive capacity 
for abstracting reasons from phantasms.  That is to say, the divine light is an intrinsic 
force which is at work inasmuch as the God-given power is put to work.   
Because Augustinian illumination has been defined in one way or another as 
an extrinsic influence, Thomas’ tendency to conflate illumination with the gift of the 
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agent intellect has been regarded as a fundamentally anti-Augustinian one.784  Yet I 
have shown that illumination does not entail extrinsic conditioning in Augustine’s 
thought.  Long before Thomas, the bishop contended that the mind is illumined to 
illumine.  What it passively receives from God is nothing but the ability to be an 
active knowing agent.  If Augustine’s illumination theory has been defined in an 
extrinsic sense, such that it precludes Aquinas’ interpretation, it is only because 
Bonaventure saw illumination as an extrinsic conditioning and assigned that view to 
Augustine which Reformation thinkers found suitable for their own purposes and 
thus promulgated in the modern period. 
Far from undermining Augustine’s vision of knowledge by illumination, 
Aquinas perpetuates it by identifying the divine light with the source of a capacity to 
cognize in the way Aristotle described, which resembles the way of Augustine.  By 
equating illumination with the cognitive capacity, Aquinas does not deny that the 
light is involved in other aspects of cognition, such as the ongoing process of 
knowing, the generation of cognitive content and certitude, and the knowledge of 
God, as he is often accused of doing.  Inasmuch as all those aspects of cognition 
entail the use of the cognitive capacity, illumination enters into them.  Yet it enters in 
a way that does not rob the mind of its ability to perform its proper function of its 
own accord, as illumination on Bonaventure’s understanding was prone to do. 
Aquinas finds the conceptual resources to affirm without contradiction that 
every act of knowing is entirely a human initiative and that is fully supported by God 
in an influentia model of divine causality, according to which God’s primary 
causality instils in human beings the very ability to act as secondary causes.785  In 
this model, the success of human acts is attributed to God, not because He imposes 
knowledge or performs the act of knowing itself, but because He gives the power to 
work on one’s own initiative in the first place and is therefore the indirect cause of 
the acts of knowing the human being directly affects. 
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In Aquinas’ view, the power to illumine reality or abstract ideas from 
phantasms is a natural one.  By what he calls the ‘natural light’ of reason, natural 
objects can be known.  Moreover, natural reason is capable of inferring from its 
knowledge of natural objects that there are principles of order or causes of nature.  
Although such ‘transcendental’ ideas are not intuited at the outset of cognition as 
Bonaventure thought, Aquinas argues that the knower can gradually learn to 
associate effects with their transcendental causes.786  To improve at the art of 
abstraction is simply to improve at this skill of relating many to one, which is the 
skill of knowing in an intuitive manner.  By these means, Aquinas states that the 
philosopher can even grasp that the natural order must have a divine cause and end.   
When Aquinas spoke of these truths to which natural reason is able to attain, 
he was not advocating a natural theology like the one many Neo-Thomists attributed 
to him.  By truths of reason, Thomas referred to the kinds of truths all monotheist 
thinkers would uphold.  Muslims, Jews, and even Greek philosophers like Aristotle 
were all monotheists in the sense that they reasoned in the belief that a divine being 
is the source and goal of all reality.787  Natural reason, as Aquinas understood it, is 
still reason that works within the context of monotheist faith. 
Although he admits that non-Christian monotheists are able to reach the 
conclusions that God exists, that He has ordered nature, and so on, Aquinas 
acknowledges the impossibility of inferring from the natural order that the God in 
question is Triune.  To know that He is, Christian revelation is required, that is, the 
revelation of the Incarnate Son of God.  When he grants that there are two types of 
truth, one attainable by natural reason and another only through Christian revelation, 
Thomas by no means implies that Christian truth is just one among many equally 
plausible truths as Bonaventure insinuates that he does.788   
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Quite the opposite, Aquinas opens up ways to demonstrate the unmatched 
profundity and veracity of Christian faith.  By accepting reason’s competence to 
figure out the way things work in its own sphere, Aquinas enacts the possibility of 
appropriating intellectual resources non-Christian monotheists have to offer in the 
effort to understand faith.  This practice of ‘spoiling’ secular resources, which 
Augustine had sanctioned, makes it possible to bring Christian faith to bear on the 
use of those resources and thus substantiate and where necessary correct the insights 
of non-Christian thinkers.  That is to say, it gives the Christian thinker the chance to 
show why things work the way they work, namely, because the God who makes all 
things work is Triune and has revealed Himself as such through the Incarnation.   
Although all monotheists in Aquinas’ day desired to give an account of the 
way reality derives from God and of the ability the human mind has to attain to Him, 
only the Christian doctrines could enable one to say how these things actually come 
about, that is, how the transcendent spills into the immanent and how the immanent 
can reach up to what is transcendent.  Granting reason some independence put 
Thomas in the position to point the way towards the satisfaction of monotheist 
intellectual desires.  In sum, it made a way to “engage with diverse religious 
traditions.”789  
While Thomas admittedly adhered to a theory of two truths, he did not 
thereby imply that reason can operate without faith in the Trinity.  Rather, he 
realistically acknowledged that it does operate in this way.  At the same time, he 
made room for Christian thinkers to reconcile faith and whatever they evaluate by the 
light of reason, testifying to the truth of their faith in the process.  Inasmuch as he 
articulates an account of human knowledge in which there is space for the apologetic 
work that is the raison d’etre of the Dominican order, Aquinas gives an account that 
is wholly consistent with that of Augustine, whose theory of knowledge was oriented 
in all respects towards the redemption of human reason. 
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Knowledge of God 
In order to accomplish redemptive intellectual work, Aquinas believes an 
added ‘light of grace’ is needed.  The light of grace is the revelation of God’s Triune 
nature through His Incarnate Son.  In the opening question of his Summa Theologiae, 
Thomas reiterates the point that natural reason is unable to uncover the true identity 
of the supernatural source and end of the natural domain.790  As he explains, the mind 
can only gaze on a given reality if it has a ‘species’ proper to that reality.  Since 
human beings abstract species from corporeal creatures, they naturally possess no 
species suited to grasping the divine.791  Although abstraction stimulates the desire to 
know the one Being that unites all beings, it frustrates the desire, insofar as it is 
impossible to abstract one’s way to God.   
For this reason, Aquinas concludes that the species that reveals the Trinity 
can only be acquired through the revelation of the Incarnate Christ: the light of 
grace.792  When the natural light becomes receptive to this light in faith, the intellect 
regains the potential it lost at the fall to have God as its first object.  According to 
Aquinas, that potential can be actualized in one of two ways.  In the first way, the 
intellect actually sees the species itself and gazes on the very essence of the Triune 
God.793  So long as human beings inhabit a realm in which creatures are 
approximating their essences through participation in their various modes of 
existence, however, it is not possible to face a God whose essence is His existence.794  
A vision of the ‘light of glory’ is unattainable in the present life.  It is the kind of 
vision only God and the blessed can have.  
Although it is not possible to know God directly, Aquinas affirms that His 
‘species’ can now be known in another way.  In explaining this way, Aquinas 
introduces Aristotle’s distinction between two kinds of science.795  Some sciences, 
like arithmetic and geometry, proceed by way of their own principles.  Others 
proceed according to principles that are dictated by a higher science.  Music, for 
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instance, follows rules it receives from arithmetic.  In relation to arithmetic, music is 
what Aristotle called a subalternate science.   
On Aquinas’ account, theology, or ‘sacred doctrine’ (sacra doctrina), is this 
sort of science.  It is subalternate to the vision of the Triune God that God Himself 
and the blessed have.796  Though human beings cannot enjoy the science of the 
Trinity, they can proceed according to the principles of that science.  That is to say, 
they can reason according to faith in the Triune God Christ revealed.  Sacra doctrina, 
as Aquinas explains it, includes an account of the doctrines of Trinity and 
Incarnation.  In that sense, it is a purely speculative science.  Yet it also instructs how 
to apply those principles through efforts to evaluate reality in light of them, how to 
argue from the first principles rather than to them, as other monotheists are 
constrained to do.797  In this sense, sacra doctrina is a practical science.798  Inasmuch 
as it is a speculative science, it would seem that sacra doctrina accomplishes what 
Augustine had in the first half of his De Trinitate; Anselm in his Monologion.  So far 
as it is practical, sacred doctrine entails the same sort of inquiry Augustine outlined 
in the latter half of his treatise on the Trinity and that Anselm delineated in his 
Proslogion. 
In the second sense, sacred doctrine or knowledge in the light of God’s grace 
is not a properly constituted body of knowledge so much as it is a way of perceiving 
the body of natural knowledge under a certain formality.799  That formality is faith in 
the Trinity.800  To the extent the intellect has a habit of perceiving reality ‘in God’, 
all that is seen by the light of natural reason is seen at once in the light of grace.  The 
mind that is illumined knows that it is illumined by the Triune God.  Because it is 
resultantly divinely illumined, every natural act of knowing serves to adjust the eyes 
of the mind to the brilliant light of glory.801  Every unifying cognitive act, in other 
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words, cultivates wisdom and thus becomes, “a remote anticipation of the final 
beatified intuition” of the Wisdom of God.802  
After he treats the scope and aims of sacred doctrine in the first question of 
the Summa, Aquinas introduces his famous five proofs for God’s existence.803  The 
first issue Aquinas addresses here concerns whether His existence is self-evident.804  
Thomas contends that it is not and goes on to distinguish between two types of self-
evidence.  On his account, a proposition may be self-evident in itself, but not to the 
mind, or self-evident in itself and to the mind.  While he affirms that God’s existence 
is self-evident in itself, he does not believe, as Bonaventure does, that the knowledge 
of God remains self-evident to the mind after the fall.   
On the grounds that the knowledge of God is not a priori, Thomas rejects the 
reading of Anselm’s argument, obviously Franciscan, according to which it is.  For 
him, an awareness of God as constant as the awareness of the world is not one that is 
always maintained but one that must be regained.  In faith, God is reinstated as the 
first object of the intellect.  Even then, however, His reinstatement is only a potential 
one.  The intellect must subsequently strive to make faith effective by forming a 
habit of evaluating reality in the light of belief in God, until He is actually restored as 
the intellect’s governing idea or first object.  Although the mind with faith initially 
“receives obscurely all the conclusions of divine science,”805 it remains for it to 
discover the significance of those conclusions, as per Plato’s Meno paradox.806   
Since God cannot be known a priori, Aquinas insists that His existence must 
be demonstrated a posteriori.  One must infer from effects to cause rather than the 
other way around.807  He goes on to list his ways to demonstrate God’s existence, 
most of which are drawn from Aristotle’s writings.808  The first way is the argument 
from motion, according to which whatever is in motion must have been put in motion 
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by a first mover.  The second is from efficient causality, or the idea that no effect is 
its own cause.  The third way is from possibility and necessity.  According to 
Aquinas, all creatures are contingent.  They did not have to exist, but were brought 
into existence by a Being whose existence is in fact necessary.   
The fourth way is found in the gradation of things.  Among beings, Aquinas 
writes, there are greater and lesser goods.  Since there are degrees of goodness, these 
must be included in and surpassed by the maximal good, which is God.  The fifth and 
final way has to do with final causality.  All beings serve some purpose, Aquinas 
contends, which they do not determine for themselves.  Therefore, there must be an 
intelligent Being by whom all natural things are directed to their end, and this is God.   
Aquinas’ five ways have been interpreted in many ways.  Neo-Thomists of 
various kinds tended to describe them as pre-theological proofs for God’s existence, 
and this sort of interpretation is one many philosophers of religion have advanced.809  
More recently, scholars have started to stress that the proofs must be deciphered with 
a view to the context provided by the surrounding questions, overall structure, and 
authorial intent of the Summa.810  Bearing these issues in mind, Eric Mascall has 
argued that the five ways do not argue to but presuppose God’s existence.  They are 
not proofs per se but approaches to discovering what it means that He exists by 
considering the world in view of the fact that it depends on God.811  Similarly, Rudi 
Te Veld contends that the proofs are for the purpose of rendering the belief in God 
intelligible.812   
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These are the sorts of interpretation that I want to push forward in what 
follows.  To do that, however, I must first discuss the contents of the subsequent 
section of the Summa, which treats the knowability of God’s essence.  At the start of 
the section, Aquinas argues that God’s nature needs to be discovered through what 
He is not, namely, creatures, since it is not possible to know what His essence is.  
Knowing God ‘by negation’, as I have explained previously, entails thinking about 
the creatures or circumstances one faces in view of the fact that they are not ultimate 
as God is.  He is the Highest Good from whom all things derive their goodness.813  
He is the infinite, omnipresent, immutable, eternal one that is utterly distinct from 
finite, mutable, temporal beings.814  To have Him rather than whatever is under 
consideration is to have happiness.   
The intellect that evaluates reality with these things in mind forms a 
perspective on things that is informed by the knowledge of God as the Highest Good.  
As it reasons in faith, the intellect reconciles reason and faith in the only place 
possible, that is, in its own perspective.  Thoughts formulated in faith do not bear on 
God but only on the creatures under consideration.  They reveal something about 
creation rather than Creator.  Even so, God is known through the mediation of the 
idea formed in faith inasmuch as faith has affected the formation of the idea and thus 
the evaluation of temporal circumstances.   
The perspective on the circumstances that is informed by faith enables one to 
see God’s hand in them, that is, to see Him in His effects; it therefore predisposes the 
mind for the vision of the cause.  In sum, the view of reality in the light of God 
doubles as the knowledge of God attainable in this life.  It is the knowledge of Him 
that can be acquired through thinking about the things He is not.  Put differently, it is 
knowledge by negation or ‘analogical’ knowledge of God.  Though thoughts and 
words about the things that come to pass in God’s order are not thoughts or words 
about the essence of God, they apply analogously to Him in the sense that faith has 
impacted the formation of the thoughts and words themselves.   
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Following Kerr, I contend that Aquinas’ five theistic proofs serve as “the first 
lesson in Thomas’ negative theology.”815  Far from an “exercise in rationalist 
apologetics,” 816 the proofs are designed to facilitate the mind’s efforts to put things 
in proper perspective, that is, to think in terms of the fact that whatever is known is 
not ultimate, while God is.  One might employ the first argument, for instance, in 
reflecting on the way God has orchestrated certain events in what has proven in 
retrospect to be the best way.  The second proof might be used to give credit to God 
for some good one has done, since God bestows the ability to do good in the first 
place.   
The third way could be invoked in expressing thanks to God for the way 
events in one’s life have worked out, in view of the fact that it is totally out of human 
control to determine a future course of events.  One might appeal to the fourth way in 
marvelling in increasing measure at God’s goodness.  Although God always remains 
the ultimate good, His goodness appears to increase from the perspective of one who 
persists in thinking of things in light of belief in His goodness.  Using the fifth way, 
one can assess a situation in view of the fact that all things work together for good.   
When considered along these lines, the five ways come forward as conceptual 
resources designed to help the reader think about everything that is and that happens 
from the perspective of faith in God.  They are tools intended to facilitate efforts to 
know God through knowing the things He is not.  Since all things that are ‘not God’ 
can be seen ‘in God’, Aquinas affirms that even that which appears to pose a 
challenge to faith, for example the Cathar heresy, can become occasions for growth 
in faith.  In short, there is nothing that cannot be redeemed by the mind.  There is no 
situation in which it is impossible to bring faith to bear on that which reason 
assesses.  Conversely, there is no way to reconcile reason and faith but to do so by 
reconciling them in one’s own perspective on a particular situation, so as to identify 
and testify to the efficacy of God in it.   
The concern of Thomas Aquinas like Augustine and Anselm before Him was 
to aid his readers’ efforts to cultivate this habit of reasoning in faith.  The intellect 
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with such a habit sees all things, at all times, and in all places in God.  Consequently, 
it sees things in a manner that is consistent with the belief in God’s ultimate 
goodness and all that His goodness entails: infinity, eternity, omnipresence, and so 
forth.  Since it has learned to automatically see effects in relation to the divine cause, 
the intellect is predisposed to intuitively identify the divine cause both in His effects 
and, in future, in Himself.   
 The process of forming a habit of faithful reasoning that has been outlined 
thus far, Aquinas points out, is quite simply a process of overcoming the effect of the 
fall—the loss of the knowledge of God and His image—by re-conforming to the 
image.  Although he affirms that all persons are made in the image in virtue of the 
natural desire to ‘know why’, Thomas states that it is only those that have become 
subject to the light of grace and are forming a habit of knowing God through their 
natural habits of knowing that are aware of their creation in His image and are 
therefore preparing to encounter the reality.817   
The discussion of the imago dei brings Aquinas to the end of the first part of 
his Summa.  There, he established that the Triune God is the greatest good and that 
human beings are made in His image in virtue of a natural capacity for abstraction.  
He instructed his readers to re-learn to use this capacity for its intended purpose, 
namely, to see God in all things.  Put differently, he explained how to conform to the 
image of God.  In the process of conforming, illumination had a key role to play, for 
it is by cultivating the skill of viewing things in the light of faith that the natural light 
of reason is progressively readied for the sight of the light of glory.   
The second part of the Summa covers the topics of moral order and Christian 
virtue, serving to indicate that the illumination of the intellect that is enabled in part 
one is not the terminus of Thomas’ line of inquiry.  For Aquinas, rather, the goal of a 
transformed mind is a transformed life.  Only when thoughts and behaviours are 
consistent with professed beliefs does one become fully conformed to the image of 
God and therefore living proof for His existence.  Unless such proof is provided by 
one who is also able to give an account of the Triune, Incarnate God that is proved, 
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there is no recourse to demonstrating the existence of a Triune God in a world where 
all do not profess faith in Him.   
In the desire to produce readers capable of providing living proof for the 
Triune God, Aquinas spells out in his second part the life changes that should occur 
in the one whose mind has been transformed along the lines of part one.818  At the 
turn of the second part to the third, Jordan notes, Aquinas reminds that any life 
change has occurred under the impetus of faith in Christ who illumined the Triune 
nature of God so that His people might do likewise.819  
Aquinas the Augustinian  
 Thomas Aquinas has been said to abandon the Augustinian tradition for the 
Aristotelian one.  More specifically, it has been claimed that he rejects Augustine’s 
illumination theory and Anselm’s argument.  In this chapter, I have shown that such 
claims only obtain where Aquinas is assigned certain views past interpreters needed 
him to hold in order to invoke his authority in pushing their own agendas.  This 
‘rewritten theology’ of Aquinas has had opponents as well as proponents.  On the 
assumption that Thomas did in fact present pre-theological theistic proofs as many of 
his Neo-Thomist readers insisted, some have accused Aquinas of separating the 
project of explaining and proving the nature and existence of God from real life in 
Christ.  This is the same charge that has been levelled against Augustine, because of 
his psychological analogies and Anselm, because of his argument.   
 Just the opposite of what is frequently affirmed is true of all three authors, 
however.  Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas, with the analogies, the argument, and 
the five ways, respectively, provide resources for conforming to the image of the 
Triune God, as they commonly understand God.  In this, they tie reflection on God’s 
nature and daily Christian living together.820  They conceptually carry their readers 
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from the beginning to the end of the process of conforming to God’s image, which is 
a process of increasing illumination.   
 Inasmuch as it is an inquiry which both articulates an Augustinian Trinitarian 
doctrine and explains how to be intellectually and practically transformed by it 
through faith in Christ, Aquinas’ Summa falls in a genre of theological-pedagogical 
literature together with Augustine’s De Trinitate and Anselm’s Monologion and 
Proslogion.  In that treatise, Thomas perpetuates the tradition of Augustine, not 
merely for its own sake, but because he felt compelled as his forebears had to help 
the group of intellectually gifted believers in his care bring their faith to bear on their 
everyday endeavours and by means of those endeavours bear witness to the faith.   
In composing a treatise for such an audience, Aquinas imitated Augustine and 
Anselm in the sense that he allowed their shared understanding of the revelation of 
God in Christ to direct his efforts to appropriate the philosophical resources popular 
at the time for the purpose of writing a guide for conforming to God’s image.  
Although he employed new forms of argumentation, this is exactly the reason why 
he was able to affirm in a fresh and relevant way the meaning of Augustine’s claim 
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VI. DIVINE ILLUMINATION IN DECLINE  
(1274 – c. 1300) 
Introduction 
 The passing away of both Bonaventure and Aquinas in 1274 marked the start 
of a new phase in the history of divine illumination theory: the period of its decline.  
In this chapter, I explain why Franciscan thinkers working in the last quarter of the 
thirteenth century began to reconsider the illumination account and eventually 
abandoned it.  While there were many that challenged illumination theory in one way 
or another during this period, I limit the present discussion to three thinkers that 
played very different but key roles in the decline of illumination theory: Peter John 
Olivi, Henry of Ghent, and John Duns Scotus.821   I elucidate the account of 
knowledge and illumination each thinker gives.  In the case of Henry and Scotus, I 
will also elaborate the way the knowledge of God is construed.   
 The discussion of illumination and related issues in the thought of these three 
thinkers will confirm that the illumination account against which late thirteenth-
century Franciscans reacted was not that of Augustine but Bonaventure.  However, it 
will also reveal that Franciscans after Bonaventure did not question the authority of 
the Seraphic Doctor in questioning the viability of his illumination account so much 
as they sought to eliminate inconsistencies from his Franciscan definition of 
knowledge and in this spell out the logical corollaries of that definition.  Towards the 
end of the chapter, the explanation of all these issues will put me in a position to 
assess the other two studies of the late thirteenth-century decline of the illumination 
account and to give a preliminary analysis of the relationship between late Medieval 
Franciscan and modern thought. 
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Peter John Olivi (1248-1298) 
KNOWLEDGE & DIVINE ILLUMINATION 
 Peter John Olivi was likely the first Franciscan figure to raise problems for 
illumination theory.822  On this and other matters, Olivi did not hesitate to cause 
controversy within the order.  In the 1260’s, he studied at the Franciscan school in 
Paris, where he almost certainly sat under Bonaventure’s teaching, before he moved 
on to serve as a lector in southern France.823  It was during his time as lector that 
Olivi became notorious for his outspoken stance on religious issues, above all, 
poverty.  As the chief of the ‘spiritual’ contingent, Olivi greatly opposed the 
mainstream academic members of the order.824  In 1283, his works were censured by 
Franciscan authorities. 
 Although Olivi was reprimanded for espousing unorthodox theological and 
philosophical views, recent research has shown that the primary motivation for 
condemning him on intellectual grounds was to discredit the spiritual stance on 
poverty.825  If Olivi had not been the champion of the spiritual movement, his 
“speculative opinions would hardly have attracted much attention.”826  This is 
especially true since his arguments disclose nothing but the deepest commitment to 
St. Francis.827  Olivi’s expressed intention was to promulgate the Franciscan 
principles Bonaventure codified and spell out their logical implications, even if he 
did this with a degree exuberance that unsettled colleagues.828 
 Among the reasons cited for his condemnation was his oblique rejection of 
illumination theory.829  Although the points he raised were controversial in the 
moment, many of his Franciscan colleagues and examiners, most notably his student 
                                                
822 Etienne Gilson, History, 344. 
823 David Burr, The Persecution of Peter Olivi  (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 
1967), 6.   
824 See David Burr, Olivi and Franciscan Poverty: The Origins of the ‘Usus Pauper’ Controversy, 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989).   
825 David Burr, The Persecution of Peter Olivi, 40. 
826 Carter Partee, “Peter John Olivi: Historical and Doctrinal Study,” Franciscan Studies 20 (1960): 
218.  
827 David Burr, The Persecution of Peter Olivi, 19. 
828 See Carter Partee, “Peter John Olivi,” 220; David Flood, “Recent Study on Peter Olivi,” 
Franciscan Studies 58 (2000): 111.  
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Peter of Trabes and his inquisitor Richard of Middleton, quickly came to see that his 
criticisms were not unfounded.830  By the time Duns Scotus reached the height of his 
career approximately fifteen years later, intervening figures like these had already 
made illumination a moot point.  Scotus merely placed the final stamp of approval on 
a thesis Olivi originally advanced.831   
 Olivi presents his arguments against illumination when he inquires ‘whether 
or not the eternal reasons are the principle of understanding all things’ and ‘whether 
or not God irradiates in the intellect whenever it understands’.832  He starts by 
summarizing the claim Bonaventure made to support his illumination theory: 
whatever is eternal and immutable and infallible is God, and whatever truth humans 
know with certitude must be eternal and immutable and infallible; therefore, the 
divine light must be that by which human beings attain true and certain 
knowledge.833   
 There are two major problems Olivi sees as implicit in this illumination 
account.  Both problems unfold from the view that the eternal reasons are innately 
impressed on the mind through illumination.  Inasmuch as these reasons are one with 
the very essence of God and immediately join the mind to God, Olivi insists they are 
bound to give the human being recourse to the direct vision of the thoughts of God 
and therefore God Himself.  For this reason, he concludes that illumination theory is 
prone to the error of ontologism.834   
 The other problem concerns the role the eternal reasons play in supervising 
natural acts of knowing, for the sake of ensuring that ideas produced are absolutely 
                                                                                                                                     
829 See S. Piron, “La liberté divine et la destruction des idées chez Olivi,” in Pierre de Jean Olivi 
(1248-1298): Pensée scolastique, dissidence spirituelle et société (Paris: Vrin, 1998), 71-89.  
830 See Patrick James Doyle’s, “The Disintegration of Divine Illumination Theory”; Antonio di Noto, 
O.F.M., La Théologie Naturelle de Pierre de Trabibus, O.F.M. (Padua: CEDAM, 1963); Edgar 
Hocedez, S.J., Richard de Middleton: sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa doctrine (Paris: Edouard Champion, 
1925).  
831 See C. Berube, “Olivi, critique de Bonaventure et d’Henri de Gand,” in Studies Honoring Ignatius 
Charles Brady, Friar Minor (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1976), 57-121; Etienne Gilson, 
History, 350. 
832 Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, 3 vols., ed. Bernard Jansen, S.J. 
(Quaracchi: Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 1926), vol. 3, 500-13; for other 
summaries of Olivi’s thoughts on illumination, see Patrick James Doyle, “The Disintegration of 
Divine Illumination Theory,” 63-5; Etienne Gilson, History, 692-3. 
833 Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones, 502. 
834 Ibid., 5-507. 
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true and certain.  Even though Bonaventure did not think that natural human 
cognitive activity gives rise to the knowledge of the supernatural or is wholly 
accomplished by the supernatural, he did define the act of cognition as a shared effort 
on the part of human and divine beings.  Grace is needed to perfect nature, in 
Bonaventure’s view, because nature is not adequate as it stands.   
The interference of the supernatural in the natural which Bonaventure 
welcomed is precisely what Olivi finds problematic.  So long as cognition occupies 
an ambiguous space between the natural and the supernatural, Olivi thinks it cannot 
help but be regarded as what some have called a ‘zero-sum game’ in which God and 
human persons compete for the same responsibilities or domain.835  If acts of 
knowing entail a cooperative effort or shared concursus on the part of human and 
divine beings, this implies that the mind is incompetent to know truth and achieve 
certitude of its own accord.836  If that is in fact the case, then Olivi cannot see how 
illumination theory can avoid leading to scepticism, the very terminus it was 
introduced to evade.   
While Bonaventure posited the concursus of the innate a priori reasons in the 
effort to intimately relate the mind to God, it was precisely that overbearing 
interference that, ironically, rendered the divine causality in cognition repugnant to 
Olivi.837  Lest grace destroy nature, Olivi insists that illumination ought to be 
eliminated and the power to procure infallible knowledge be reallocated in full to the 
human being.838  Although he remains totally willing to “endorse illumination as a 
theological doctrine,”839 that is, as the source of concepts about God or help to know 
Him, Olivi communicates that he has serious reservations about the claim that divine 
illumination is the condition of possibility of all human knowledge.   
                                                
835 David Burrell, Faith and Freedom, 171; John Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 95.   
836 Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones, 508-9. 
837 Jacob Schmutz, “Causalité  et nature pure,” 226. 
838 Ibid. See also David Burrell’s Faith and Freedom, 115, 281, 485. On the difficulties involved in 
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around the time of Olivi, see John Lynch, The Theory of Knowledge of Vital du Four (St. 
Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1972), 153; Etienne Gilso, History, 343-4. 
839 John Marschall, “The Causation of Knowledge in the Philosophy of Peter John Olivi, O.F.M.” 
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Despite his reservations, Olivi states that he gives credence to illumination 
theory, simply because wise men like Bonaventure had advanced it.840  He claims 
that he only mentions the theory’s fatal flaws so that his followers can deal with 
them.  He urges his readers to promptly devise ways to eliminate the errors inherent 
in the illumination account, since it is a ‘very dangerous’ theory of knowledge as it 
stands. 
Even though he questions the viability of illumination, Olivi’s writings on 
natural cognition reveal that he thinks the nature of knowledge itself after the manner 
of Bonaventure.  Like his Seraphic predecessor, Olivi understands knowledge as a 
one-to-one correspondence or the “actual, immediate expression of an object.”841  On 
the basis of that assumption, Olivi, who had already implicitly rejected the idea that 
the eternal reasons mediate between the mind and reality, radically challenges the 
notion that a mediating species is necessary for knowledge at all.  If knowledge is 
immediate, he argues, the mind that requires a species will never see reality but only 
the species.842  On those grounds, he rejects the species and thus advances what may 
be the first form of direct realism.843 
Although Olivi attributes to human beings all the powers that are required to 
perform immediate acts of knowing indefectibly in his implicit rejection of 
illumination, he never denies the relevance of faith for reason.  To the contrary, he 
states that the grace that is received through faith, which only arises from a will to 
love God, opens access to the infallible powers of reason, even though it does not 
interfere with the use of reason itself.   This view grounds his wholesale rejection of 
pagan philosophy and the sacra doctrina of Thomas Aquinas.844  
 
                                                
840 Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones, 512-13. 
841 John Marschall, “The Causation of Knowledge in the Philosophy of Peter John Olivi, O.F.M.,” 
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844 See David Burr, “Petrus Ionnis Olivi and the Philosophers,” Franciscan Studies 31 (1971): 41-71, 
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Henry of Ghent (1217-1293) 
KNOWLEDGE & DIVINE ILLUMINATION  
 Olivi’s contemporary Henry of Ghent was one of the most influential 
intellectuals at the University of Paris in the last quarter of the thirteenth century.  
Although he was not officially associated with a religious order, Henry was one of 
the foremost spokesmen on behalf of the Franciscan cause.  When he recast the 
illumination account in his Summa quaestionum ordinarium, he sought to clear it of 
charges such as Olivi had raised.845 
 The first question Henry asks in his Summa is whether it is possible to know 
anything at all.  This is significant, inasmuch as it signals a departure from the 
methods of earlier Summists.  While these had begun their works with questions on 
God’s nature, Henry only turns to pursue this line of inquiry once he has investigated 
issues pertaining to the possibility and nature of knowledge.  As I will soon show, 
Henry took this approach in an effort to intellectually out-manoeuvre Aquinas and to 
discredit the account of knowledge by negation the latter’s Summa outlined.  After 
Henry, it became common for Franciscans to open their major theological works 
with the question whether knowledge is possible.   
 When he addresses this question himself, the Solemn Doctor considers the 
closely related and by his time controversial question ‘whether it is possible for a 
human being to know something without divine illumination’.846  In answering it, he 
makes a pro-Franciscan attempt to confirm that illumination does in fact concur in 
ordinary cognition, even while showing that does not err in the two ways Olivi 
mentioned.  To accomplish this, Henry introduces a new distinction between what he 
                                                
845 Other summaries of Henry’s thought on illumination are given by Robert Pasnau, “Henry of Ghent 
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calls ‘purely natural’ knowledge and supernatural or ‘special’ divine illumination.847  
He notes that some objects of knowledge can never “be apprehended by purely 
natural means but only by a special divine illumination, for example, those that are 
essentially and unqualifiedly matters of faith.”848   
 By contrast to supernatural objects, Henry insists that natural objects can in fact 
be known purely naturally. Although Henry is willing to allow that the First Knower 
exerts a general influence on the knower by bestowing the natural capacity, he 
emphatically denies that God concurs with the human mind in the process of 
cognition.  In other words, he concludes that the mind does not need the illumination 
of the eternal reasons in order to abstract, as Bonaventure had defined abstraction.  In 
affirming this, Henry dispels all hints of ontologism and avoids taking “much away 
from the dignity and perfection of the created intellect.”849  In short, he puts Olivi’s 
allegations to rest.   
 Although he denies that illumination enters into the process of cognition, 
Henry does not reject it altogether.  He acknowledges that his Franciscan 
predecessors and Augustine had insisted on the indispensability of the divine light 
and thus proceeds to explain what they meant when they did this.  Towards that end, 
the Solemn Doctor introduces yet another distinction between two ways of knowing 
any object.  He admits that his treatment of these two ways borrows much from 
Avicenna, whose thought was garnering a great deal of interest amongst late 
thirteenth-century Franciscan scholars.850  This Franciscan ‘return’ to Avicenna was 
apparently part of a greater effort to prove the traditional Augustinianism of the 
Franciscan outlook and to distinguish Franciscan thought from the Averroist and 
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Aristotelian articles that had been condemned in the 1270’s.   
 In the first way of cognition Henry mentions, the intellect abstracts a created 
reason or exemplar.851  In the process, it grasps the first principle of Being and its 
transcendental determinations, one, true, good, as they are manifested in the 
exemplar.852  In the second way, the intellect abstracts ‘backwards’ from the 
exemplar it previously constructed to something in the created order it now seeks to 
comprehend.  The difference between the two ways of knowing is the difference 
between a cognitive move from a sensible particular to an intelligible universal or 
from an intelligible universal to a sensible particular.   
 When the mind works in the first way, Henry states that it knows what is true 
(verum) in that object.  It simply apprehends the thing as it is and has the thing as the 
direct object of knowledge (objectum cognitum).  When the mind works in the 
second way, employing the exemplar as the basis for cognizing other things (ratio 
cognoscendi), it engages in a complex mode of cognition in which it determines the 
correspondence between objects and exemplars in the mind, so as to determine the 
essential truth (veritas) of objects.853  In summary, Henry’s view is that there is a 
two-fold knowledge of truth: the true knowledge that comes from simply grasping 
that a being exists, and the knowledge of truth the mind enjoys when it employs the 
concept of an object it has grasped in order to understand other things.  In 
emphasizing the indispensability of exemplars for the true and truthful 
comprehension of the natural order, Henry insists he perfectly marries the insights of 
Plato and Aristotle, as Bonaventure and Augustine had done.854 
  Though Henry allows that the knowledge of the true and the truth are 
attainable by purely natural means, he goes on to argue that the only way to achieve 
infallible cognitive certitude about the truth or ‘whatness’ (quidditas) of a thing is 
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through special divine illumination.855  This is the case because the purely naturally 
known exemplar is abstracted on the basis of mutable sense objects, and invoking 
Plato and Augustine, Henry insists like a typical dualist that ‘pure truth’ (sincera 
veritas) cannot be acquired from the senses.856  
 Not only do the objects of knowledge change but the mind does as well.  For 
this reason, Henry infers that purely naturally formed ideas are bound to be 
“incomplete, obscure, and foggy.”857  Because the objects of knowledge and the 
knower are mutable, Henry concludes with Bonaventure that, “certain, infallible, and 
pure knowledge of the truth,”858 or wisdom, cannot be achieved on the basis of a 
human exemplar but only on the grounds of a divine one.859 
 The Solemn Doctor proceeds to differentiate between two kinds of exemplar.  
The first is the kind the human mind creates on the basis of experience.  The second 
is an uncreated one that subsists in the divine mind.  Since the divine exemplars are 
the ideal patterns after which all things are made, Henry reasons that the truth of 
anything that has been made in accordance with an exemplar is known most perfectly 
in its uncreated exemplar. 
 To avoid the ontologist insinuations of this claim, Henry revisits his distinction 
between the two ways of utilizing any exemplar in cognition, namely, as the object 
of knowledge (objectum cognitum) or as the means of knowing (ratio cognoscendi).  
He argues that the divine exemplars are only understood in the second sense in the 
present life, even though they will be known in the first way in the state of beatitude.  
According to Henry, the divine exemplars of Being, unity, truth, and goodness are 
imprinted or poured upon the mind through special illumination.  These uncreated 
exemplars ‘check’ the truth of the exemplars that have been created by the mind and 
thus confirm that they are absolutely certain.860   
 In summary, Henry holds that the mind can apprehend that an object is true as 
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well as its truth by purely natural means, that is, by abstracting a created exemplar 
from sense objects, a posteriori.  To know pure truth with infallible certitude, 
however, the mind must cognize its objects by attending from an a priori divine 
exemplar to an empirical instance of the exemplar, which is something that must be 
made possible by the special divine illumination of uncreated exemplars.861  
Although knowledge by illumination does not necessarily alter the content of the 
idea the mind produces of its own accord, it is required to stabilize the ground on 
which the idea rests. 
 By presenting distinctions between purely natural and special knowledge, two 
kinds of truth, and two kinds of exemplar, Henry found a complex way to say that 
the illumination received through the eternal reasons does not concur in the process 
of cognition as Bonaventure supposed but only acts as the final guarantor of 
cognitive certitude.  In doing this, he sought to give an account of knowledge and 
illumination recognizably consistent with Bonaventure’s, yet which was not given to 
ontologism and did not threaten to undermine the autonomy of the intellect.  Once he 
had formulated it, he could honestly say with the Seraphic Doctor that divine 
illumination is the condition of possibility of all certain knowledge.  
KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 
Henry’s views on the knowledge of God are closely related to his account of 
natural or ordinary knowledge and the role of illumination in it.862  In fact, natural 
knowledge by illumination as he understands it turns out to be convertible with the 
knowledge of God.863  When illumination pours eternal reasons into the mind in 
order to afford absolutely certain knowledge of beings, Henry writes, it 
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simultaneously fosters knowledge of beings as they reflect an idea of God.  Because 
they are exactly patterned after the divine ideas that are God, beings directly even if 
finitely reveal something of the divine Being, as per the univocal concept of being 
Henry basically presupposes.864 
Although Henry admits that the infinite Being is unknowable in Himself 
owing to the gap that separates the finite from the infinite, he nonetheless insists that 
the existence of that Being is grasped each time an illumined mind grasps the 
existence of any finite being.  From an illumined perspective, the existence of finite 
beings assumes the existence of an infinite Being who is the sum total of all actually 
and possibly existing finite beings.865  For this reason, it is not possible to fail to infer 
from creatures that God exists.   
Since every being’s essence is a direct representation of some finite facet of 
the divine essence, moreover, Henry indicates that illumined knowledge of what a 
creature is simultaneously provides positive knowledge of something that God is.  
Whatever is understood about the existence and essence of a creature, in summary, 
confirms something about the existence and essence of God in virtue of the univocal 
relation of beings to Being.  According to Henry, it is only because God’s existence 
and essence can be fully grasped by finite means in the present that He can be 
ultimately known in the fullness of His infinitude.866 
Though the knowledge of God Henry describes is occasioned by the 
knowledge of creatures, Henry stresses that it originates in what is proper to the 
illumined mind, or in the eternal reasons.  For Henry as for Bonaventure and 
Avicenna, the a posteriori or cosmological proof for God’s existence follows from 
the proof that is a priori or ontological.  Conversely, the plausibility of the 
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cosmological proofs is guaranteed by the ontological one.  Because the latter does 
not depend upon the senses but on what comes to the intellect from above, Henry 
claims that it can achieve infallible certitude and that it therefore provides the ‘most 
perfect’ basis for proving God’s existence from creatures.867  
In the twenty-first article of his Summa, Henry indicates that the discussion of 
God’s existence and essence he is about to undertake is the most important in the 
whole work.  Yet he also affirms that the preceding articles on the possibility and 
nature of knowledge laid a foundation for the present line of inquiry which was 
essential.  In the preliminary questions on knowledge and illumination, Henry had 
attempted to prove the impossibility of attaining absolutely certain knowledge of 
empirical reality without recourse to the a priori eternal reasons that come from 
above.  Establishing that at the outset allowed him to affirm in his questions on the 
knowability of God’s existence and essence that the same holds true in the case of 
the knowledge of God: that it is not possible to know anything, much less God, 
unless one identifies the intuition of Being as the precondition of abstraction on the 
basis of beings.   
 By structuring his Summa as he did and arguing along these lines, Henry 
implicitly undermined the plausibility of Aquinas’ account of natural knowledge as 
well as his five ways to prove the existence and essence of God.  Aquinas’ had not 
discussed knowledge on the assumption that the mind enjoys a preliminary intuition 
of Being, much less God’s Being.  In fact, he had emphatically denied that the mind 
attains that intuition short of the beatific vision.  For him, one can only anticipate the 
experience of intuiting God in knowing by negation.  
In giving the definitive statement of Franciscan proofs for God’s existence, as 
Henry believes he does, the Solemn Doctor suggests that knowledge of God as 
Thomas understands it is not only inferior to the type of knowledge his account 
promises to give; he also implies that it is impossible to hold such knowledge with 
any certainty.  The theory of knowledge by negation is in all respects inferior by 
comparison to the Franciscan theory, which allows positive even if finite knowledge 
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to be obtained indubitably.868  The latter is the theory Henry claims can be found in 
the writings of Augustine, Anselm, and Avicenna. 
 By Henry’s time, an attitude of opposition towards Aquinas had become 
pervasive amongst Franciscans.  Towards the end of Bonaventure’s life, Franciscans 
had already begun to grow uneasy about Aquinas’ work.  In particular, they regarded 
his doctrine of double truth as a threat to their outlook and to the Christian faith more 
generally.  After Aquinas’ death, it would seem that Franciscans began campaigning 
against him.869  Historical records indicate that some important ‘doctors of Sacred 
Scripture’ in Paris began to complain to the Pope that erroneous ideas were being 
taught in the university.870  In response, the Pope asked Etienne Tempier, the Bishop 
of Paris and a great Franciscan sympathizer, to investigate the situation.  Although 
the Pope had merely requested a preliminary investigation, Tempier almost 
immediately issued the condemnation of 1277 on his own authority, without 
consulting the Holy Father, although there is no evidence that the Pope frowned upon 
this decision.     
 Recent research has shown that Aquinas was strongly implicated in some of the 
219 articles that were condemned and that the condemnation may even have been an 
attempt to invalidate his system.871  It is likely that Tempier and his advisors had 
already drawn up a list of articles to condemn when the Pope sent his request.  When 
he finally reported the condemnation to the Pope, Tempier wrote that he had sought 
the advice of those aforementioned ‘doctors of Sacred Scripture’, most likely 
Franciscans, and especially that of Henry of Ghent, when he was drafting the 
condemnation.872  Although Aquinas’ reputation would eventually be cleared by 
papal decree in 1325, Franciscans had the chance in the meantime to make many 
trend-setting intellectual moves.873  Because of his implicit and explicit efforts to 
undermine the authority of Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent deserves much of the 
                                                
868 Stephen Dumont, “Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus,” 303. 
869 Etienne Gilson, History, 410.  
870 This account of the circumstances surrounding the condemnation of 1277 is drawn from John F. 
Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277,” The Modern Schoolman 72 (1995): 233-
72. 
871 Ibid. 
872 R. Wielockx, “Henry of Ghent and the Events of 1277,” in A Companion to Henry of Ghent, ed. 
Gordon Wilson (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming in 2009). 
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credit for creating this opportunity.874 
John Duns Scotus (1265/66-1308) 
KNOWLEDGE & DIVINE ILLUMINATION 
 John Duns Scotus was the Franciscan scholar that eliminated illumination 
from ordinary cognition once and for all.  The exposition of Scotus’ arguments 
against illumination I offer here is based on the text of his mature work, the 
Ordinatio.875  Like his teacher William of Ware, the Subtle Doctor frames his 
objections to illumination as a response to Henry of Ghent.876  Hence, he begins his 
article on illumination with a summary of Henry’s account.877  Henry had argued that 
the uncreated exemplars received through illumination are essential for certitude 
because the objects that serve as the basis for the construction of a created exemplar 
are mutable, as is the knowing subject in which the exemplar inheres.   
Scotus’ strategy for invaliding Henry’s arguments for illumination involves 
demonstrating that the objects known and the knower are not in fact mutable.  In his 
opinion, the objects of knowledge must be inherently intelligible and the mind 
naturally equipped to perceive intelligibility if certitude is to be obtainable at all.  So 
long as Henry posits the concurrence of the divine light in any aspect of human 
                                                                                                                                     
873 John F. Wippel, “Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277,” 239.  
874 Stephen Dumont, “Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus,” 296. 
875 Scotus produced several versions of this text.  The earliest is the Lectura Oxoniensis, from which 
he taught at Oxford from around 1297 to 1301.  A second, revised draft of his Lectura is known as the 
Reportata Parisiensa, which was delivered at Paris.  The Ordinatio is the final version, which is also 
known as Scotus’ Opus oxoniense.  His question on illumination in the early Lectura can be found in 
Lectura in librum primum Sententiarum, vol. 16 (Vatican, 1960), 1.3.1.3.  The Ordinatio text can be 
found in Scotus’ Opera omnia (Vatican: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950), vol. 3, 1.3.1.4 (pp. 123-
72).  This section has been translated by Allan Wolter, O.F.M. under the title, “Concerning Human 
Knowledge,” in Duns Scotus: Philosophical Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987). 
876 See Jerome V. Brown, “John Duns Scotus on Henry of Ghent’s Arguments for Divine 
Illumination: The Statement of the Case,” Vivarium 13: 2 (1976): 94-112; idem., “John Duns Scotus 
on Henry of Ghent’s Theory of Knowledge,” The Modern Schoolman 56 (1978); idem., “Duns Scotus 
on the Possibility of Knowing Genuine Truth: The Reply to Henry of Ghent in the Lectura Prima and 
in the Ordinatio,” Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale 51 (1984): 136-82; Steven P. 
Marrone, “Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus on the Knowledge of Being,” Speculum 63:1 (1988): 22-
57. 
877 On William of Ware, see chapter five of Doyle’s The Disintegration of Divine Illumination and an 
edition of Ware’s question on illumination in Augustinus Daniels, “Wilhelm von Ware über das 
Menschliche Erkennen,” in Zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters Supplementband I & 2 
(Muenster: Aschendorflsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1913), qu. 18. 
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cognition whatsoever, he cannot truly affirm that the mind is competent to certainly 
know.878  For this reason, the Solemn Doctor invites scepticism with respect to the 
possibility of knowledge.   
 The arguments Scotus presents to prove the immutability of the objects known 
and the infallibility of the knower turn on the univocal concept of being he elucidates 
elsewhere.879  According to this concept, created beings exist finitely and materially, 
as the divine being exists infinitely and immaterially, that is, immutably.880  For this 
reason, thoughts and words can apply to created and divine beings in exactly the 
same sense.  In the question on illumination itself, the Subtle Doctor interprets 
Augustine’s illumination as his own theory of the univocity of being.881  On his 
account, the divine light permeates created reality in a general sense, inasmuch as it 
causes beings to exist in an immutable mode of being.  Through the divine light, 
creatures become manifestly knowable.882  What is known of them is known of God. 
Once he has recast Augustinian illumination along these lines, Scotus 
proceeds to argue that the human mind is intrinsically stable by appealing to its 
primary or intuitive knowledge of being.883   The key and characteristically subtle 
move he makes in this regard is to construe the intuition of being and the 
transcendentals which earlier Franciscan thinkers had contended comes through 
illumination as an entirely natural feature of the mind.  In arguing this, the Subtle 
Doctor collapses the Solemn Doctor’s supernatural way of knowing into the natural 
power to know.  He altogether eliminates the divine concursus in ordinary cognition.  
For Scotus, the intuition of being performs much the same function it had in 
the thought of Bonaventure and Henry.  As opposed to a distinct type of knowledge 
                                                
878 John Duns Scotus, “Concerning Human Knowledge,” 104. 
879 See Scotus’ Opera omnia, vol. 4, Ordinatio 1.8.3 (pp. 205-7); translated by Wolter under the title 
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change even where forms were defined in a ‘fixed’ sense, it is worth mentioning that the doctrine was 
declared unsound in 1311, even though the concept of beings as fixed remained.  See Etienne Gilson, 
History, 344. 
881 John Duns Scotus, “Concerning Human Knowledge,” 115. 
882 Ibid., 123. 
883 See Basil Heiser, O.F.M., “The Primum Cognitum According to Duns Scotus,” Franciscan Studies 
23:2 (1942): 193-216. 
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or conceptual content per se, it represents a built-in intellectual capacity to check the 
truth and certitude of the ideas the mind generates in abstraction.884  Naturally, 
Scotus understands abstraction in the Avicennian-Franciscan sense as the act in 
which the intellect derives from a phantasm or sense species the knowledge of its 
unchanging essence or quiddity, namely, an intelligible species.885   
Although Scotus believes the abstractive faculties are competent to infer an 
intelligible species from a sense species, he does not think they can at once account 
for their own ability to obtain perfect and complete, that is, immediate, knowledge of 
a reality.  For Scotus, this is exactly the responsibility of intuitive cognition, which 
guarantees the veracity and certitude of abstract concepts and therefore saves 
abstractive knowledge from scepticism.886  Because it equips the intellect to 
immediately grasp its objects, Scotus concludes that the intuitive capacity is what 
ultimately befits the mind for the immediate vision of God.887 
In the question on illumination, Scotus invokes his distinction between 
abstractive and intuitive cognition in stressing that the mind is naturally equipped to 
achieve certain knowledge of truth and thus to establish that there is no need for the 
divine concurrence in any aspect of human cognition whatsoever.888  On account of 
the univocal nature of being, he concludes that the objects of knowledge are stable 
and that their significance is therefore self-evident.  Owing to the intellect’s intuitive 
knowledge of the being that encompasses all beings, moreover, the mind is suited to 
immediately grasp what it knows now and eventually God.  Indeed, things are 
structured such that the intellect cannot help but do so. 
                                                
884 For Scotus’ discussion of and distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition, see the 
relevant sections of his Ordinatio that have been translated by Hyman and Walsh in Philosophy in the 
Middle Ages (Indiana: Hackett, 1983), 1.1.1.2, 2.3.2.2. 
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888 John Duns Scotus, “Concerning Human Knowledge,” 121-2; Stephen D. Dumont, “Theology as a 
Science and Duns Scotus’ Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” Speculum 64:3 
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KNOWLEDGE OF GOD 
Unlike his Franciscan and Dominican predecessors, Scotus concentrates on 
producing just one proof for the knowability of God’s existence and essence.  
Although he composed numerous drafts of this proof, its basic structures remain 
constant.889  On the assumption that being is the first thing the mind intuits naturally 
as opposed to supernaturally, as Henry had thought, Scotus elevates Henry’s a 
posteriori approach to proof to the level of a priori perfection.  Not unlike Henry, he 
observes that there are many different finite beings and states that it seems possible 
that an infinite Being exists which includes all these finite beings.  On the grounds 
that the nature of being is univocal, such that created beings enjoy the same mode of 
immutable being finitely that the divine being enjoys infinitely, Scotus concludes 
that what is possible is also necessary.  Since all people have a natural intuition of 
being, moreover, they can naturally see that an infinite Being must exist, simply by 
considering finite beings and drawing an inference to the existence of the infinite 
Being.890   
Scotus claims his proof for God’s existence is consistent with Anselm’s 
argument, according to which the Being ‘than which nothing greater can be thought’ 
must exist in reality if it exists in thought, since God is what it is best to be, which is 
to exist.891  Like Henry, Scotus adds that the existing beings which establish the 
existence of Being also reveal aspects of His essence by way of their own 
essences.892  Although he admits that the quiddity of God Himself cannot be fully 
grasped in this life, because it is infinite, positive if limited aspects of His quiddity 
are understood whenever the quiddity of a creature univocally related to Him is 
perceived.  
                                                
889 This is according to Allan B. Wolter in “The Existence and Nature of God” in The Philosophical 
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When he collapsed Henry’s supernatural way of acquiring infallibly certain 
knowledge into the intrinsic abilities of the mind, Scotus invested the mind with a 
natural power to discern from creatures that God exists and to see what He is like.  
He formulated for the first time a truly natural theology.  Even so, Scotus maintains a 
place for what he calls the ‘supernatural’ knowledge of God, or knowledge by 
special illumination.893  Supernatural knowledge is primarily knowledge that God is 
Triune and that He is the creative source and end of all things.  Though all human 
agents act towards an end, Scotus notes that most have no definite idea of what the 
end is.894  Nor do they know what is required of them in order to reach that end.895  
Human beings have no natural inclination towards the supernatural, Scotus 
concludes, because there is absolutely nothing supernatural about nature.896  If 
human beings are oriented in any sense towards the supernatural, it is only inasmuch 
as the one who gives the natural powers is supernatural.897 
For this reason, Scotus insists that all propositional knowledge of God’s 
nature and His status as the end of human life “must be given in a supernatural 
manner.”898  That is to say, supernatural knowledge must be bestowed as a result of 
God’s benevolent will to impart it; similarly, it must be received through a 
spontaneous response to Him on the part of the human will.  For Scotus, a personal 
response to God is emphatically not a rational matter but a matter of the will.899  To 
have faith that God is Triune and that He is the goal of human life is to take a leap 
beyond reason.900  Although reason is abandoned in the leap the will makes in faith, 
Scotus does not think it is denigrated in the same instance but perfected, because it 
thereby attains to the love of God.  
                                                
893 This question has been translated by Allan Wolter, O.F.M. in his article, “Duns Scotus on the 
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Olivi, Ghent, and Scotus the Augustinians? 
Peter Olivi, Henry of Ghent, and John Duns Scotus all claimed to accurately 
represent the meaning of Augustine’s views on illumination in presenting their 
own.901  With the exception of Scotus, they are often believed.  Challenging this 
belief, I have shown that Scotus responds to Henry who responds to Olivi who works 
with Bonaventure’s theory of knowledge by divine illumination in mind.  
Bonaventure conceived of divine illumination as the source of eternal reasons which 
supervise human acts of knowing to ensure their truth and certitude.  Although he 
had intentionally construed illumination as an extrinsic influence for the sake of 
accounting for the mind’s intimacy with God and absolute dependence on Him, his 
successors quickly identified the philosophical inconsistencies in this account.  To 
Olivi’s mind, the concursus of illumination, when coupled with the Franciscan 
standard of immediate knowledge, gives way to the error of ontologism.  
Furthermore, it reduces cognition to a zero-sum game in which human beings 
effectively compete with God for the chance to perform acts which they should 
seemingly perform of their own accord.   
Since Augustine never conceived of illumination as an extrinsic and 
interfering influence but as an intrinsic or empowering one, his account is not subject 
to the accusations that the grace of illumination undermines the integrity of nature or 
leads to ontologism.  Because Bonaventure’s was, Franciscans after him faced the 
challenge of promulgating his tradition of thought even while eradicating the 
inconsistencies in it.  Henry of Ghent made an initial attempt by removing the 
influence of the divine light from the knowing process.  In doing this, he avoided 
ontologism and preserved the integrity of the intellect even while maintaining an 
essential role for illumination in cognition as the final guarantor of certitude.   
Henry’s attempt to significantly reduce the concurrence of the divine light did 
not satisfy Scotus, who held that any concurrence whatsoever threatens the integrity 
of the intellect and therefore undermines the possibility of knowledge.  On these 
grounds, Scotus eradicated illumination and proceeded to explain how human beings 
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are naturally competent to fulfil all the intellectual responsibilities they formerly 
shared with God, on account of an intuitive knowledge of Being which is not 
illumined but intrinsic.   
In the end, Franciscan thinkers obtained an account of the human cognitive 
power as an intrinsic one; they got what Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas always 
had.  Yet their understanding of the intrinsic power differed greatly from the one the 
three Augustinians presupposed.  It was an understanding that can be traced back to 
Bonaventure.  Even though they reconsidered or rejected his views on illumination, 
Olivi, Ghent, and Scotus did not question the standard of knowledge that had been 
set by the Seraphic Doctor.  They only sought to remove philosophical 
inconsistencies from it.  Their attempts to recast illumination in various ways were 
motivated by the desire to uphold the Franciscan concept of knowledge they held in 
common.  
By affirming this, I by no means wish to imply that Olivi, Henry, Scotus and 
their contemporaries held exactly the same views on all matters pertaining to 
knowledge.  This clearly was not the case.  Olivi, for instance, rejects the intelligible 
species, while Scotus insists upon it.  Bonaventure and Henry argue that the intuitive 
knowledge of being that makes the mind adequate to know reality comes from God, 
where Scotus contends that it is built into the very fabric of human nature.   
Although these are admittedly differences in perspective, one can see that the 
spirit of Franciscan thought remains fairly constant through the changes.  The 
intuitive knowledge of being is always considered fundamental to abstraction, no 
matter whether it is thought to come supernaturally or naturally.  Furthermore, 
abstraction is consistently conceived in an originally Avicennian fashion, as the 
immediate knowledge of a totalized essence, whether or not the intelligible species is 
said to enter into it. 
Such views on human knowledge originally derived from broader theological 
and metaphysical assumptions that were drawn from Richard of St. Victor and 
                                                                                                                                     
901 Raymond Macken, O.F.M., “Henry of Ghent and Augustine,” in Ad litteram: Authoritative Texts 
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Avicenna, respectively, in the attempt to articulate positions that expressed 
Franciscan ideals.  The abandonment of illumination as Bonaventure understood it 
was not at once an abandonment of those ideals or the philosophical assumptions that 
were formed because of them.  Rather, it is indicative of the Franciscans’ 
commitment to advancing their ideals by removing internal contradictions and 
carrying them to their logical conclusions.  The same idea of knowledge lies latent in 
Franciscan thought from the start to the end of the thirteenth century.  Like all ideas, 
it simply takes time to emerge. 
Scholars have a habit of sharply distinguishing between early and late 
thirteenth-century Franciscan schools of thought.902   Members of the early school 
supposedly upheld classic Augustinian views, especially illumination, which later 
thinkers rejected.  Bonaventure is considered the chief representative of the early 
school, where Scotus is described as the leader of the later school which turned in 
new philosophical directions.  In contrast to this view, I have stressed that there is 
tremendous continuity of thought amongst thirteenth-century Franciscan thinkers.  
On my reading, Bonaventure and Duns Scotus do not present their readers with 
mutually exclusive systems.  Rather, their work represents different phases in the 
gradual emergence of a philosophy that is based on Franciscan ideals and purged of 
internal contradictions.   
From my perspective, late thirteenth-century Franciscans did not reject the 
early Franciscan views formulated by Bonaventure so much as they gradually settled 
on what Franciscans always inchoately thought, adjusting their uses of sources, 
terms, and arguments in the process.  The fact that such adjustments were made 
should not lead the scholar to conclude that fundamental shifts in underlying 
meaning were simultaneously taking place.  When the relevant texts are examined 
with a view to the theological source of significance, one can attend from varying 
forms of philosophical argumentation to shared assumptions; and if there are 
assumptions that have hardly changed in the whole history of the Franciscan 
                                                
902 See Ewert Cousins, Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites, 5; Christopher Cullen, 
Bonaventure, 2; Bert Roest, A History of Franciscan Education (Boston: Brill, 2000).   
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intellectual tradition since Bonaventure, they are assumptions about the structure of 
Trinitarian theology and the primacy of Christ.903 
These conclusions bear directly on my assessment of the researches of Doyle 
and Marrone concerning the thirteenth-century decline of illumination theory.  Doyle 
took the work of Etienne Gilson as the point of departure for his study of the 
disintegration of divine illumination theory in the thought of Peter of Trabes, Richard 
of Middleton, and William of Ware.  Gilson had spoken of an Augustinian complex 
of inseparable doctrines that virtually all Franciscan thinkers espoused in the 
thirteenth century.904   Some of these doctrines were the plurality of substantial 
forms, essentialism, the convertibility of existence and essence in creatures, the 
formal distinction, and of course, divine illumination.  
Doyle’s project was to determine whether the doctrines were in fact 
inseparable in the thought of the figures that are the focus of his study.  In other 
words, he set out to see whether the rejection of divine illumination entailed the 
rejection of the other doctrines in the complex.  Doyle found that it did not and 
confessed that he was surprised by this discovery.  Since he supposed that all the 
doctrines in the complex were truly Augustinian as Gilson indicated, he thought it 
odd that one doctrine could so suddenly be eliminated after it had been considered 
indispensable for centuries.   
Doyle does not seem to recognize that the doctrines in Gilson’s ‘Augustinian’ 
complex are not Augustinian but distinctly Franciscan and originally Avicennian.  
The research presented here has revealed that illumination remained a feature of 
Franciscan thought only so long as it helped Franciscans achieve their principal 
objective of articulating and advancing Franciscan ideals, and no longer.  Once it 
became clear that illumination made it impossible to affirm the other doctrines in the 
Franciscan complex in a consistent manner, it had to be abandoned.  From this 
perspective, it comes as no surprise that late thirteenth-century Franciscans such as 
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Peter, Richard, and William, who rejected illumination, also held fast to their other 
philosophical assumptions, for it was those very assumptions that rendered 
illumination untenable.  
Marrone also takes the work of Etienne Gilson as the point of departure for 
his study of illumination in ten thirteenth-century thinkers.  It is partially for that 
reason that he construes the theory of knowledge by illumination Augustine espoused 
as an unsystematic and mystical one.  Although Marrone acknowledges that the 
‘illiterate’ people of the early Middle Ages were content with such an account, its 
inferiority quickly became obvious once Aristotle’s works on cognition were 
introduced.905   
In view of the threat Aristotle posed to the authority of Augustine, Marrone 
explains that ‘ultra-conservative’ Augustinians, most notably Bonaventure, put forth 
a concerted effort to systematize Augustine’s theory of knowledge.  Other 
Augustinians such as Henry of Ghent realized the inadequacy of his attempt and 
proposed other possibilities.  Eventually, Augustinians acknowledged the futility of 
their efforts.  In the thought of Duns Scotus, Augustinian illumination was finally 
abandoned and the Aristotelian ideal of knowledge came to prevail.  This is exactly 
the ideal which Marrone insists that modern thinkers adopted.  Because such 
different interpretations of illumination were presented by the ten thirteenth-century 
Augustinians whose thought Marrone examines, the author concludes that there is no 
continuity of thought in the ‘Augustinian’ school.  What bound thirteenth-century 
Augustinians together in his opinion was not shared assumptions concerning the 
nature knowledge, but an appreciation for the same metaphors.906   
Marrone fails to recognize that there is a difference between Augustinian and 
Franciscan thought.  He conflates the illumination accounts of Augustine and 
Bonaventure, and he does so without making any attempt to come to a resolution as 
to what Augustine or any other pre-thirteenth-century thinker actually meant by 
illumination.  From my perspective, these oversights give rise to numerous problems 
in his account of the thirteenth-century decline of illumination theory.   
                                                
905 Steven P. Marrone, The Light of Thy Countenance, vol. 1, 11.  
906 Ibid., 16. 
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In the first place, Marrone’s lack of awareness of any difference between 
Augustinian and Franciscan thought leads him to misconstrue the place of Aristotle 
in thirteenth-century thought.  Contrary to what Marrone supposes, the revolutionary 
cognitive ideal that brought about the rejection of illumination was not Aristotelian 
but Avicennian.  That ideal did not come from outside the allegedly Augustinian 
tradition but from within it.  It was not a genuinely Augustinian ideal but was one 
consistent with Franciscan ideals.  Although Marrone depicts the Franciscans as 
conservatives, desperate to preserve a longstanding tradition, they were in fact 
innovators grounding a novel theory of knowledge on the authority of trusted 
thinkers.  While that theory of knowledge is admittedly incompatible with 
Aristotle’s, the Augustinian theory is not as Marrone believes.   
For this reason, it is inaccurate to conclude as Marrone does that the decline 
of divine illumination theory was directly proportional to the rise of an Aristotelian 
cognitive ideal.  The research I have presented shows that the demise of illumination 
was gradually brought about by the emergence of the Avicennian-Franciscan ideal 
from under the guise of Augustinian illumination in the hands of figures like Olivi, 
Ghent, and Scotus.  All this escapes Marrone’s notice because he does not take note 
of the difference between Augustinian and Franciscan thought in his treatment of 
thirteenth-century Augustinians, and he makes no attempt to understand what the 
thought of Augustine actually entails.  
Marrone comes to his conclusions because he takes the usual interpretive 
approach of a Medieval historian and reads thirteenth-century arguments concerning 
illumination at face value.  He fails to identify what Augustine meant by illumination 
or the difference between Augustine himself and thirteenth-century ‘Augustinians’ 
on illumination because he does not take into consideration that Medieval thinkers 
employed philosophical sources and arguments for theological reasons and assigned 
them theologically-determined connotations.  Unfortunately, these interpretive 
methods cause him to misidentify the cause of the decline of divine illumination 
theory as well as the late Medieval sources of modern thought.   
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Franciscan and Modern Thought 
 In recent years, many scholars have begun to inquire into the late Medieval 
sources of modern thought, especially those that can be detected in the Franciscan 
intellectual tradition.  Although much of the discussion centres on John Duns Scotus, 
it is possible to identify the structures of thought many would recognize as 
prototypically modern emerging as early as Bonaventure.  Though this claim may 
come as a surprise to those that regard the Seraphic Doctor as the last representative 
of Medieval Augustinianism, the investigations made here have indicated that Scotus 
mainly made explicit what was latent in Bonaventure, in the course of eradicating the 
contradictions in his and similar systems.   
 The connection between Franciscan and modern thought has been made on 
both philosophical and theological levels, not to mention socio-political ones.  It has 
been argued that Scotus effectively extracted grace from nature and created a 
previously unimagined realm of ‘pure nature’ when he collapsed whatever was 
supernatural into the natural.907  In the case of knowledge, the collapse occurred 
when the Subtle Doctor eliminated the extrinsic influence of illumination from 
account of ordinary cognition. 
By eradicating Christ’s concursus in cognition, Scotus denied that God’s 
primary causality bears in any way on the secondary causation of human beings.908  
While the influentia model allowed Augustinians to affirm that God’s primary 
causality is indirectly and inoffensively active in secondary causation inasmuch as it 
imparts the power to act as a secondary cause, the concursus model made causality 
seem like a zero-sum competition.  It thus engendered a perceived need to construe 
divine causality as an all or nothing affair.  In the effort to preserve the autonomy and 
integrity of the intellect, Scotus opted for nothing.  He thus evacuated the 
supernatural from the natural and created the realm of ‘pure nature’.909 
 What he left when he eliminated the concursus was the basic concept of 
nature, or the natural intellectual power, which Franciscans had always presupposed.  
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909 Ibid., 218.  
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On that concept, the human subject has an intrinsic and fully actualized power to 
cognize realities in an immediate manner, or to discern the exact correlation between 
thought and reality, and to do so with absolute certitude.  The subject simply needs to 
turn to itself to see that its powers provide the perfectly adequate foundation for all 
knowledge. 
While Bonaventure had attributed this tremendous intellectual power to the 
concursus of Christ, Scotus saw it as one that is built into the very fabric of human 
nature.  Bonaventure’s extremely self-deprecating humility thus gave rise to the 
opposite extreme of unjustified intellectual pride.  Scotus placed so much confidence 
in reason, in fact, that he affirmed the possibility of giving ontological and 
cosmological proofs for God’s existence without recourse to revelation.  Since he 
was among the first to affirm this, Scotus can likewise be listed among the founders 
of the discipline of natural theology. 
Although Scotus refuses the concursus of Christ in natural knowledge, he still 
allows the Son’s extrinsic influence in the acquisition of the supernatural knowledge 
of God.  In fact, he newly defines grace in an extrinsic sense.910  In this sense, grace 
does not operate whenever the nature which is received through grace actively 
operates.  Rather, it is passively received conceptual content concerning God, which 
has little to no bearing on natural operations.  While knowledge of nature is a totally 
rational matter, in the way described above, faith in God is entirely a matter of the 
will to love Him.  Faith, in other words, entails a leap over, against, and beyond 
reason.   
In Scotus and already in Bonaventure, the Augustinian program of knowing 
God by negation was being rendered obsolete.911  It was being replaced by a 
distinctly Franciscan understanding of the knowledge of God.  In Scotus, at least, it 
was replaced by a natural theology in which rational proofs for God’s existence are 
given without recourse to faith, on the one hand, and, on another, a Christian faith in 
the Triune, Incarnate God, which is not a rational matter.  Augustinians have been 
                                                
910 Ibid., 229.   
911 Catherine Pickstock describes this development as the loss of ‘an integrally conceptual and 
mystical path’ in “Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary Significance,” Modern Theology 
21:4 (Oct 2005): 548. 
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falsely accused of making the separation between reflection on God’s existence and 
essence and ordinary life, especially a life of faith.  However, this move appears to 
have been enabled in the Franciscan tradition of thought.   
Such a separation was made at the same time the extremes of rationalism—or 
reason without faith—and fideism—or faith without reason—were being created 
along the lines described above, extremes which Bonaventure appears to have 
anticipated in giving his absolute definitions of knowledge and love.  Such are the 
extremes which quintessentially modern thinkers assumed.  By some accounts, in 
fact, modernity is merely the extension of this particular middle ages.912  In his 
Meditations, for example, the rationalist philosopher Descartes makes his infamous 
turn to the subject, espouses a representational theory of knowledge, exhibits an 
unprecedented occupation with certitude and scepticism, and develops his own 
version of the ontological proof. Around the same time, Blaise Pascal formulates his 
famous wager, daring his readers to take the arbitrary leap of faith.913   
There are undoubtedly affinities between late Medieval Franciscan and 
modern thought.  At present, I can only gesture towards them, and I certainly cannot 
detail all that has been said both positively and negatively about the originally 
Franciscan ideas that had an impact on modern thinkers.914  Even so, I do wish to 
pursue a line of inquiry in the last pages of this thesis which would make it possible 
to return to the above issues in the future and which anticipates by that same token an 
account of the relevance of this inquiry into the history of divine illumination theory 
for efforts to identify the sources and structures of modern epistemology, its virtues, 
its problems, and ways to overcome them.   
                                                
912 Catherine Pickstock, “Modernity and Scholasticism: A Critique of Recent Invocations of 
Univocity,” Antonianum 78 (2003): 33. 
913 Etienne Gilson notes the relation between Franciscan thought and that of Descartes and Pascal in 
History, 48, 174, 459, 650. 
914 Criticisms of Scotus  have come from those with ‘Radically Orthodox’ sensibilities.  See Catherine 
Pickstock, “Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary Significance,” 543-74; idem., “Modernity 
and Scholasticism,” 3-46.  In addition to Franciscan scholars themselves, Richard Cross regards 
Franciscan thought in a very positive light; see Cross’ “Where angels Fear to Tread: Duns Scotus and 
Radical Orthodoxy,” Antonianum 76 (2001): 1-36; see also Mary Beth Ingham, “Re-situating Scotist 
Thought,” Modern Theology 21:4 (2005): 609-18; Marilyn McCord Adams, in various works; Robert 
Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages, passim; Thomas Williams, “The Doctrine of 
Univocity of True and Salutory,” Modern Theology 21:4 (2005): 575-85. 
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The line of inquiry that interests me at present concerns the extent to which 
one can even speak of a relationship between Franciscan and modern thought.  The 
chapters of this thesis obliquely indicate that thirteenth-century Franciscans, 
especially Bonaventure, did not use their ideas as modern thinkers used them.  They 
did not ask their questions as modern thinkers have asked them.  Take, for example, 
the Franciscan concern regarding the possibility of knowledge and the ‘threat’ of 
scepticism.  For Bonaventure and even Duns Scotus, this was not really a live 
concern.  The two took certitude as a given and simply sought to explain why it is a 
given.915  In their view, certitude can only be seen as a given when knowledge is 
defined along Franciscan lines.  To assert this was to legitimize the Franciscan 
intellectual life.  The preoccupation with cognitive certitude was not indicative of a 
genuine concern regarding scepticism.  Instead, the problem of certitude was 
deliberately introduced in the effort Bonaventure in particular made to exonerate the 
Franciscan order of accusations that were being levelled against it by those that 
questioned the viability of its intellectual life. 
The recognizably proto-modern ‘subjective turn’ that originally takes place in 
the writings of Bonaventure, to take another example, is not a characteristically 
modern turn, inasmuch as the turn is to the source of divine help within.  
Furthermore, it does not seem plausible to locate the source of rationalism and 
fideism in the Franciscan tradition, inasmuch as the Franciscans were not rationalists 
nor fideists themselves.  Even if they defined faith, reason, and their inter-
relationship in ways that would enable others to create those extremes, they did not 
assume the extremes nor did they worry in the modern way whether faith and reason 
defined in an extreme sense can be reconciled.  Franciscan definitions of faith and 
reason were offered for the sake of giving systematic expression to Francis’ 
experience and validating it in an academic setting, in the case of Bonaventure, and 
making Franciscan thought consistent, in that of Scotus.  Albeit in their own way, 
thirteenth-century Franciscans saw faith and reason as reconcilable and as reconciled. 
These examples underscore the fact that Franciscan ideas served purposes in 
the Franciscan context which are distinguishable from the purposes they had in the 
                                                
915 Katherine H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 76. 
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modern context.  In the Franciscan tradition itself, for instance, the emphasis on the 
primacy of love highlighted that human endeavours really do amount to nothing if 
not motivated by love.  Ideas that are meant to help can cause harm if they are not 
utilized in the desire to serve.  Words are meaningless if one does not substantiate 
them with actions, and changing one’s behaviour goes hand-in-hand and even ahead 
of changing one’s mind.   
Additionally, the theory concerning the a priori knowledge of the 
transcendentals held Franciscans to a high standard of purity and integrity and 
encouraged personal commitment to Christ.  Within the Franciscan and thus the 
Christian context, Franciscan ideals encouraged the friars and their followers to lead 
holy and selfless lives of service out of love for Christ.  They did so in the Middle 
Ages, and they still do.  For these reasons, it does not seem fair to affirm that the 
ideas drawn from the Franciscan tradition which had a detrimental impact in 
modernity are problematic in themselves.  They clearly are not, even if they become 
problematic when they are removed from their original context and utilized for 
purposes the Franciscans never intended.   
This appears to have been the fate of Franciscan thought in some modern 
systems of thought.  Insofar as they never intended or foresaw those developments, 
however, Franciscans cannot be held responsible for modern developments.  As 
Olivier Boulnois has argued, it is essential to differentiate between the project of 
conducting a genealogy of modern thought, and the project of determining where the 
responsibility for modern developments lies.916   
In light of Boulnois’ observation, it only seems justifiable to hold Franciscan 
thinkers accountable for the consequences of their ideas in an indirect sense, that is, 
to the extent they had already begun to use Franciscan ideas in a context and for a 
purpose for which they were not intended.  Bonaventure appears to have done this 
                                                
916 See Olivier Boulnois, “Reading Duns Scotus: From History to Philosophy,” trans. F.C. 
Bauerschumidt in Modern Theology 21:4 (2005): 603-8.  In his Être et représentation and Duns Scot, 
la rigueur de la charité (Paris: Le Cerf, 1998), Boulnois traces the rise of modern ‘onto-theology’ and 
voluntarism, respectively.  Though he recognizes Duns Scotus as a pivotal figure in Western 
philosophical history along with proponents of Radical Orthodoxy, he stresses the importance of 
distinguishing genealogical work on modernity such as his own from the project of identifying the 
‘inventors’ of modernity and repairing the problems they created. 
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when he utilized Franciscan ideals, which were intended to promote moral purity and 
service within a Christian context, and more specifically, amongst those that had 
committed themselves to a life of Franciscan ministry, and transformed them into a 
normative cognitive standard, for the sake of legitimizing the Franciscan presence in 
the academic context.   
However he may have attempted to justify this effort as one that is conducive 
to the fulfilment of Francis’ wishes, it patently was not.917  Francis had called his 
followers to serve the poor and downtrodden, at the expensive of involvement in 
academic life.  In arguing to the contrary and going even further to transform 
Franciscan principles which were meant to support and motivate a particular sort of 
ministerial life into a universally applicable philosophical standard, Bonaventure had 
already begun to de-contextualize the Franciscan vision.   
Although Bonaventure could not have known the future outcome of his 
efforts, he was not without recourse to an objective perspective.  Augustine had long 
since explained the sense in which objectivity can be obtained, namely, by refusing 
to prize anything, even intellectual or spiritual goals, as the Highest Goods they 
cannot be.  An orientation towards the objective of knowing that Good which is 
common to all makes it possible to evaluate circumstances under consideration from 
a perspective that is objective, not because it is all-encompassing, but because it 
precludes attitudes like pride, envy, fear, and malice that motivate those that reduce 
the all-inclusive Good to a particular good that cannot encompass all.  In maintaining 
an orientation towards the common Good, Augustine affirmed, one lives in imitation 
of Christ.  Since there are as many ways of being oriented to the Father, through the 
Son in the Spirit as there are human spirits, every conceivable way of imitating 
Christ is opened up and encouraged by his account. 
In equating the imitation of Christ with the literal imitation of Francis, albeit 
a Francis whose ministerial guidelines had been redefined as philosophical ones, 
                                                
917 John Moorman goes so far as to say that Bonaventure never understood Francis’ vision at all in A 
History of the Franciscan Order, 140-41; see also E. Randolph Daniel, “St Bonaventure: A Faithful 
Disciple of St. Francis?  A Re-examination of the Question,” in Sanctus Bonaventura 1274-1974, vol. 
2 (1973): 170-87. To this same effect, J. Guy Bougerol quotes friar Jacopone da Todi, who famously 
proclaimed that “accursed Paris is destroying Assisi” (Introduction, 13). 
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Bonaventure restricted the range of possible ways to imitate Christ.  He made the 
ethical standard to which Francis held Franciscans an intellectual standard to which 
he thought all were subject.  In these ways, he de-contextualized the Franciscan 
vision and thus contributed indirectly to making later, larger efforts to do so possible.  
Though late Medieval Franciscans are not directly responsible for the modern 
misuses of their ideals, the problems that resulted from the abuses of their ideas 
remain.  There is the problem of proving that knowledge is possible, and how.  There 
is the problem of reconciling faith with reason.  There is the problem of re-
integrating considerations concerning God Himself and ordinary life.   These are 
problems the Augustinian intellectual tradition is particularly well suited to address, 
not because it is intrinsically superior to the Franciscan tradition but because it is a 
different type of tradition, with a broader purpose.   
Augustine’s purpose was to articulate an account of God that would enable 
those made in His image to make the best of whatever historical-philosophical 
situation presented itself and to show how the intellectual resources available in that 
situation can be appropriated in the interest of making faith in God intelligible to 
both the faithful and the faithless.  The purposes of Francis were far more specific.  
His concern was to give his followers the resources they required to live the life of 
poverty and service to which he had called them.  Francis never tried to explain how 
to deal with philosophical perspectives and problems.  He only advised Franciscans 
to avoid them, for the sake of staying focused on the tasks they had to hand.   
By contrast, it was Augustine’s intent to articulate a theory of knowledge 
with implicit instructions for embracing other philosophical perspectives and 
addressing philosophical problems.  In order to deal with the perspectives and 
problems that have arisen in consequence of the de-contextualization of Franciscan 
thought in modernity, I submit that contemporary scholars must find a way to do as 
Augustine did, which will require just as much faith, philosophical acumen and 
ingenuity as it did in the time of Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas.  They must find a 
contemporarily relevant way to articulate a theory of knowledge based on the 
Augustinian assumption that divine illumination is the condition of possibility of all 
human knowledge. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The main goal of this thesis was to identify why late thirteenth-century 
Franciscans abandoned the theory of knowledge by illumination they attributed to 
Augustine, after claiming to be his closest followers.  In order to identify the cause of 
the account’s decline, a great deal of preliminary work needed to be done.  In the 
first place, I deemed it necessary to determine what illumination meant in 
Augustine’s own thought.  The question regarding the function he assigns 
illumination in cognition is a controversial one which has yet to be fully resolved.   
Normally, Augustinian illumination is interpreted as an extrinsic influence, 
albeit in a number of different ways.  For this reason, it is set against Aquinas’ 
interpretation, according to which the divine light imparts an intrinsic power.  I 
suggested that the reason extrinsic interpretations of Augustine have prevailed has 
little to do with the fact that they accurately represent the bishop’s views on 
illumination and much to do with the fact that they reflect the view of revelation 
Augustine’s late Medieval and modern readers have needed him to hold in order for 
their own views to seem supportable. 
 For the sake of determining what Augustine’s view on the role of divine 
illumination really was, I reasoned it seemed best to begin my investigation by 
attending to the theological assumptions that underlie the account.  This is an 
approach that is not usually taken by interpreters of Augustine’s illumination theory, 
who tend to turn immediately to texts in which Augustine explicitly handles issues 
pertaining to knowledge and illumination.  There are a number of likely reasons why 
past scholars have not extensively analyzed Augustine’s illumination theory in its 
theological context, especially that which is provided by his De Trinitate.  In 
discussing Augustine, I mentioned the work of some recent scholars who have made 
such an analysis possible through their groundbreaking work on Augustine’s 
theological thought.  
 The Trinitarian doctrine presented in De Trinitate was the first one I 
considered in my study of Augustine.  This line of inquiry soon exposed the bishop’s 
understanding of the imago dei as an intrinsic intellectual gift and highlighted the 
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unifying nature of the cognitive work the intellect, as an image, performs.  By means 
of a cognitive process which resembles abstraction, Augustine explained that the 
intellect comes to increasingly participate subjectively in a universal objective order, 
which is God’s knowledge of Himself in all things.   
After establishing that, I turned to consider the effects of the fall and 
redemption on the image, as Augustine described them, and the process involved in 
re-conforming to the image of God as he outlined it.  This process was one of 
knowing by negation.  It required the knower to cultivate the skill of evaluating all 
the things that are ‘not God’ in view of the fact that they cannot make or break 
human happiness, since this can only be found in God, the Highest Good.  The seven 
psychological analogies Augustine presented in the second half of his treatise on the 
Trinity, I discovered, were designed to help the reader form a habit of reasoning in 
faith, and by these means, undergo the restoration of the image of God.   
The study of De Trinitate I conducted for the sake of comprehending the 
purpose of illumination established to my mind that it is a work with a specific 
pedagogical purpose.  In the first half, Augustine gave a straightforward presentation 
of his Trinitarian doctrine, or a positive theological account.  In the second half, he 
explained what is involved in applying the doctrine of the Trinity, or conforming to 
the image of God.  He gave a negative theological account.  In the first and second 
halves of the work, respectively, consequently, Augustine showed his readers how to 
directly and indirectly interpret the message of Scripture, in which God’s Triune 
nature is gradually revealed through the Person and work of His Son.  In short, He 
demonstrated how to imitate Christ. 
For Augustine, the imitation of Christ entailed the use of one’s intrinsic 
powers for their intended purpose, namely, to glorify the Father.  Illumination proved 
to be an illustration of the process of conforming to God’s image through which a 
person learned to do this, or to ‘be themselves’.  By outlining the process of 
conforming or illumination in his De Trinitate, Augustine instructed his readers in 
the way to harness all their abilities, indeed, the whole of the human spirit, in and for 
the purposes of faith.  Implicitly, my arguments along these lines gestured towards 
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the continuity that exists between the early ‘philosophical’ and later theological 
writings of Augustine.    
From Augustine, I turned to the eleventh century Benedictine Anselm of 
Canterbury.  Although scholars generally recognize that there is great continuity of 
thought between Augustine and Anselm, they are not always as clear when it comes 
to indicating wherein the continuity lies.  My goal was to locate the continuity of 
thought on illumination in Augustine and Anselm at the theological source of the 
continuity.  I went through the same steps in the chapter on Anselm as I did in 
Augustine, discussing the monk’s doctrine of God, the imago dei, the fall, 
redemption, and conformity to God’s image.  Although Anselm’s forms of 
argumentation differed fairly significantly from Augustine’s in most cases, I insisted 
that his decision to adopt new methods contributed to an effort to convey the sense of 
Augustine’s ideas in a way that was relevant to the concerns of his readers.  By these 
means, I determined that being an Augustinian means doing as Augustine does, not 
necessarily what Augustine does.   
In the Monologion and Proslogion, I found that Anselm did more or less as 
Augustine did in the two halves of his treatise on the Trinity.  He had the same 
theological-pedagogical project in mind when he composed the two tracts.  Inasmuch 
as Anselm speculatively articulated an Augustinian Trinitarian doctrine in the former 
and showed how to practically apply it in the latter, his two tracts can be classed 
together with De Trinitate in a single literary genre.   
Such conclusions proved particularly significant when it came to evaluating 
the Proslogion and the famous argument Anselm presents in it.  Though the 
argument is often described an a priori proof for God’s existence, at the expense of 
attending to what the whole of the treatise actually communicates, I showed that it is 
in fact a ‘formula’ for conforming to God’s image, a resource for engaging in 
knowledge by negation, not unlike Augustine’s psychological analogies.  Since 
Anselm testified that he received the argument in illumination and that its purpose is 
to increase illumination, I felt justified in concluding that illumination was for him, 
as it was for Augustine, an illustration of the process involved in conforming to the 
image of God.   
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After discussing Anselm, I traced the way divine illumination theory made 
the transition from the monastery to the university setting as it passed from the hands 
of Augustinians and Benedictines to Dominicans and above all Franciscans.  In this 
effort, it was essential to cover the twelfth-century translation movements and the 
early Franciscan scholarly use of new resources provided by Richard of St. Victor 
and Avicenna especially.  These researches highlighted how new theological and 
philosophical presuppositions appeared on the Western intellectual scene, at least in 
Franciscan thought, albeit in the disguise of traditional Augustinian and Anselmian 
arguments.   
The Franciscan thinker Bonaventure is virtually universally hailed the last 
great proponent of the Medieval Augustinian tradition.  This has much to do with the 
fact that Bonaventure consistently employed traditional Augustinian arguments and 
metaphors.  The Seraphic Doctor’s theory of knowledge by divine illumination, for 
instance, is commonly considered the hallmark of his Augustinianism.  Moreover, 
his place at the end of a line of traditional Augustinian thinkers is supposedly 
confirmed by his advocacy of Anselm’s ‘ontological’ argument.   
The contention I bolstered was that there is in fact a great difference between 
the Franciscan thought of Bonaventure, articulated in Augustinian terms, and 
genuinely Augustinian thought.  I sought to show that Bonaventure’s primary goal 
was to give systematic expression to St. Francis’ vision and even to transform the 
poverello’s experience into a normative cognitive standard, in the interest of 
addressing polemical issues he faced as the order’s Minister General.  Bonaventure’s 
appeals to the authority of Augustine, Anselm, and Pseudo-Dionysius should not be 
regarded as efforts to bolster their opinions, but to ground arguments in support of 
his innovative system in the way thirteenth-century scholastics went about doing this, 
namely, by invoking authorities.  The rationale behind the attempt I made to 
differentiate Bonaventure from Augustine was that this seemed likely to help me 
understand why Bonaventure’s successors rejected Augustinian illumination, even 
after he had so zealously championed it.  
In order to identify wherein the differences lie and what they are, I took the 
same approach to interpreting Bonaventure’s thought on illumination as I had done 
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in the cases of Augustine and Anselm.  That is to say, I interpreted his illumination 
account as a function of his Trinitarian theology.  On doing so, I found that the 
Victorine doctrine Bonaventure espoused generated an altogether unprecedented 
notion of the image of God and its cognitive operations.  From the beginning, 
Franciscans had turned to Avicenna for philosophical resources suited to explaining 
these matters.  For Bonaventure, who here betrayed the influence of Avicenna upon 
him, the human mind was the imago dei because it possessed an intuitive knowledge 
of Being, which enabled it to accurately and certainly conceive of beings inside, 
outside, and above itself.   
The intuition of being instilled in the human person the power to abstract as 
Avicenna had conceived abstraction, namely, as the act of extracting immediate 
knowledge of a fixed essence from one of its material instantiations.  Inasmuch as 
that intuitive knowledge was the result of an ongoing divine gift, however, the power 
to abstract was not entirely intrinsic or natural for Bonaventure.  It was part 
supernatural, so far as God concurred with the human mind to help it abstract its 
ideas.  In Bonaventure’s thought, illumination illustrated this extrinsic concurrence.  
Bonaventure often referred to the act of abstraction as contuition.  For him, to contuit 
was simply to determine the correspondence between the thought of a being in one’s 
own mind and the being as it was perfectly represented in the mind of God.   By 
contrast to Augustine, who understood knowledge as ‘objective participation’, 
Bonaventure construed cognition as ‘subjective representation’.  Such 
representational knowledge, in his view, gave direct or positive even if finite insight 
into the existence and essence of the infinite Being that is the sum total of all 
possibly and actually existing beings. 
To gain access to this great power of knowing, the mind simply had to reflect 
upon itself as the image of God, or reflect on its intuitive knowledge of Being, that 
makes the mind the adequate foundation or principle of all knowledge of beings.  
Since that Being is the divine Being, reflection upon it immediately confirms the 
existence of God, as through an ontological or a priori proof.  When he argued this, 
Bonaventure invoked Anselm’s argument and thus recast it along Avicennian lines, 
changing the way the ‘proofs’ for God’s existence were thenceforward conceived.  In 
Bonaventure’s thought, Anselm’s proof was not a conceptual resource for re-
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conforming to the image of God on the intellect but the means through which the 
mind gained access to immediate even if partial knowledge of God which it had 
never lost. 
On the basis of the assumption that the image of God was not effaced at the 
fall, Bonaventure implied that efforts to re-conform to it were unnecessary.  His 
famous treatise on Christ likeness is his Itinerarium.  This text is usually described as 
the last in a line of traditional Augustinian accounts of the mind’s ‘ascent’ into God.  
My aim in expositing this text was to demonstrate that the Seraphic Doctor did not in 
fact give a truly Augustinian explanation of the process involved in conforming to 
God’s image, and could not have done, inasmuch as he saw no need for conforming.  
Instead, the Seraphic Doctor articulated in a traditional format and trusted 
terms a totally unprecedented account of Christ likeness, according to which 
conformity to Christ is not a matter of the intellect and the will but of the will alone.  
The motivation for affirming this, and for offering ‘absolute’ definitions of both 
knowledge and love, was to give an account in which likeness to Christ is nigh unto 
likeness to the life of Francis, which entailed poverty and other forms of self-
abandonment.  That motivation, in turn, was mainly polemical. 
Although Bonaventure undeniably said what Augustine says in many cases, 
he manifestly did not do as Augustine did in expressing his theological and 
philosophical positions.  For this reason, I concluded that he was not a genuine 
Augustinian but one of the first and foremost proponents of an utterly distinct 
Franciscan intellectual tradition, which deserves to be appreciated in its own right.   
To throw the non-Augustinian character of Bonaventure’s thought on 
illumination into sharper relief and to reinforce the point that being an Augustinian 
means doing as Augustine did, I investigated the account of illumination and 
knowledge Aquinas offered in his Summa Theologiae.  Ironically, Aquinas rather 
than his Franciscan contemporary Bonaventure has been accused of abandoning the 
traditional Augustinian intellectual path to God by rejecting Augustinian illumination 
and Anselm’s argument in favour of an Aristotelian account of cognition.  My 
research led me to conclude that Aquinas only challenged the Franciscan 
interpretations of these arguments.  After doing so, moreover, he went on to 
   279
communicate the sense of Augustine’s arguments concerning illumination by 
formulating an account of knowledge that was informed by the traditional 
Augustinian doctrines of God and God’s image.  Though he sought to do this in the 
most relevant forms of philosophical argumentation, which were drawn from 
Aristotle and other sources, he nonetheless described the cognitive process as a 
process of illumination.   
Far from rejecting Augustine’s account of knowledge by illumination, 
Aquinas upheld it by ‘updating’ it, that is, by conveying the sense of the original 
account in new forms of words.  In the Summa Theologiae, he both articulated an 
Augustinian Trinitarian doctrine and instructed how to practically apply the doctrine 
in delineating his famous ‘five ways’, as Augustine had done with his analogies and 
Anselm with his argument.  Inasmuch as he detailed what is involved in conforming 
to God’s image and thus illumination over the course of the treatise, Aquinas 
produced a thirteenth-century counterpart to the theological-pedagogical works of 
Augustine and Anselm.  Like theirs, his work was composed for an audience of 
exceptionally erudite readers with a high level of commitment to the faith. 
By attending to the theological doctrines and motivations behind the 
philosophical decisions thirteenth-century thinkers made to adopt certain theories of 
knowledge, I found that the relationships of Bonaventure and Aquinas to Augustine 
were the reverse of what is commonly thought: Aquinas does and Bonaventure does 
not perpetuate Augustine’s theory of knowledge by illumination.  The received view 
amongst late Medieval historians which is to be contrasted with mine is that 
Augustine did not develop a precise theory of knowledge; that he did not place much 
confidence on the competence of human reason; and that Franciscans like 
Bonaventure advanced his views.  Late Medieval thinkers like Aquinas and Duns 
Scotus eventually abandoned illumination because they saw it as inferior to the 
Aristotelian theory of knowledge by abstraction, which was supposedly suited to 
producing absolutely true and certain knowledge.  
The research that was presented here on Aquinas in particular intimated that 
the theories of knowledge formulated by the historical Augustine and the historical 
Aristotle are actually highly compatible, even if both are incompatible with the 
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Avicennized reading of Augustine that was espoused by Franciscan thinkers who 
claimed to be the champions of Augustine.  One implication of this conclusion, 
incidentally, is that it tends to redraw the lines that demarcate late Medieval schools 
of thought.  Though these schools are usually identified on the basis of philosophical 
allegiances to Augustine, Aristotle, or Averroes, my arguments hinted that these 
schools should actually be determined along theological lines.  The major scholars of 
the late Medieval period were mendicant friars first and foremost who made 
decisions to use certain philosophical sources for the sake of promulgating the ideals 
they learned within their orders.   
Scholastic method was designed to enable these scholars to present new ideas 
or to give expression to old ones on the basis of trusted authorities.  This, in fact, was 
how arguments were advanced in the late Medieval university.  Given that is the 
case, it does not seem sound to assume that an authority’s views are truly being 
represented whenever they are invoked, or equally, that an authority’s views are not 
implicitly perpetuated even where he is not mentioned.  In sum, Medieval 
philosophical arguments should not be taken at face value.  Rather, the reader must 
attend to the factors that determined the meaning of those arguments, which were 
generally theological.   
A theological approach to interpreting Medieval arguments concerning 
illumination helped me identify the function the divine light performed in the thought 
of Augustine and to discern continuity of thought on the matter between Augustine, 
Anselm, and Aquinas, and discontinuity in the case of Bonaventure.  All those 
preliminary efforts finally put me in a position to identify why illumination was 
abandoned by Franciscans in the last quarter of the thirteenth century.  My criticisms 
of the two existing studies on the late Medieval decline of illumination theory arose 
as a result of the fact that neither took the study of Augustine himself as a point of 
departure, nor considered illumination in the thought of any Medieval figure from a 
theological standpoint.   
By contrast to these accounts which identify the late Medieval cause of 
illumination’s demise located in a preference for Aristotle over Augustine, I argued 
that Augustine’s illumination account was not even the one Franciscans questioned.  
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Instead, illumination as Bonaventure defined it was gradually eliminated for two 
reasons.  First, the standard of immediate knowledge Franciscan thinkers 
presupposed was incompatible with the notion that the divine light assists in 
knowing, since it seems to give recourse to the immediate vision of God.  Second, 
the interference of the divine light threatened to undermine the integrity of the 
intellect.  In the effort to remove these inconsistencies from the Franciscan 
understanding of cognition and thus promote that understanding, Duns Scotus and 
those like Olivi and Ghent that prepared the way for him carried Bonaventure’s 
assumptions concerning cognition to their logical conclusions. 
In some closing remarks about the connection between late Medieval 
Franciscan and modern thought, I acknowledged that there do seem to be affinities 
between the two.  Yet I emphasized that Franciscan ideals had and still have a proper 
context and purpose which should be recognized and appreciated.  Any detrimental 
consequences of their ideas should not be associated with the ideas themselves but 
with the removal of those ideas from their proper context.  To the extent Bonaventure 
and those that followed him began to do this in the effort to vindicate the intellectual 
pursuits of the friars minor in the eyes of colleagues, one might say that they opened 
the door for the de-contextualization of their own ideas.  Even so, they did not utilize 
their ideas or address their questions in the attitude of the modern thinker.  Their 
theological and philosophical problems were not the ones that prevail today.   
Still, the theological and philosophical problems of an epistemological nature, 
which resulted from the misuse of originally Franciscan resources remain and require 
a reckoning.  For the task of identifying and repairing those problems, the conceptual 
resources Augustine has to offer seem particularly well suited.  Those resources are 
to be found in Augustine’s directions for making good of any philosophical situation 
by managing the concerns and appropriating the ideas that predominate in it from the 
standpoint of faith.  To follow those directions in articulating a theory of knowledge 
by negation that draws on and thus converses with contemporary modes of 
philosophical thought would be to do as Augustine did when he argued that divine 
illumination is the condition of possibility of all human knowledge.  It would be to 
re-instigate the trend of composing works in the Augustinian genre of theological-
pedagogical works designed to help faithful readers cultivate a habit of directing 
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every thought to the Father, through the Son, in the Spirit, until everything that 
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